게시판  검색  자료실  사이트맵  예수와나?

[ 뒤로 ] [ ] [ 위로 ] [ 다음 ]


철학 - 지혜의 탐구

Indian Philosophy



1 Introduction

Indian philosophy, which includes both orthodox (astika) systems, namely, the Nyaya, Vaishesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-mimamsa, and Vedanta schools of philosophy, and unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Buddhism and Jainism, has been concerned with various philosophical problems. Significant among these concerns have been the nature of the world (cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of knowledge (epistemology), ethics, and religion.


2 General considerations



In relation to Western philosophical thought, Indian philosophy offers both surprising points of affinity and illuminating differences. The differences highlight certain fundamentally new questions that the Indian philosophers asked. The similarities reveal that, even when philosophers in India and the West were grappling with the same problems and sometimes even suggesting similar theories, Indian thinkers were advancing novel formulations and argumentations. Problems that the Indian philosophers raised for consideration, but that their Western counterparts never did, include such matters as the origin (utpatti) and apprehension ( jñapti) of truth (pramanya). Problems that the Indian philosophers for the most part ignored but that helped shape Western philosophy include the question of whether knowledge arises from experience or from reason and distinctions such as that between analytic and synthetic judgments or between contingent and necessary truths. Indian thought, therefore, provides the historian of Western philosophy with a point of view that may supplement that gained from Western thought. A study of Indian thought, then, reveals certain inadequacies of Western philosophical thought and makes clear that some concepts and distinctions may not be as inevitable as they may otherwise seem. In a similar manner, knowledge of Western thought gained by Indian philosophers has also been advantageous to them.

Vedic hymns, Hindu scriptures dating from the 2nd millennium BC, are the oldest extant record from India of the process by which the human mind makes its gods and of the deep psychological processes of mythmaking leading to profound cosmological concepts. The Upanisads (Hindu philosophical treatises) contain one of the first conceptions of a universal, all-pervading, spiritual reality leading to a radical monism (absolute nondualism, or the essential unity of matter and spirit). The Upanisads also contain early speculations by Indian philosophers about nature, life, mind, and the human body, not to speak of ethics and social philosophy. The classical, or orthodox, systems (darshanas) debate, sometimes with penetrating insight and often with a degree of repetition that can become tiresome to some, such matters as the status of the finite individual; the distinction as well as the relation between the body, mind, and the self; the nature of knowledge and the types of valid knowledge; the nature and origin of truth; the types of entities that may be said to exist; the relation of realism to idealism; the problem of whether universals or relations are basic; and the very important problem of moksa, or salvation--its nature and the paths leading up to it. (see also  Veda, Hinduism)




2.2.1 Common concerns.

The various Indian philosophies contain such a diversity of views, theories, and systems that it is almost impossible to single out characteristics that are common to all of them. Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas characterizes all the orthodox (astika) systems, but not the unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Carvaka (radical materialism), Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers professed allegiance to the Vedas, their allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of their speculative ventures. On the contrary, the acceptance of the authority of the Vedas was a convenient way for a philosopher's views to become acceptable to the orthodox, even if a thinker introduced a wholly new idea. Thus, the Vedas could be cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the Vaishesika thinkers (i.e., those who believe in ultimate particulars, both individual souls and atoms) as much as by the Advaita (monist) philosophers.

In most Indian philosophical systems, the acceptance of the ideal of moksa, like allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with the systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological, logical, and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely rational grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksa. Only the Vedanta ("end of the Vedas") philosophy and the Samkhya (a system that accepts a real matter and a plurality of the individual souls) philosophy may be said to have a close relationship to the ideal of moksa. The logical systems--Nyaya, Vaishesika, and Purva-mimamsa--are only very remotely related. Also, both the philosophies and other scientific treatises, including even the Kama-sutra ("Aphorisms on Love") and the Arthashastra ("Treatise on Material Gain"), recognized the same ideal and professed their efficacy for achieving it.

When Indian philosophers speak of intuitive knowledge, they are concerned with making room for it and demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logic--and there, as far as they are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers do not seek to justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the dignity of religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious.

Three basic concepts form the cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: the self, or soul (atman), works (karma, or karman), and salvation (moksa). Leaving the Carvakas aside, all Indian philosophies concern themselves with these three concepts and their interrelations, though this is not to say that they accept the objective validity of these concepts in precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma, signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the most typically Indian. The concept of atman, not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds, in a certain sense, to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit self--important differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksa as the concept of the highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of Western thought, especially during the Christian Era, though it probably has never been as important as for the Hindu mind. Most Indian philosophies assume that moksa is possible, and the "impossibility of moksa" (anirmoksa) is regarded as a material fallacy likely to vitiate a philosophical theory.

In addition to karma, the lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics, and, in the Christian Era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramanas, or ways of knowing accepted by the different schools, there is none that includes mathematical knowledge or historical knowledge. Possibly connected with their indifference toward mathematics is the significant fact that Indian philosophers have not developed formal logic. The theory of the syllogism (a valid deductive argument having two premises and a conclusion) is, however, developed, and much sophistication has been achieved in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive example of a logic of cognitions (jñanani) rather than of abstract propositions--a logic not sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it is meant to be the logic of man's actual striving to know what is true of the world. (see also  mathematics, philosophy of)


2.2.2 Forms of argument and presentation.

There is, in relation to Western thought, a striking difference in the manner in which Indian philosophical thinking is presented as well as in the mode in which it historically develops. Out of the presystematic age of the Vedic hymns and the Upanisads and many diverse philosophical ideas current in the pre-Buddhistic era, there emerged with the rise of the age of the sutras (aphoristic summaries of the main points of a system) a neat classification of systems (darshanas), a classification that was never to be contradicted and to which no further systems are added. No new school was founded, no new darshana came into existence. But this conformism, like conformism to the Vedas, did not check the rise of independent thinking, new innovations, or original insights. There is, apparently, an underlying assumption in the Indian tradition that no individual can claim to have seen the truth for the first time and, therefore, that an individual can only explicate, state, and defend in a new form a truth that had been seen, stated, and defended by countless others before him: hence the tradition of expounding one's thoughts by affiliating oneself to one of the darshanas.

If one is to be counted as a great master (acarya), one has to write a commentary (bhasya) on the sutras of the darshana concerned, or one must comment on one of the bhasyas and write a tika (subcommentary). The usual order is sutra-bhasya-varttika (collection of critical notes)-tika. At any stage, a person may introduce a new and original point of view, but at no stage can he claim originality for himself. Not even an author of the sutras could do that, for he was only systematizing the thoughts and insights of countless predecessors. The development of Indian philosophical thought has thus been able to combine, in an almost unique manner, conformity to tradition and adventure in thinking.



The role of the sacred texts in the growth of Indian philosophy is different in each of the different systems. In those systems that may be called adhyatmavidya, or sciences of spirituality, the sacred texts play a much greater role than they do in the logical systems (anviksikividya). In the case of the former, Shankara, a leading Advaita Vedanta philosopher (c. 788-820), perhaps best laid down the principles: reasoning should be allowed freedom only as long as it does not conflict with the scriptures. In matters regarding supersensible reality, reasoning left to itself cannot deliver certainty, for, according to Shankara, every thesis established by reasoning may be countered by an opposite thesis supported by equally strong, if not stronger, reasoning. The sacred scriptures, embodying as they do the results of intuitive experiences of seers, therefore, should be accepted as authoritative, and reasoning should be made subordinate to them.

Whereas the sacred texts thus continued to exercise some influence on philosophical thinking, the influence of mythology declined considerably with the rise of the systems. The myths of creation and dissolution of the universe persisted in the theistic systems but were transformed into metaphors and models. With the Nyaya (problem of knowledge)-Vaishesika (analysis of nature) systems, for example, the model of a potter making pots determined much philosophical thinking, as did that of a magician conjuring up tricks in the Advaita (nondualist) Vedanta. The nirukta (etymology) of Yaska, a 5th-century-BC Sanskrit scholar, tells of various attempts to interpret difficult Vedic mythologies: the adhidaivata (pertaining to the deities), the aitihasika (pertaining to the tradition), the adhiyajña (pertaining to the sacrifices), and the adhyatmika (pertaining to the spirit). Such interpretations apparently prevailed in the Upanisads; the myths were turned into symbols, though some of them persisted as models and metaphors. (see also  Vaisheshika)

The issue of theism vis-à-vis atheism, in the ordinary senses of the English words, played an important role in Indian thought. The ancient Indian tradition, however, classified the classical systems (darshanas) into orthodox (astika) and unorthodox (nastika). Astika does not mean "theistic," nor does nastika mean "atheistic." Panini, a 5th-century-BC grammarian, stated that the former is one who believes in a transcendent world (asti paralokah) and the latter is one who does not believe in it (nasti paralokah). Astika may also mean one who accepts the authority of the Vedas; nastika then means one who does not accept that authority. Not all among the astika philosophers, however, were theists, and even if they were, they did not all accord the same importance to the concept of God in their systems. The Samkhya system did not involve belief in the existence of God, without ceasing to be astika, and Yoga (a mental-psychological-physical meditation system) made room for God not on theoretical grounds but only on practical considerations. The Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini, the greatest philosopher of the Mimamsa school, posits various deities to account for the significance of Vedic rituals but ignores, without denying, the question of the existence of God. The Advaita Vedanta of Shankara rejects atheism in order to prove that the world had its origin in a conscious, spiritual being called Ishvara, or God, but in the long run regards the concept of Ishvara as a concept of lower order that becomes negated by a metaphysical knowledge of Brahman, the absolute, nondual reality. Only the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta and the Nyaya-Vaishesika remain zealous theists, and of these schools, the god of the Nyaya-Vaishesika school does not create the eternal atoms, universals, or individual souls. For a truly theistic conception of God, one has to look to the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta, the Vaisnava, and the Shaiva philosophical systems. Whereas Hindu religious life continues to be dominated by these last-mentioned theistic systems, the philosophies went their own ways, far removed from that religious demand.



S.N. Dasgupta, a 20th-century Indian philosopher, has divided the history of Indian philosophy into three periods: the prelogical (up to the beginning of the Christian Era), the logical (from the beginning of the Christian Era up to the 11th century AD), and the ultralogical (from the 11th century to the 18th century). What Dasgupta calls the prelogical stage covers the pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan periods (c. 321-185 BC) in Indian history. The logical period begins roughly with the Kusanas (1st-2nd centuries AD) and finds its highest development during the Gupta era (3rd-5th centuries AD) and the age of imperial Kanauj (7th century AD).


2.4.1 The prelogical period.

In its early prelogical phase, Indian thought, freshly developing in the Indian subcontinent, actively confronted and assimilated the diverse currents of pre-Aryan and non-Aryan elements in the native culture that the Aryans sought to conquer and appropriate. The marks of this confrontation are to be noted in every facet of Indian religion and thought: in the Vedic hymns in the form of conflicts, with varying fortunes, between the Aryans and the non-Aryans; in the conflict between a positive attitude toward life that is interested in making life fuller and richer and a negative attitude emphasizing asceticism and renunciation; in the great variety of skeptics, naturalists, determinists, indeterminists, accidentalists, and no-soul theorists that filled the Ganges Plain; in the rise of the heretical, unorthodox schools of Jainism and Buddhism protesting against the Vedic religion and the Upanisadic theory of atman; and in the continuing confrontation, mutually enriching and nourishing, that occurred between the Brahmanic (Hindu priestly) and Buddhist logicians, epistemologists, and dialecticians. The Aryans, however, were soon followed by a host of foreign invaders, Greeks, Shakas and Hunas from Central Asia, Pushtans (Pathans), Mongols, and Mughals (Muslims). Both religious thought and philosophical discussion received continuous challenges and confrontations. The resulting responses have a dialectical character: sometimes new ideas have been absorbed and orthodoxy has been modified; sometimes orthodoxy has been strengthened and codified in order to be preserved in the face of the dangers of such confrontation; sometimes, as in the religious life of the Christian Middle Ages, bold attempts at synthesis of ideas have been made. Nevertheless, through all the vicissitudes of social and cultural life, Brahmanical thought has been able to maintain a fairly strong current of continuity.

In the chaotic intellectual climate of the pre-Mauryan era, there were skeptics (ajñanikah) who questioned the possibility of knowledge. There were also materialists, the chief of which were the Ajivikas (deterministic ascetics) and the Lokayatas (the name by which Carvaka doctrines--denying the authority of the Vedas and the soul--are generally known). Furthermore, there existed the two unorthodox schools of yadrchhavada (accidentalists) and svabhavavada (naturalists), who rejected the supernatural. Kapila, the legendary founder of the Samkhya school, supposedly flourished during the 7th century BC. Pre-Mahavira Jaina ideas were already in existence when Mahavira (flourished 6th century BC), the founder of Jainism, initiated his reform. Gautama the Buddha (flourished 6th-5th centuries BC) apparently was familiar with all of these intellectual ideas and was as dissatisfied with them as with the Vedic orthodoxy. He sought to forge a new path--though not new in all respects--that was to assure blessedness to man. Orthodoxy, however, sought to preserve itself in a vast Kalpa- (ritual) sutra literature--with three parts: the Shrauta-, based on shruti (revelation); the Grhya-, based on smrti (tradition); and the Dharma-, or rules of religious law, sutras--whereas the philosophers tried to codify their doctrines in systematic form, leading to the rise of the philosophical sutras. Though the writing of the sutras continued over a long period, the sutras of most of the various darshanas probably were completed between the 6th and 3rd centuries BC. Two of the sutras appear to have been composed in the pre-Maurya period, but after the rise of Buddhism; these works are the Mimamsasutras of Jaimini (c. 400 BC) and the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana (c. 500-200 BC). (see also  Kalpa-sutra, Shrauta-sutra, Grhya-sutra, dharmasutra, "Mimamsa-sutra," )

The Maurya period brought, for the first time, a strong centralized state. The Greeks had been ousted, and a new self-confidence characterized the beginning of the period. This seems to have been the period in which the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana were initiated, though their composition went on through several centuries before they took the forms they now have. Manu, a legendary lawgiver, codified the Dharma-shastra; Kautilya, a minister of King Candragupta Maurya, systematized the science of political economy (Arthashastra); and Patañjali, an ancient author or authors, composed the Yoga-sutras. Brahmanism tried to adjust itself to the new communities and cultures that were admitted into its fold: new gods--or rather, old Vedic gods that had been rejuvenated--were worshipped; the Hindu trinity of Brahma (the creator), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva (the destroyer) came into being; and the Pashupata (Shaivite), Bhagavata (Vaisnavite), and the Tantra (esoteric meditative) systems were initiated. The Bhagavadgita--the most famous work of this period--symbolized the spirit of the creative synthesis of the age. A new ideal of karma as opposed to the more ancient one of renunciation was emphasized. Orthodox notions were reinterpreted and given a new symbolic meaning, as, for example, the Gita does with the notion of yajña ("sacrifice"). Already in the pre-Christian era, Buddhism had split up into several major sects, and the foundations for the rise of Mahayana ("Greater Vehicle") Buddhism had been laid. (see also  Mauryan empire, Vajrayana)


2.4.2 The logical period.

The logical period of Indian thought began with the Kusanas (1st-2nd centuries). Gautama (author of the Nyaya-sutras; probably flourished at the beginning of the Christian Era) and his 5th-century commentator Vatsyayana established the foundations of the Nyaya as a school almost exclusively preoccupied with logical and epistemological issues. The Madhyamika ("Middle Way"), or Shunyavada ("Voidist") school of Buddhism, arose and the thought of Nagarjuna (c. 200), the great propounder of Shunyavada (dialectical thinking), reached great heights. Though Buddhist logic in the strict sense of the term had not yet come into being, a logical style of philosophizing was in existence in such schools of thought.

During the reign of the Guptas, there was a revival of Brahmanism of a gentler and more refined form. Vaisnavism of the Vasudeva cult, centring on the prince-god Krishna and advocating renunciation by action, and Shaivism prospered, along with Buddhism and Jainism. Both the Mahayana and the Hinayana ("Lesser Vehicle"), or Theravada ("Way of the Elders"), schools flourished. The most notable feature, however, was the rise of the Buddhist Yogacara school, of which Asanga (4th century AD) and his brother Vasubandhu were the great pioneers. Toward the end of the 5th century, Dignaga, a Buddhist logician, wrote the Pramanasamuccaya ("Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge"), a work that laid the foundations of Buddhist logic. (see also  Gupta dynasty)

The greatest names of Indian philosophy belong to the post-Gupta period from the 7th to the 10th century. At that time Buddhism was on the decline and the Tantric cults were rising, a situation that led to the development of the tantric forms of Buddhism. Shaivism was thriving in Kashmir, and Vaisnavism in the southern part of India. The great philosophers Mimamsakas Kumarila (7th century), Prabhakara (7th-8th centuries), Mandana Mishra (8th century), Shalikanatha (9th century), and Parthasarathi Mishra (10th century) belong to this age. The greatest Indian philosopher of the period, however, was Shankara. All of these men defended Brahmanism against the "unorthodox" schools, especially against the criticisms of Buddhism. The debate between Brahmanism and Buddhism was continued, on a logical level, by philosophers of the Nyaya school--Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Mishra, and Udayana (Udayanacarya).


2.4.3 The ultralogical period.

Muslim rule in India had consolidated itself by the 11th century, by which time Buddhism, for all practical purposes, had disappeared from the country. Hinduism had absorbed Buddhist ideas and practices and reasserted itself, with the Buddha appearing in Hindu writings as an incarnation of Vishnu. The Muslim conquest created a need for orthodoxy to readjust itself to a new situation. In this period the great works on Hindu law were written. Jainism, of all the "unorthodox" schools, retained its purity, and great Jaina works, such as Devasuri's Pramananayatattvalokalamkara ("The Ornament of the Light of Truth of the Different Points of View Regarding the Means of True Knowledge," 12th century AD) and Prabhachandra's Prameyakamalamartanda ("The Sun of the Lotus of the Objects of True Knowledge," 11th century AD), were written during this period. Under the Cola (Chola) kings (c. 850-1279) and later in the Vijayanagara kingdom (which, along with Mithila in the north, remained strongholds of Hinduism until the middle of the 16th century), Vaisnavism flourished. The philosopher Yamunacarya (flourished AD 1050) taught the path of prapatti, or complete surrender to God. The philosophers Ramanuja (11th century), Madhva, and Nimbarka (c. 12th century) developed theistic systems of Vedanta and severely criticized Shankara's Advaita Vedanta. (see also  Cola dynasty)

Toward the end of the 12th century, creative work of the highest order began to take place in the fields of logic and epistemology in Mithila and Bengal. The 12th-13th-century philosopher Gangesa's Tattvacintamani ("The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things") laid the foundations of the school of Navya-Nyaya ("New-Nyaya"). Four great members of this school were Paksadhara Mishra of Mithila, Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (16th century), his disciple Raghunatha Shiromani (both of Bengal), and Gadadhara Bhattacaryya. (see also  Gangesha)

Religious life was marked by the rise of great mystic saints, chief of which are Ramananda, Kabir, Caitanya, and Guru Nanak, who emphasized the path of bhakti, or devotion, a wide sense of humanity, freedom of thought, and a sense of unity of all religions. Somewhat earlier than these were the great Muslim Sufi (mystic) saints, including Khwaja Mu'in-ud-Din Hasan, who emphasized asceticism and taught a philosophy that included both love of God and love of humanity.

The British period in Indian history was primarily a period of discovery of the ancient tradition (e.g., the two histories by Radhakrishnan, scholar and president of India from 1962 to 1967, and S.N. Dasgupta) and of comparison and synthesis of Indian philosophy with the philosophical ideas from the West. Among modern creative thinkers have been Mahatma Gandhi, who espoused new ideas in the fields of social, political, and educational philosophy; Sri Aurobindo, an exponent of a new school of Vedanta that he calls Integral Advaita; and K.C. Bhattacharyya, who developed a phenomenologically oriented philosophy of subjectivity that is conceived as freedom from object.


3 Historical development of Indian philosophy




3.1.1 Shruti and the nature of authority.

All "orthodox" philosophies can trace their basic principles back to some statement or other in the Vedas. The Vedanta schools, especially, had an affiliation with the authority of shruti, and the school of Mimamsa concerned itself chiefly with the questions of interpreting the sacred texts. The Hindu tradition regards the Vedas as being apauruseya--i.e., as not composed by any person. Sayana, a famous Vedic commentator, said that this means an absence of a human author. For Sayana, the eternality of the Vedas is like that of space and time; man does not experience their beginning or end. But they are, in fact, created by Brahma, the supreme creator. For the Advaita Vedanta, because no author of the Vedas is mentioned, an unbroken chain of Vedic teachers is quite conceivable, so that the scriptures bear testimony to their own eternality. The authoritative character of shruti may then be deduced from the fact that it is free from any fault (dosa), or limitation, which characterizes human words. Furthermore, the Vedas give knowledge about things--whether dharma (what ought to be done) or Brahman (the absolute reality)--which cannot be known by any other empirical means of knowledge. The authority of the Vedas cannot, therefore, be contradicted by any empirical evidence. Later logicians of the "orthodox" schools sought to give these arguments precision and logical rigour.

The Vedic hymns (mantras) seem to be addressed to gods and goddesses (deva, one who gives knowledge or light), who are personifications of natural forces and phenomena (Agni, the fire god; Indra, the rain god; Vayu, the wind god). But there are gods not identifiable with such phenomena (e.g., Aditi, the infinite mother of all gods; Mitra, the friend; Varuna, the guardian of truth and righteousness; Vishvakarman, the all-maker; shraddha, faith). Also, the hymns show an awareness of the unity of these deities, of the fact that it is one God who is called by different names. The famed conception of rta--meaning at once natural law, cosmic order, moral law, and the law of truth--made the transition to a monistic view of the universe as being but a manifestation of one reality about which the later hymns continue to raise fundamental questions in a poignant manner, without, however, suggesting any dogmatic answer.


3.1.2 Development of the notion of transmigration.

The hymns may, in general, be said to express a positive attitude toward human life and to show interest in the full enjoyment of life here and hereafter rather than an anxiety to escape from it. The idea of transmigration and the conception of the different paths and worlds traversed by good men and those who are not good--i.e., the world of Vishnu and the realm of Yama--are found in the Vedas. The chain of rebirth as a product of ignorance and the conception of release from this chain as the greatest good of the spiritual life are markedly absent in the hymns.


3.1.3 Origin of the concept of Brahman and atman.

The Upanisads answer the question "Who is that one Being?" by establishing the equation Brahman = atman. Brahman--meaning now that which is the greatest, than which there is nothing greater, and also that which bursts forth into the manifested world, the one Being of which the hymn of creation spoke--is viewed as nothing but atman, identifiable as the innermost self in man but also, in reality, the innermost self in all beings. Both the words gain a new, extended, and spiritual significance through this identification. Atman was originally used to mean breath, the vital essence, and even the body. Later etymologizing brought out several strands in its meaning: that which pervades (yad apnoti), that which gives (yadadatte), that which eats (yad atti), and that which constantly accompanies (yacca asya santato bhavam). Distinctions were made between the bodily self, the vital self, the thinking self, and the innermost self, whose nature is bliss (ananda), the earlier ones being sheaths (koshas) covering the innermost being. Distinctions were sometimes drawn between the waking ( jagrat), dreaming (svapna), and dreamless-sleep (susupti) states of the self, and these three are contrasted with the fourth, or transcendent (turiya), state that both transcends and includes them all. The identification of the absolute reality underlying the universe with the innermost being within the human person resulted in a spiritualization of the former concept and a universalization of the latter. This final conception of Brahman or atman received many different explications from different teachers in the Upanisads, some of which were negative in character (neti neti, "not this, not this") while others positively affirmed the all-pervasiveness of Brahman. But there were still others who insisted on both the transcendence and immanence of Brahman in the universe. Brahman is also characterized as infinite, truth, and knowledge and as existence, consciousness, and bliss.


3.1.4 The principles underlying macrocosm and microcosm.

Though the objective and the subjective, the macrocosm (universal) and the microcosm (individual), came to be identified according to their true essences, attempts were made to correlate different macrocosmic principles with corresponding microcosmic principles. The manifested cosmos was correlated with the bodily self; the soul of the world, or Hiranyagarbha, with the vital self; and Ishvara, or God as a self-conscious being, with the thinking self. The transcendent self and the Brahman as bliss are not correlates but rather are identical.




3.2.1 Background.

Buddhism was not a completely new phenomenon in the religious history of India; it was built upon the basis of ideas that were already current, both Brahmanic and non-Aryan. Protests against the Brahmanic doctrines of atman, karma, and moksa were being voiced in the 6th century BC, prior to the Buddha, by various schools of thought: by naturalists, such as Purana ("The Old One") Kassapa, who denied both virtue and vice (dharma and adharma) and thus all moral efficacy of human deeds; by determinists, such as the Ajivika Makkhali Gosala, who denied sin and freedom of will; and by materialists, such as Ajita Keshakambalin, who, besides denying virtue, vice, and afterlife, resolved man's being into material elements, Nigantha Nataputta, who believed in salvation by an ascetic life of self-discipline and hence in the efficacy of deeds and the possibility of omniscience, and, finally, Sanjaya Belathiputta, the skeptic, who, in reply to the question "Is there an afterlife?" would not say "It is so" or "It is otherwise," nor would he say "It is not so" or "It is not not so."

Of these six, the Jaina tradition identifies Nigantha with Mahavira; the designation "Ajivika" is applied, in a narrow sense, to the followers of Makkhali and in a loose sense to all nonorthodox sects other than the Jainas--the skeptics and the Lokayatas.

Buddhism, Jainism, and the Ajivikas rejected, in common, the sacrificial polytheism of the Brahmanas and the monistic mysticism of the Upanisads. All three of them recognized the rule of natural law in the universe. Buddhism, however, retained the Vedic notions of karma and moksa, though rejecting the other fundamental concept of atman.


3.2.2 The four noble truths and the nature of suffering.

In such an intellectual climate Gautama the Buddha taught his four noble truths: (1) duhkha (generally but misleadingly translated as "suffering"); (2) the origination of duhkha (duhkhasamudaya); (3) the cessation of duhkha; and finally (4) the way leading to the cessation.

Although the word duhkha in common parlance means suffering, its use by Gautama was meant to include both pleasure and pain, both happiness and suffering. There are three aspects of this conception: duhkha as suffering in the ordinary sense; duhkha arising out of the impermanence of things, even of a state of pleasure; and duhkha in the sense of five aggregates meaning that the "I" constituted by any individual is nothing but a totality of five aggregates--i.e., form, feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness. In brief, whatever is noneternal--i.e., whatever is subject to the law of causality--is characterized by duhkha; for Gautama, this is the human situation. One who recognizes the nature of duhkha also knows its causes. Duhkha arises out of craving (trsna), craving arises out of sensation (vedana), and sensation arises out of contact (sparsha), so that man is faced with a series of conditions leading back to ignorance (avidya)--a series in which the rise of each succeeding member depends upon the preceding one (pratityasamutpada).


3.2.3 The path of liberation: methods of eightfold path.

The four noble truths follow the golden mean between the two extremes of sensual indulgence and ascetic self-torture, both of which Gautama rejected as spiritually useless. Only the middle path consisting in the eight steps--called the eightfold path--leads to enlightenment and to Nirvana. The eight steps are (1) right views, (2) right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration. Of these eight, steps 3, 4, and 5 are grouped under right morality (shila); steps 6, 7, and 8 under right concentration (samadhi); and steps 1 and 2 under right wisdom (prajña).


3.2.4 The concepts of selflessness and Nirvana.

Two key notions, even in early Buddhism, are those of anatman (Sanskrit: "no-self"; Pali anatta) and Nirvana. The Buddha apparently wanted his famed doctrine of anatman to be a phenomenological account of how things are rather than a theory. In his discourse to the wandering monk Vacchagotta, he rejected the theories of both eternalism (shashvatavada) and annihilationism (ucchedavada). The former, he stated, would be incompatible with his thesis that all laws ( dharmas; Pali dhammas) are selfless (sabbe dhamma anatta); the latter would be significant only if one had a self that is no more in existence. Thus, by not taking sides with the metaphysicians, the Buddha described how the consciousness "I am" comes to constitute itself in the stream of consciousness out of the five aggregates of form, feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness. The doctrine of "no-self" actually has two aspects: as applied to pudgala, or the individual person, and as applied to the dhammas, or the elements of being. In its former aspect, it asserts the fact that an individual is constituted out of five aggregates; in its latter aspect it means the utter insubstantiality of all elements. Intuitive realization of the former truth leads to the disappearance of passions and desires, realization of the latter removes all misconceptions about the nature of things in general. The former removes the "covering of the passions" (kleshavarana); the latter removes "the concealment of things" ( jñeyavarana). Together, they result in Nirvana.

Both negative and positive accounts of Nirvana are to be found in the Buddha's teachings and in early Buddhist writings. Nirvana is a state of utter extinction, not of existence, but of passions and suffering; it is a state beyond the chain of causation, a state of freedom and spontaneity. It is in addition a state of bliss. Nirvana is not the result of a process; were it so, it would be but another perishing state. It is the truth--not, however, an eternal, everlasting substance like the atman of the Upanisads, but the truth of utter selflessness and insubstantiality of things, of the emptiness of the ego, and of the impermanence of all things. With the realization of this truth, ignorance is destroyed, and, consequently, all craving, suffering, and hatred is destroyed with it (see also the article BUDDHISM ).



The great epic Mahabharata represents the attempt of Vedic Brahmanism to adjust itself to the new circumstances reflected in the process of the aryanization (integration of Aryan beliefs, practices, and institutions) of the various non-Aryan communities. Many diverse trends of religious and philosophical thought have thus been synthesized in this work (see also HINDUISM ).


3.3.1 "Moksadharma." Proto-Samkhyan texts.

In its philosophical views, the epic contains an early version of Samkhya (a belief in real matter and the plurality of individual souls), which is prior to the classical Samkhya of Ishvarakrsna, a 3rd-century philosopher. The chapter on "Moksadharma" in Book 12 of the Mahabharata is full of such proto- Samkhya texts. Mention is made of four main philosophical schools: Samkhya-Yoga, taught by Kapila (a sage living before the 6th century BC); Pañcaratra, taught by Vishnu; the Vedas; and Pashupata ("Lord of Creatures"), taught by Shiva. Belonging to the Pañcaratra school, the epic basically attempts to accommodate certain presystematic Samkhya ideas into the Bhagavata faith. Samkhya and Yoga are sometimes put together, sometimes distinguished. Several different schemata of the 25 principles (tattvas) of the Samkhya are recorded. One common arrangement is that of eight productive forms of prakrti (the unmanifest, intellect, egoism, and five fine elements: sound, smell, form or colour, taste, and touch) and 16 modifications (five organs of perception, five organs of action, mind, and five gross elements: ether, earth, fire, water, and air), and purusa (man). An un-Samkhyan element is the 26th principle: Ishvara, or the supreme Lord. One notable result is the identification of the four living forms (vyuhas) of the Pañcaratra school with four Samkhya principles: Vasudeva with spirit, Samkarsana with individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with the ego-sense. Non-Samkhyan texts.

Besides the Samkhya-Yoga, which is in the foreground of the epic's philosophical portions, there are Vedanta texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts emphasizing not only a personal deity but also the doctrine of avatar (avatara), or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult characterizes the theistic part of the epic. Early theories of kingship and state.

In the Shanti Parvan ("Book of Consolation," 12th book) of the Mahabharata, there is also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma, or the dharma (law) of the king as king. Bhisma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior period in which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a time characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the strong; the other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter account contains a theory of the fall of mankind from this ideal state, which led to a need for institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account leads directly from the insecurity of the prekingship era to the installation of king by the divine ruler for the protection and the security of mankind. Kingship is thus recognized as having a historical origin. The primary function of the king is that of protection, and dandaniti, or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma, or dharma of the king. Though it recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the dharma, the moral law, superior to the king.


3.3.2 The "Bhagavadgita."

The Bhagavadgita ("Divine Song" or "Song of the Lord") forms a part of Mahabharata and deserves separate consideration by virtue of its great importance in the religious life and thought of the Hindus. Not itself a shruti, it has, however, been accorded the status of an authoritative text and is regarded as one of the sources of the Vedanta philosophy. At a theoretical level, it brings together Samkhya metaphysics, Upanisadic monism, and a devotional theism of the Krishna-Vasudeva cult. In its practical teaching, it steers a middle course between the "path of action" of the Vedic ritualism and the "path of renunciation" of the Upanisadic mysticism, and it accommodates all the three major "paths" to moksa: the paths of action (karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge ( jñana). This synthetic character of the work accounts for its great hold on the Hindu mind. The Hindu tradition treats it as one homogenous work, with the status of an Upanisad.

Neither performance of the duties prescribed in the scriptures nor renunciation of all action is conducive to the attainment of moksa. If the goal is freedom, then the best path to the goal is to perform one's duties with a spirit of nonattachment without caring for the fruits of one's actions and without the thought of pleasure or pain, profit or loss, or victory or failure, with a sense of equanimity and equality. The Kantian ethic of "duty for duty's sake" seems to be the nearest Western parallel to Krishna's (Kr{subdot}sna's) teaching at this stage. But Krishna soon went beyond it, by pointing out that performance of action with complete nonattachment requires knowledge ( jñana) of the true nature of the self, its distinction from prakrti, or Matter (the primeval stuff, not the world of matter perceived by the senses), with its three component elements (sattva--i.e., tension or harmony; rajas--i.e., activity; and tamas--i.e., inertia), and of the highest self (purusottama), whose higher and lower aspects are Matter and finite individuals, respectively. This knowledge of the highest self or the supreme lord, however, would only require a devotional attitude of complete self-surrender and performance of one's duties in the spirit of offering to him. Thus, karma-yoga (yoga of works) is made to depend on jñana-yoga (yoga of knowledge), and the latter is shown to lead to bhakti-yoga (yoga of devotion). Instead of looking upon Krishna's teaching as laying down alternative ways for different persons in accordance with their aptitudes, it would seem more logical to suppose that he taught the essential unity and interdependence of these ways. How one should begin is left to one's aptitude and spiritual makeup.



In the Tipitaka (Pali: "The Three Baskets"; Sanskrit Tripitaka), collected and compiled 300 years after the Buddha's mahaparinirvana (attainment of Buddhahood), at the council at Pataliputra (3rd century BC), both the canonical and philosophical doctrines of early Buddhism were codified. Abhidamma pitaka, the last of the pitakas, has seven parts: Dhammasangani, which gives an enumeration of dhammas, or elements of existence; Vibhanga, which gives further analysis of the dhammas; Dhatukatha, which is a detailed classification, following many different principles, of the elements; Puggalapaatti, which gives descriptions of individual persons according to stages of their development; Kathavatthu, which contains discussions and refutation of other schools (of Buddhism); Yamaka, which derives its name from the fact that it deals with pairs of questions; and Patthana, which gives an analysis of relations among the elements. (see also  "Abhidhamma Pitaka," )

The key notion in all this is that of the dhammas. Because Buddhist philosophers denied any permanence, whether in outer nature or in inner life, they felt compelled to undertake a detailed, systematic, and complete listing and classification of the different elements that constitute both the external world and the mental, inner life. Each of these elements, except for the three elements that are not composed of parts (i.e., space, or akasha, and the two cessations, Nirvana and a temporary stoppage, in states of meditation, of the flow of passions, or apratisamkhyanivodha), is momentary. The primary object of this exhaustive analysis was an understanding not so much of outer nature as of the human person (pudgala). The human person, however, consists in material (rupa) and mental (nama) factors, which led to an account of the various elements of matter. The primary interest, nevertheless, is in man, who is regarded as an aggregate of various elements. The analysis of these components, together with the underlying denial of an eternal self, was supposed to provide the theoretical basis for the possibility of a good life conducive to the attainment of Nirvana.

The individual person was analyzed into five aggregates (skandhas): material form (rupa); feeling (vedana); conception (samjña); disposition (samskara); and consciousness (vijñana). Of these, the last four constitute the mental; the first alone is the material factor. The material is further analyzed into 28 states, the samskara into 50 (falling into three groups: intellectual, affectional, and volitional), and the vijñana into 89 kinds of states of consciousness. Another principle of classification leads to a list of 18 elements (dhatus): five sense organs, five objects of those senses, mind, the specific object of mind, and six kinds of consciousness (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, and purely mental). A third classification is into 12 bases (ayatanas), which is a list of six cognitive faculties and their objects. The Buddhist analysis of matter was in terms of sensations and sense data, to which the sense organs were also added. The analysis of mind was also in terms of corresponding modes of consciousness and their objects.




3.5.1 The history of the sutra style.

A unique feature of the development of Indian thought was the systematization of each school of thought in the form of sutras, or extremely concise expressions, intended to reduce the doctrines of a science or of a philosophy into a number of memorizable aphorisms, formulas, or rules. The word sutra, originally meaning "thread," came to mean such concise expressions. A larger work containing such sutras also came to be called a sutra. The aid of commentaries becomes indispensable for the understanding of the sutras, and it is not surprising that philosophical composition took the form of commentaries and subcommentaries. The earliest sutras, the Kalpa-sutras, however, are not philosophical but ritualistic. These Kalpa-sutras fell into three major parts: the Shrauta-sutras, dealing with Vedic sacrifices; the Grhya-sutras, dealing with the ideal life of a householder; and the Dharma-sutras, dealing with moral injunctions and prohibitions.

In the works of Panini, a Hindu grammarian, the sutra style reached a perfection never attained before and only imperfectly approximated by the later practitioners. The sutra literature began before the rise of Buddhism, though the philosophical sutras all seem to have been composed afterward. The Buddhist sutta (Pali form of the Sanskrit word sutra) differs markedly in style and content from the Hindu sutra. The suttas are rather didactic texts, discourses, or sermons, possibly deriving their name from the sense in which they carry the thread of the tradition of the Buddha's teachings.


3.5.2 The "Purva-mimamsa-sutras" and Shabara's commentary.

The Purva-mimamsa ("First Reflection"), or Karmamimamsa ("Study of [Ritual] Action"), is the system that investigates the nature of Vedic injunctions. Though this is the primary purpose of the system, this task also led to the development of principles of scriptural interpretation and, therefore, to theories of meaning and hermeneutics (critical interpretations). Jaimini, who composed sutras about the 4th century BC, was critical of earlier Mimamsa authors, particularly of one Badari, to whom is attributed the view that the Vedic injunctions are meant to be obeyed without the expectation of benefits for oneself. According to Jaimini, Vedic injunctions do not merely prescribe actions but also recommend these actions as means to the attainment of desirable goals. For both Jaimini and Shabara (3rd century), his chief commentator, performance of the Vedic sacrifices is conducive to the attainment of heaven; both emphasize that nothing is a duty unless it is instrumental to happiness in the long run.

Jaimini's central concern is dharma, which is defined as the desired object (artha), whose desirability is testified only by the injunctive statements of the scriptures (codana-laksano). In order to substantiate the implied thesis that what ought to be done--i.e., dharma--cannot be decided by either perception or reasoning, Jaimini proceeds to a discussion of the nature of ways of knowing. Because perceptual knowledge arises from contact of the sense organs with reality that is present, dharma that is not an existent reality but a future course of action cannot possibly be known by sense-experience. Reasoning based on such sense-experience is for the same reason useless. Only injunctive statements can state what ought to be done. Commands made by finite individuals are not reliable, because the validity of what they say depends upon the presumption that the persons concerned are free from those defects that render one's words dependable. Therefore, only the injunctions contained in the scriptures--which, according to Mimamsa and the Hindu tradition, are not composed by any finite individual (apauruseya)--are the sources of all valid knowledge of dharma. The Mimamsa rejects the belief that the scriptures are utterances of God. The words themselves are authoritative. In accordance with this thesis, Jaimini developed the theory that the relation between words and their meanings is natural (autpattikastu shabdasyarthena sambandhah, or "the relation of word to its meaning is eternal") and not conventional, that the primary meaning of a word is a universal (which is also eternal), that in a sentence the principal element is the verb, and that the principal force of the verb is that which specifically belongs to the verb with an optative ending and which instigates a person to take a certain course of action in order to effect the desired end.

Though this theory provided the Mimamsa with a psychological and semantic technique for interpreting the sentences of the scriptures that are clearly in the injunctive form, there are also other kinds of sentences: prayers, glorifications, those referring to a thing by a name, and prohibitions. Attempts were therefore made to show how each one of these types of sentences bears, directly or indirectly, on the central, injunctive texts. Furthermore, a systematic classification of the various forms of injunctions is undertaken: those that indicate the general nature of an action, those that show the connection of a subsidiary rite to the main course of action, those that suggest promptness in performance of the action, and those that indicate the right to enjoy the results to be produced by the course of action enjoined.

The commentary of Shabara elaborated on the epistemological themes of the sutras; in particular, Shabara sought to establish the intrinsic validity of experiences and traced the possibility of error to the presence of defects in the ways of knowing. He also critically examined Buddhist subjective idealism and the theory of utter emptiness of things and proved the existence of soul as a separate entity that enjoys the results of one's actions in this or the next life.


3.5.3 The "Vedanta-sutras." Relation to the "Mimamsa-sutras."

Along with Badari and Jaimini, Badarayana, a contemporary of Jaimini, was the other major interpreter of Vedic thought. Just as the Mimamsa-sutra traditions of Badari's tradition were revived by Prabhakara, a 7th-8th-century scholar, and Jaimini's defended by Shabara and Kumarila, a 7th-8th-century scholar, Badarayana's sutras laid the basis for the development of Vedanta philosophy. The relation of the Vedanta-sutras to the Mimamsa-sutras, however, is difficult to ascertain. Badarayana approves of the Mimamsa view that the relation between words and their significations is eternal. There are, however, clear statements of difference: according to Jaimini, for example, the dispenser of the "fruits" of one's actions is dharma, the law of righteousness itself, but for Badarayana it is the supreme lord, Ishvara. Often, Jaimini's interpretation is contrasted with that of Badari; in such cases, Badarayana sometimes supports Badari's view and sometimes regards both as defensible.

The overall difference that emerges is that whereas Jaimini lays stress on the ritualistic parts of the Vedas, Badarayana lays stress on the philosophical portions--i.e., the Upanisads. The former recommends the path of Vedic injunctions, hence the ideal of karma; the latter recommends the path of knowledge. The central concept of Jaimini's investigation is dharma--i.e., what ought to be done; the central theme of Badarayana's investigations is Brahman--i.e., the absolute reality. The relationship between these two treatises remains a matter of controversy between later commentators--Ramanuja, a great South Indian philosopher of the 11th-12th centuries, defending the thesis that they jointly constitute a single work with Jaimini's coming first and Badarayana's coming after it in logical order, and Shankara, an earlier great South Indian philosopher of the 8th-9th centuries, in favour of the view that the two are independent of each other and possibly also inconsistent in their central theses. Contents and organization of the four books.

Badarayana's sutras have four books (adhyayas), each book having four chapters (padas). The first book is concerned with the theme of samanvaya ("reconciliation"). The many conflicting statements of the scriptures are all said to agree in converging on one central theme: the concept of Brahman, the one absolute being from whom all beings arise, in whom they are maintained, and into whom they return. The second book establishes avirodha ("consistency") by showing the following: (1) that dualism and Vaishesika atomism are neither sustainable interpretations of the scriptures nor defensible rationally; (2) that though consciousness cannot conceivably arise out of a nonconscious nature, the material world could arise out of spirit; (3) that the effect in its essence is not different from the cause; and (4) that though Brahman is all-perfect and has no want, creation is an entirely unmotivated free act of delight (lila). The Buddhist (Vijñanavada) view that there are no external objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted, as also the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all that is. The Jaina pluralism and the theism of the Pashupatas and the Bhagavatas are also rejected. Because, according to Vedanta, only Brahman is external, the third and the fourth chapters of the second book undertake to show that nothing else is eternal. The third book concerns the spiritual discipline and the various stages by which the finite individual ( jiva) may realize his essential identity with Brahman. The fourth and last book deals with the final result of the modes of discipline outlined in the preceding book and distinguishes between the results achieved by worshipping a personal Godhead and those achieved by knowing the one Brahman. Included is some discussion of the possible "worlds" through which the spirits travel after death, but all this discussion is subordinate to the one dominant goal of liberation and consequent escape from the chain of rebirth. Variations in views.

Badarayana's sutras refer to interpreters of Vedanta before him who were concerned with such central issues as the relation between the finite individual ( jiva) and the absolute spirit (Brahman) and the possible bodily existence of a liberated individual. To Ashmarthya, an early Vedanta interpreter, is ascribed the view that the finite individual and the absolute are both identical and different (as causes and their effects are different--a view that seems to have been the ancestor of the later theory of Bhedabheda). Audulomi, another pre-Badarayana Vedanta philosopher, is said to have held the view that the finite individual becomes identical with Brahman after going through a process of purification. Another interpreter, Kashakrtsna, holds that the two are identical--a view that anticipates the later "unqualified monism" of Shankara. Badarayana's own views on this issue are difficult to ascertain: the sutras are so concise that they are capable of various interpretations, though there are reasons to believe that Ramanuja's is closer to their intentions than Shankara's.


3.5.4 The "Samkhya-karikas." Relation to orthodoxy.

Ishvarakrsna's Samkhya-karika (or "Verses on Samkhya," c. 2nd century AD) is the oldest available Samkhya work. Ishvarakrsna describes himself as laying down the essential teachings of Kapila as taught to Asuri and by Asuri to Pañcashikha. He refers also to Sastitantra ("Doctrine of 60 Conceptions"), the main doctrines of which he claims to have expounded in the karikas. The Samkhya of Caraka, which is substantially the same as is attributed to Pañcashikha in the Mahabharata, is theistic and regards the unmanifested (avyakta) as being the same as the purusa (the self). The Mahabharata refers to three kinds of Samkhya doctrines: those that accept 24, 25, or 26 principles, the last of which are theistic. The later Samkhya-sutra is more sympathetic toward theism, but the karikas are atheistic, and the traditional expositions of the Samkhya are based on this work. The nature of the self (purusa).

According to the karikas, there are many selves, each being of the nature of pure consciousness. The self is neither the original matter (prakrti) nor an evolute of it. Though matter is composed of the three gunas (qualities), the self is not; though matter, being nonintelligent, cannot discriminate, the self is discriminating; though matter is object (visaya), the self is not; though matter is common, the self is an individual (asamanya); unlike matter, the self is not creative (aprasavadharmin). The existence of selves is proved on the ground that nature exhibits an ordered arrangement the like of which is known to be meant for another (pararthatva). This other must be a conscious spirit. That there are many such selves is proved on the grounds that different persons are born and die at different times, that they do not always act simultaneously, and that they show different qualities, aptitudes, and propensities. All selves are, however, passive witnesses (saksin), essentially alone (kevala), neutral (madhyastha), and not agents (akarta). (see also  purusha) The nature, origin, and structure of the world (prakrti).

Phenomenal nature, with its distinctions of things and persons (taken as psychophysical organisms), is regarded as an evolution out of a primitive state of matter. This conception is based on a theory of causality known as the satkaryavada, according to which an effect is implicitly pre-existent in its cause prior to its production. This latter doctrine is established on the ground that if the effect were not already existent in its cause, then something would have to come out of nothing. The original prakrti (primeval stuff) is the primary matrix out of which all differentiations arose and within which they all were contained in an undistinguished manner. Original Matter is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, one, independent, self-complete, and has no distinguishable parts; the things that emerge out of this primitive matrix are, on the other hand, caused, noneternal, limited, many, dependent, wholes composed of parts, and manifested. But Matter, whether in its original unmanifested state or in its manifested forms, is composed of three gunas, nondiscriminating (avivekin), object (visaya), general, nonconscious, and yet creative.

The order in which Matter evolves is laid down as follows: prakrti mahat or buddhi (Intelligence) ahamkara (ego-sense) manas (mind) five tanmatras (the sense data: colour, sound, smell, touch, and taste) five sense organs five organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and of reproduction) five gross elements (ether, air, light, water, and earth). This emanation schema may be understood either as an account of cosmic evolution or as a logical-transcendental analysis of the various factors involved in experience or as an analysis of the concrete human personality. The concept of the three qualities (gunas).

A striking feature of this account is the conception of guna: nature is said to consist of three gunas--originally in a state of equilibrium and subsequently in varying states of mutual preponderance. The karikas do not say much about whether the gunas are to be regarded as qualities or as component elements. Of the three, harmony or tension (sattva) is light (laghu), is pleasing, and is capable of manifesting others. Activity (rajas) is dynamic, exciting, and capable of hurting. Inertia (tamas) is characterized by heaviness, conceals, is static, and causes sadness. Man's varying psychological responses are thus hypostatized and made into component properties or elements of nature--an argument whose fallacy was exposed, among others, by Shankara. Epistemology.

The Samkhya-karika delineates three ways of knowing (pramana): perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the application of the sense organs to their respective objects (prativisayadhyavasaya). Inference, which is not defined, is divided first into three kinds, and then into two. According to the former classification, an inference is called purvavat if it is based on past experience (such as when one, on seeing a dark cloud, infers that it will rain); it is called shesavat when from the presence of a certain property in one part of a thing the presence of the same property is inferred in the rest (such as when, on finding a drop of sea water to be saline, one infers the rest to be so); it is called samanyato-drsta when it is used to infer what is not perceivable (such as when one infers the movement of a star on seeing it occupy two different positions in the firmament at different times). According to the other classification, an inference may be either from the mark to that of which it is the mark or in the reverse direction. Verbal testimony, in order to be valid, must be the word of one who has authoritative knowledge.

There is, in addition to the three ways of knowing, consideration of the modes of functioning of the sense organs. The outer senses apprehend only the present objects, the inner senses (manas, antahkarana, and buddhi) have the ability to apprehend all objects--past, present, and future. The sense organs, on apprehending their objects, are said to offer them to buddhi, or intelligence, which both makes judgments and enjoys the objects of the senses. Buddhi is also credited with the ability to perceive the distinction between the self and the natural components of the person. Ethics.

In its ethics, the karikas manifest an intellectualism that is characteristic of the Samkhya system. Suffering is due to ignorance of the true nature of the self, and freedom, the highest good, can be reached through knowledge of the distinction between the self and nature. In this state of freedom, the self becomes indifferent to nature; it ceases to be an agent and an enjoyer. It becomes what it in fact is, a pure witness consciousness.


3.5.5 The "Yoga-sutras." Relation to Samkhya.

The Yoga-sutras of Patañjali (2nd century BC) are the earliest extant textbook on Yoga. Scholars now generally agree that the author of the Yoga-sutras is not the grammarian Patañjali. In any case, the Yoga-sutras stand in close relation to the Samkhya system, so much so that tradition regards the two systems as one. Yoga adds a 26th principle to the Samkhya list of 25--i.e., the supreme lord, or Ishvara--and has thus earned the name of Seshvara-Samkhya, or theistic Samkhya. Furthermore, there is a difference in their attitudes: Samkhya is intellectualistic and emphasizes metaphysical knowledge as the means to liberation; Yoga is voluntaristic and emphasizes the need of going through severe self-control as the means of realizing intuitively the same principles. God, self, and body.

In the Yoga-sutras, God is defined as a distinct self (purusa), untouched by sufferings, actions, and their effects; his existence is proved on the ground that the degrees of knowledge found in finite beings, in an ascending order, has an upper limit--i.e., omniscience, which is what characterizes God. He is said to be the source of all secular and scriptural traditions; he both revealed the Vedas and taught the first fathers of mankind. Surrender of the effects of action to God is regarded as a recommended observance.

As in Samkhya, the self is distinguished from the mind (citta): the mind is viewed as an object, an aggregate. This argument is used to prove the existence of a self other than the mind. The mental state is not self-intimating; it is known in introspection. It cannot know both itself and its object. It rather is known by the self, whose essence is pure, undefiled consciousness. That the self is not changeable is proved by the fact that were it changeable the mental states would be sometimes known and sometimes unknown--which, however, is not the case, because a mental state is always known. To say that the self knows means that the self is reflected in the mental state and makes the latter manifested. The aim of Yoga is to arrest mental modifications (citta-vrtti) so that the self remains in its true, undefiled essence and is, thus, not subject to suffering.

The attitude of the Yoga-sutras to the human body is ambivalent. The body is said to be filthy and unclean. Thus, the ascetic cultivates a disgust for it. Yet, much of the discipline laid down in the Yoga-sutras concerns perfection of the body, with the intent to make it a fit instrument for spiritual perfection. Steadiness in bodily posture and control of the breathing process are accorded a high place. The perfection of body is said to consist in "beauty, grace, strength and adamantine hardness." Theories and techniques of self-control and meditation.

Patañjali lays down an eightfold path consisting of aids to Yoga: restraint (yama), observance (niyama), posture (asana), regulation of breathing (pranayama), abstraction of the senses (pratyahara), concentration (dharana), meditation (dhyana), and trance (samadhi). The first two constitute the ethical core of the discipline: the restraints are abstinence from injury, veracity, abstinence from stealing, continence, and abstinence from greed. The observances are cleanliness, contentment, purificatory actions, study, and surrender of the fruits of one's actions to God. Ahimsa (nonviolence) also is glorified, as an ethics of detachment.

Various stages of samadhi are distinguished: the conscious and the superconscious, which are subdivided into achievements with different shades of perfection. In the final stage, all mental modifications cease to be and the self is left in its pure, undefiled state of utter isolation. This is freedom (kaivalya), or absolute independence.


3.5.6 The "Vaishesika-sutras."

The Vaishesika-sutras were written by Kanada, a philosopher who flourished c. 2nd-4th centuries. The system owes its name to the fact that it admits ultimate particularities (vishesa). The metaphysics is, therefore, pluralistic. (see also  Vaisheshika) Organization and contents.

The Vaishesika-sutras are divided into ten chapters, each with two sections. Chapter 1 states the purpose of the work: to explain dharma, defined as that which confers prosperity and ultimate good on man. This is followed by an enumeration of the categories of being recognized in the system: substance, quality (guna), action, universality, particularity, and inherence (samavaya). Later authors add a seventh category: negation (abhava). This enumeration is followed by an account of the common features as well as dissimilarities among these categories: the categories of "universal" and "particularity" and the concepts of being and existence. Chapter 2 classifies substances into nine kinds: earth, water, fire, air, ether, space, time, self, and mind. There next follows a discussion of the question of whether sound is eternal or noneternal. Chapter 3 is an attempt to prove the existence of self by an inference. Chapter 4 explains the words "eternal" and "noneternal," the noneternal being identified with avidya, and distinguishes between three different forms of the substances earth, water, fire, and air--each of these is either a body, a sense organ, or an object. Chapter 5 deals with the notion of action and the connected concept of effort, and the next traces various special phenomena of nature to the supersensible force, called adrsta. Chapter 6 argues that performance of Vedic injunctions generates this supersensible force and that the merits and demerits accumulated lead to moksa. Chapter 7 argues that qualities of eternal things are eternal and those of noneternal things are noneternal. Chapter 8 argues that the self and mind are not perceptible. Chapter 9 argues that neither action nor qualities may be ascribed to what is nonexistent and, further, that negation may be directly perceived. Chapter 9 also deals with the nature of hetu, or the "middle term" in syllogism, and argues that the knowledge derived from hearing words is not inferential. Chapter 10 argues that pleasure and pain are not cognitions because they do not leave room for either doubt or certainty. Structure of the world.

This account of the contents of the sutras shows that the Vaishesika advocates an atomistic cosmology (theory of order) and a pluralistic ontology (theory of being). The material universe arises out of the conjunction of four kinds of atoms: the earth atom, water atom, fire atom, and air atom. There also are the eternal substances: ether, in which sound inheres as a quality; space, which accounts for man's sense of direction and distinctions between far and near; and time, which accounts for the notions of simultaneity and nonsimultaneity and which, like space, is eternal and is the general cause of all that has origin. Naturalism.

The overall naturalism of the Vaishesika, its great interest in physics, and its atomism are all counterbalanced by the appeal to adrsta (a supersensible force), to account for whatever the other recognized entities cannot explain. Among things ascribed to this supersensible force are movements of needles toward a magnet, circulation of water in plant bodies, upward motion of fire, movement of mind, and movements of soul after death. These limit the naturalism of the system. Epistemology.

Knowledge belongs to the self; it appears or disappears with the contact of the self with the senses and of the senses with the objects. Perception of the self results from the conjunction of the self with the mind. Perception of objects results from proximity of the self, the senses, and the objects. Error exists because of defects of the senses. Inference is of three kinds: inference of the nonexistence of something from the existence of some other things, inference of the existence of something from nonexistence of some other, and inference of existence of something from the existence of some other thing. Ethics.

Moksa is a state in which there is no body and no rebirth. It is achieved by knowledge. Works in accordance with the Vedic injunction may help in its attainment.


3.5.7 The "Nyaya-sutras."

The Nyaya-sutras probably were composed by Gautama or Aksapada about the 2nd century BC, though there is ample evidence that many sutras were subsequently interpolated. (see also  Nyaya) Content and organization.

The sutras are divided into five chapters, each with two sections. The work begins with a statement of the subject matter, purpose, and relation of the subject matter to the attainment of that purpose. The ultimate purpose is salvation--i.e., complete freedom from pain--and salvation is attained by knowledge of the 16 categories: hence the concern with these categories, which are means of valid knowledge (pramana); objects of valid knowledge (prameya); doubt (samshaya); purpose (prayojana); example (drstanta); conclusion (siddhanta); the constituents of a syllogism (avayava); argumentation (tarka); ascertainment (nirnaya); debate (vada); disputations ( jalpa); destructive criticism (vitanda); fallacy (hetvabhasa); quibble (chala); refutations ( jati); and points of the opponent's defeat (nigrahasthana). Epistemology.

The words "knowledge," buddhi, and "consciousness" are used synonymously. Four means of valid knowledge are admitted: perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with the object, which is nonjudgmental, or unerring or judgmental. Inference is defined as the knowledge that is preceded by perception (of the mark) and classified into three kinds: that from the perception of a cause to its effect; that from perception of the effect to its cause; and that in which knowledge of one thing is derived from the perception of another with which it is commonly seen together. Comparison is defined as the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well-known.

The validity of the means of knowing is established as against Buddhist skepticism, the main argument being that if no means of knowledge is valid then the demonstration of their invalidity cannot itself claim validity. Perception is shown to be irreducible to inference, inference is shown to yield certain knowledge, and errors in inference are viewed as being faults in the person, not in the method itself. Knowledge derived from verbal testimony is viewed as noninferential. Theory of causation and metaphysics.

Although the sutras do not explicitly develop a detailed theory of causation, the later Nyaya theory is sufficiently delineated in Chapter 4. No event is uncaused. No positive entity could arise out of mere absence--a thesis that is pressed against what seems to be a Buddhist view that in a series of momentary events every member is caused by the destruction of the preceding member. Cause and effect should be homogeneous in nature, and yet the effect is a new beginning and was not already contained in the cause. The Buddhist thesis that all things are negative in nature (inasmuch as a thing's nature is constituted by its differences from others) is rejected, as is the view that all things are eternal or that all things are noneternal. Both these latter views are untrue to experience. Thus, the resulting metaphysics admits two kinds of entities: eternal and noneternal. The whole is a new entity over and above the parts that constitute it. Also, the idea that God is the material cause of the universe is rejected. God is viewed as the efficient cause, and human deeds produce their results under the control and cooperation of God. The syllogism and its predecessors.

Of the four main topics of the Nyaya-sutras (art of debate, means of valid knowledge, syllogism, and examination of opposed views) there is a long history. There is no direct evidence for the theory that though inference (anumana) is of Indian origin, the syllogism (avayava) is of Greek origin. Vatsayana, the commentator on the sutras, referred to some logicians who held a theory of a ten-membered syllogism (the Greeks had three). The Vaishesika-sutras give five propositions as constituting a syllogism but give them different names. Gautama also supports a five-membered syllogism with the following structure:

1. This hill is fiery (pratijña: a statement of that which is to be proved).

2. Because it is smoky (hetu: statement of reason).

3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, as is a kitchen (udaharana: statement of a general rule supported by an example).

4. So is this hill (upanaya: application of the rule of this case).

5. Therefore this hill is fiery (nigamana: drawing the conclusion).

The characteristic feature of the Nyaya syllogism is its insistence on the example--which suggests that the Nyaya logician wanted to be assured not only of formal validity but also of material truth. Five kinds of fallacious "middle" (hetu) are distinguished: the inconclusive (savyabhicara), which leads to more conclusions than one; the contradictory (viruddha), which opposes that which is to be established; the controversial (prakaranasama), which provokes the very question that it is meant to settle; the counterquestioned (sadhyasama), which itself is unproved; and the mistimed (kalatita), which is adduced "when the time in which it might hold good does not apply." (see also  middle term) Other characteristic philosophic matters.

Other philosophical theses stated in the sutras are as follows: the relation of words to their meanings is not natural but conventional; a word means neither the bare individual nor the universal by itself but all three--the individual, the universal, and structure (akrti); desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the marks of the self; body is defined as the locus of gestures, senses, and sentiments; and the existence and atomicity of mind are inferred from the fact that there do not arise in the self more acts of knowledge than one at a time.


3.5.8 The beginnings of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. Contributions of the Mahasangikas.

When the Mahasangikas ("School of the Great Assembly") seceded from the Elders (Theravadins) about 400 BC, the germs were laid for the rise of the Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahasangikas admitted non-arhat monks and worshippers (i.e., those who had not attained perfection), defied the Buddha, taught the doctrine of the emptiness of the elements of being, distinguished between the mundane and the supramundane reality, and considered consciousness (vijñana) to be intrinsically free from all impurities. These ideas found varied expression among the various groups into which the Mahasangikas later divided (see also BUDDHISM ). Contributions of the Sarvastivadins.

The Sarvastivadins ("realists" who believe that all things, mental and material, exist or also that all dharmas--past, present, and future--exist) seceded from the Elders about the middle of the 3rd century BC. They rejected, in common with all other sects, pudgalatma, or a self of the individual, but admitted dharmatman--i.e., self-existence of the dharmas (categories), or the elements of being. Each dharma is a self-being; the law of causality applies to the formation of aggregates, not to the elements themselves. Dharmas, whether they are past or are in future, exist all the same. Of these, three are said to be unconditioned: space (akasha) and the two cessations (nirodha)--the cessation that arises from knowledge and the cessation that arises prior to the attainment of knowledge, the former being Nirvana, the latter being an arrest of the flow of passions through meditation prior to the achievement of Nirvana. By shunyata the Sarvastivadins mean only the truth that there is no eternal substance called "I." Because all elements--past, present, or future--exist, the Sarvastivadins are obliged to account for these temporal predicates, and several different theories are advanced. Of these, the theory advanced by Vasumitra, a 1st-2nd-century-AD Sarvastivadin, viz., that temporal predicates are determined by the function of a dharma, is accepted by the Vaibhasikas--i.e., those among the Sarvastivadins who follow the authority of the texts known as the Vibhasa. Contributions of the Sautrantikas.

The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be inconsistent with the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Sautrantikas (so-called because they rest their case on the sutras) insist on the noneternality of the dharma as well. The past and the future dharmas do not exist, and only the present ones do. The so-called unconditioned dharmas are mere absences, not positive entities. Thus, the Sautrantikas seem to be the only major school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvana as entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the Vaibhasikas are direct realists, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of representationism, according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.


3.5.9 The worldview of the "Arthashastra."

Kautilya's Arthashastra (c. 321-296 BC) is the science of artha, or material prosperity, which is one of the four goals of human life. By artha, Kautilya meant "the means of subsistence of man," which is, primarily, wealth and, secondarily, earth. The work is concerned with the means of fruitfully maintaining and using the latter--i.e., land. It is a work on politics and diplomacy. Theories of kingship and statecraft.

Though Kautilya recognized that sovereignty may belong to a clan (kula), he was himself concerned with monarchies. He advocated the idea of the king's divine nature, or divine sanction of the king's office, but he also attempted to reconcile it with a theory of the elective origin of the king. He referred to a state of nature, without king, as an anarchy in which the stronger devours the weaker. The four functions of the king are to acquire what is not gained, to protect what is gained, to increase what is protected, and to bestow the surplus upon the deserving. The political organization is held to have seven elements: the king, the minister, the territory, the fort, the treasury, the army, and the ally. These are viewed as being organically related. The three "powers" of the king are power of good counsel, the majesty of the king himself, and the power to inspire. The priest is not made an element of the state organization. The king, however, is not exempt from the laws of dharma. Being the "promulgator of dharma," the king should himself be free from the six passions of sex, anger, greed, vanity, haughtiness, and overjoy. What Kautilya advocated was an enlightened monarchical paternalism. Concepts of the public good.

In the happiness of the subjects lies the king's happiness. The main task of the king is to offer protection. Monarchy is viewed as the only guarantee against anarchy. Thus, the king's duty is to avert providential visitations such as famine, flood, and pestilence; he ought also to protect agriculture, industry, and mining, the orphan, the aged, the sick, and the poor, to control crime with the help of spies, and to settle legal disputes. Relations between states.

Regarding relations with other states, Kautilya's thoughts were based not so much on high moral idealism as on the needs of self-interest. He wrote of six types of foreign policy: treaty (sandhi), war (vigraha), marching against the enemy (yana), neutrality (asana), seeking protection from a powerful king (samshraya), and dual policy (dvaidhibhava). The rules concerning these are: he who is losing strength in comparison to the other shall make peace; he who is gaining strength shall make war; he who thinks neither he nor the enemy can win shall be neutral; he who has an excess of advantage shall march; he who is wanting in strength shall seek protection; he who undertakes work requiring assistance shall adopt a dual policy. The formation and implementation of policy.

Kautilya's views about the formation and implementation of policy were as follows: a treaty based on truth and oath is binding for temporal and spiritual consequences; a treaty based on security is binding only as long as the party is strong. He who inflicts severe punishments becomes oppressive; he who inflicts mild punishments is overpowered; and he who inflicts just punishments is respected. Kautilya advocated an elaborate system of espionage for domestic as well as foreign affairs.


3.5.10 Fragments from the Ajivikas and the Carvakas. The Ajivikas.

About the time of the rise of Buddhism, there was a sect of religious mendicants, the Ajivikas, who held unorthodox views. In the strict sense, this name is applied to the followers of one Makkhali Gosala, but in a wide sense it is also applied to those who taught many different shades of heretical teachings. Primary sources of knowledge about these are the Digha Nikaya, Anguttara Nikaya, Samyutta Nikaya, the Sutrakrtanga-sutra, Shilanka's commentary on the Sutrakrtanga-sutra, the Bhagavati-sutra, the Nandi-sutra, and Abhayadeva's commentary on Samavayanga-sutra. (see also  Ajivika)

Makkhali's views may be thus summarized. There is no cause of the depravity of things; they become depraved without any reason or cause. There is also no cause of the purity of beings; they become pure without any reason or cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others. All things are destitute of power, force, or energy. Their changing states are due to destiny, environment, and their own nature. Thus, Makkhali denies sin, or dharma, and denies freedom of man in shaping his own future. He is thus a determinist, although scholars have held the view that he might leave room for chance, if not for freedom of will. He is supposed to have held an atomistic cosmology and that all beings, in the course of time, are destined to culminate in a state of final salvation. He believes not only in rebirth but also in a special doctrine of reanimation according to which it is possible for one person's soul to be reanimated in the dead bodies of others. Thus, the Ajivikas are far from being materialists. (see also  free will) The Carvakas.

Another pre-Buddhistic system of philosophy, the Carvaka, or the Lokayata, is one of the earliest materialistic schools of philosophy.The name Carvaka is traced back to one Carvaka, supposed to have been one of the great teachers of the school. The other name, Lokayata, means "the view held by the common people," "the system which has its base in the common, profane world," "the art of sophistry," and also "the philosophy that denies that there is any world other than this one." Brhaspati probably was the founder of this school. Much knowledge of the Carvakas, however, is derived from the expositions of the later Hindu writings, particularly from Madhava's Sarva-darshana-samgraha ("Compendium of All Philosophies," 14th century). Haribhadra in his Saddarshanasamuccaya ("Compendium of the Six Philosophies," 5th century AD) attributes to the Carvakas the view that this world extends only to the limits of possible sense experience.

The Carvakas apparently sought to establish their materialism on an epistemological basis. In their epistemology, they viewed sense perception alone as a means of valid knowledge. The validity of inferential knowledge was challenged on the ground that all inference requires a universal major premise ("All that possesses smoke possesses fire") whereas there is no means of arriving at a certainty about such a proposition. No amount of finite observations could possibly yield the required universal premise. The supposed "invariable connection" may be vitiated by some unknown "condition," and there is no means of knowing that such a vitiating factor does not exist. Since inference is not a means of valid knowledge, all such supersensible objects as "afterlife," "destiny," or "soul" do not exist. To say that such entities exist though there is no means of knowing them is regarded as absurd, for no unverifiable assertion of existence is meaningful.

The authority of the scriptures also is denied. First, knowledge based on verbal testimony is inferential and therefore vitiated by all the defects of inference. The Carvakas regard the scriptures as characterized by the three faults: falsity, self-contradiction, and tautology. On the basis of such a theory of knowledge, the Carvakas defended a complete reductive materialism according to which the four elements of earth, water, fire, and air are the only original components of being and all other forms are products of their composition. Consciousness thus is viewed as a product of the material structure of the body and characterizes the body itself--rather than a soul--and perishes with the body. In their ethics, the Carvakas upheld a hedonistic theory according to which enjoyment of the maximum amount of sensual pleasure here in this life and avoidance of pain that is likely to accompany such enjoyment are the only two goals that men ought to pursue. (see also  hedonism)




3.6.1 Developments in Mahayana. Nagarjuna and Shunyavada.

Though the beginnings of Mahayana are to be found in the Mahasangikas and many of their early sects, Nagarjuna gave it a philosophical basis. Not only is the individual person empty and lacking an eternal self, according to Nagarjuna, but the dharmas also are empty. He extended the concept of shunyata to cover all concepts and all entities. "Emptiness" thus means subjection to the law of causality or "dependent origination" and lack of an immutable essence and an invariant mark (nihsvabhavata). It also entails a repudiation of dualities between the conditioned and the unconditioned, between subject and object, relative and absolute, and between samsara and Nirvana. Thus, Nagarjuna arrived at an ontological monism; but he carried through an epistemological dualism (i.e., a theory of knowledge based on two sets of criteria) between two orders of truth: the conventional (samvrtti) and the transcendental (paramartha). The one reality is ineffable. Nagarjuna undertook a critical examination of all the major categories with which philosophers had sought to understand reality and showed them all to involve self-contradictions. The world is viewed as a network of relations, but relations are unintelligible. If two terms, A and B, are related by the relation R, then either A and B are different or they are identical. If they are identical, they cannot be related; if they are altogether different then they cannot also be related, for they would have no common ground. The notion of "partial identity and partial difference" is also rejected as unintelligible. The notion of causality is rejected on the basis of similar reasonings. The concepts of change, substance, self, knowledge, and universals do not fare any better. Nagarjuna also directed criticism against the concept of pramana, or the means of valid knowledge.

Nagarjuna's philosophy is also called Madhyamika, because it claims to tread the middle path, which consists not in synthesizing opposed views such as "The real is permanent" and "The real is changing" but in showing the hollowness of both the claims. To say that reality is both permanent and changing is to make another metaphysical assertion, another viewpoint, whose opposite is "Reality is neither permanent nor changing." In relation to the former, the latter is a higher truth, but the latter is still a point of view, a drsti, expressed in a metaphysical statement, though Nagarjuna condemned all metaphysical statements as false.

Nagarjuna used reason to condemn reason. Those of his disciples who continued to limit the use of logic to this negative and indirect method, known as prasanga, are called the prasangikas: of these, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, and Candrakirti are the most important. Bhavaviveka, however, followed the method of direct reasoning and thus founded what is called the svatantra (independent) school of Madhyamika philosophy. With him Buddhist logic comes to its own, and during his time the Yogacaras split away from the Shunyavadins. Contributions of Vasubandhu and Asanga.

Converted by his brother Asanga to the Yogacara, Vasubandhu wrote the Vijñapti-matrata-siddhi ("Establishment of the Thesis of Cognitions--Only"), in which he defended the thesis that the supposedly external objects are merely mental conceptions. Yogacara idealism is a logical development of Sautrantika representationism: the conception of a merely inferred external world is not satisfying. If consciousness is self-intimating (svaprakasha) and if consciousness can assume forms (sakaravijñana), it seems more logical to hold that the forms ascribed to alleged external objects are really forms of consciousness. One only needs another conception: a beginningless power that would account for this tendency of consciousness to take up forms and to externalize them. This is the power of kalpana, or imagination. Yogacara added two other modes of consciousness to the traditional six: ego consciousness (manovijñana) and storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijñana). The alaya-vijñana contains stored traces of past experiences, both pure and defiled seeds. Early anticipations of the notions of the subconscious or the unconscious, they are theoretical constructs to account for the order of individual experience. It still remained, however, to account for a common world--which in fact remains the main difficulty of Yogacara. The state of Nirvana becomes a state in which the alaya with its stored "seeds" would wither away (alayaparavrtti). Though the individual ideas are in the last resort mere imaginations, in its essential nature consciousness is without distinctions of subject and object. This ineffable consciousness is the "suchness" (tathata) underlying all things. Neither the alaya nor the tathata, however, is to be construed as being substantial.

Vasubandhu and Asanga are also responsible for the growth of Buddhist logic. Vasubandhu defined "perception" as the knowledge that is caused by the object, but this was rejected by Dignaga, a 5th-century logician, as a definition belonging to his earlier realistic phase. Vasubandhu defined "inference" as a knowledge of an object through its mark, but Dharmottara, an 8th-century commentator pointed out that this is not a definition of the essence of inference but only of its origin. Contributions of Dignaga and Dharmakirti.

Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya ("Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge") is one of the greatest works on Buddhist logic. Dignaga gave a new definition of "perception": a knowledge that is free from all conceptual constructions, including name and class concepts. In effect, he regarded only the pure sensation as perception. In his theory of inference, he distinguished between inference for oneself and inference for the other and laid down three criteria of a valid middle term (hetu), viz., that it should "cover" the minor premise (paksa), be present in the similar instances (sapaksa), and be absent in dissimilar instances (vipaksa). In his Hetucakra ("The Wheel of 'Reason"'), Dignaga set up a matrix of nine types of middle terms, of which two yield valid conclusions, two contradictory, and the rest uncertain conclusions. Dignaga's tradition is further developed in the 7th century by Dharmakirti, who modified his definition of perception to include the condition "unerring" and distinguished, in his Nyayabindu, between four kinds of perception: that by the five senses, that by the mind, self-consciousness, and perception of the yogins. He also introduced a threefold distinction of valid middle terms: the middle must be related to the major either by identity ("This is a tree, because this is an oak") or as cause and effect ("This is fiery, because it is smoky"), or the hetu is a nonperception from which the absence of the major could be inferred. Dharmakirti consolidated the central epistemological thesis of the Buddhists that perception and inference have their own exclusive objects. The object of the former is the pure particular (svalaksana), and the object of the latter (he regarded judgments as containing elements of inference) is the universal (samanyalaksana). In their metaphysical positions, Dignaga and Dharmakirti represent a moderate form of idealism.


3.6.2 Purva-mimamsa: the Bhatta and Prabhakara schools. Principal texts and relation to Shabara.

Kumarila commented on Jaimini's sutra as well as on Shabara's bhasya. The Varttika (critical gloss) that he wrote was commented upon by Sucarita Mishra in his Kashika ("The Shining"), by Someshvara Bhatta in his Nyayasudha ("The Nectar of Logic"), and Parthasarathi Mishra in Nyayaratnakara ("The Abode of Jewels of Logic"). Parthasarathi's Shastradipika ("Light on the Scripture") is a famous independent Mimamsa treatise belonging to Kumarila's school. (see also  Prabhakara)

Prabhakara, who most likely lived after Kumarila, was the author of the commentary Brhati ("The Large Commentary"), on Shabara's bhasya. On many essential matters, Prabhakara differs radically from the views of Kumarila. Prabhakara's Brhati has been commented upon by Shalikanatha in his Rjuvimala ("The Straight and Free from Blemishes"), whereas the same author's Prakaranapañcika ("Commentary of Five Topics") is a very useful exposition of the Prabhakara system. Other works belonging to this school are Madhava's Jaiminiya-nyayamala-vistara ("Expansion of the String of Reasonings by Jaimini"). Appaya Diksita's Vidhirasayana ("The Elixir of Duty"), Apadeva's Mimamsa-nyaya-prakasha (Illumination of the Reasonings of Mimamsa) and Laugaksi Bhaskara's Artha-samgraha ("Collection of Treasures").

Where Kumarila and Prabhakara differed, Kumarila remained closer to both Jaimini and Shabara. Kumarila, like Jaimini and Shabara, restricted Mimamsa to an investigation into dharma, whereas Prabhakara assigned to it the wider task of enquiring into the meaning of the Vedic texts. Kumarila understood the Vedic injunction to include a statement of the results to be attained; Prabhakara--following Badari--excluded all consideration of the result from the injunction itself and suggested that the sense of duty alone should instigate a person to act. Metaphysics and epistemology.

Both the Bhatta (the name for Kumarila's school) and the Prabhakara schools, in their metaphysics, were realists; both undertook to refute Buddhist idealism and nihilism. The Bhatta ontology recognized five types of entities: substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), universals (samanya), and negation (abhava). Of these, substance was held to be of ten kinds: the nine substances recognized by the Vaishesikas and the additional substance "darkness." The Prabhakara ontology recognized eight types of entities; from the Bhatta list, negation was rejected, and four more were added: power (shakti), resemblance (sadrsa), inherence-relation (samavaya), and number (samkhya). Under the type "substance," the claim of "darkness" was rejected on the ground that it is nothing but absence of perception of colour; the resulting list of nine substances is the same as that of the Vaishesikas. Though both the schools admitted the reality of the universals, their views on this point differed considerably. The Prabhakaras admitted only such universals as inhere in perceptible instances and insisted that true universals themselves must be perceivable. Thus, they rejected abstract universals, such as "existence," and merely postulated universals, such as "Brahminhood" (which cannot be perceptually recognized in a person). (see also  category)

The epistemologies of the two schools differ as much as their ontologies. As ways of valid knowing, the Bhattas recognized perception, inference, verbal testimony (shabda), comparison (upamana), postulation (arthapatti), and nonperception (anupalabdhi). The last is regarded as the way men validly, and directly, apprehend an absence: this was in conformity with Shabara's statement that abhava (nonexistence) itself is a pramana (way of true knowledge). Postulation is viewed as the sort of process by which one may come to know for certain the truth of a certain proposition, and yet the Bhattas refused to include such cases under inference on the grounds that in such cases one does not say to himself "I am inferring" but rather says "I am postulating." "Comparison" is the name given to the perception of resemblance with a perceived thing of another thing that is not present at that moment. It is supposed that because the latter thing is not itself being perceived, the resemblance belonging to it could not have been perceived; thus, it is not a case of perception when one says "My cow at home is similar to this animal."

The Prabhakaras rejected nonperception as a way of knowing and were left with a list of five concerning definitions of perception. The Bhattas, following the sutra, define perception in terms of sensory contact with the object, whereas the Prabhakaras define it in terms of immediacy of the apprehension. Ethics.

As pointed out earlier, Kumarila supported the thesis that all moral injunctions are meant to bring about a desired benefit and that knowledge of such benefit and of the efficacy of the recommended course of action to bring it about is necessary for instigating a person to act. Prabhakara defended the ethical theory of duty for its own sake, the sense of duty alone being the proper incentive. The Bhattas recognize apurva (supersensible efficacy of actions to produce remote effects) as a supersensible link connecting the moral action performed in this life and the supersensible effect (such as going to heaven) to be realized afterward. Prabhakara understood by apurva only the action that ought to be done. Hermeneutics and semantics.

In their principles of interpretation of the scriptures, and consequently in their theories of meaning (of words and of sentences), the two schools differ radically. Prabhakara defended the thesis that words primarily mean either some course of action (karya) or things connected with action. Connected with this is the further Prabhakara thesis that the sentence forms the unit of meaningful discourse, that a word is never used by itself to express a single unrelated idea, and that a sentence signifies a relational complex that is not a mere juxtaposition of word meanings. Prabhakara's theory of language learning follows these contentions: the child learns the meanings of sentences by observing the elders issuing orders like "Bring the cow" and the juniors obeying them, and he learns the meaning of words subsequently by a close observation of the insertion (avapa) and extraction (uddhara) of words in sentences and the resulting variations in the meaning of those sentences. From this semantic approach follows Prabhakara's principle of Vedic interpretation: all Vedic texts are to be interpreted as bearing on courses of action prescribed, and there are no merely descriptive statements in the scriptures. Furthermore, only the Vedic injunctions yield the authoritative verbal testimony that may be regarded as a unique way of knowing, whereas all other verbal knowledge is really inferential in character. In matters concerning what ought to be done, Prabhakara therefore regarded only the Vedas as authoritative. (see also  language acquisition)

Kumarila's theory is very different. In his view, words convey their own meanings, not relatedness to something else. He therefore was more willing to accommodate purely descriptive sentences as significant. Furthermore, he regarded sentence meaning as composed of separate word meanings held together in a relational structure; the word meaning formed,for him, the simplest unit of sense. Persons thus learn the meaning of words by seeing others talking as well as from advice of the elders. Religious consequences.

The Mimamsa views the universe as being eternal and does not admit the need of tracing it back to a creator. It also does not admit the need of admitting a being who is to distribute moral rewards and inflict punishments--this function being taken over by the notion of apurva, or supersensible power generated by each action. Theoretically not requiring a God, the system, however, posits a number of deities as entailed by various ritualistic procedures, with no ontological status assigned to the gods.


3.6.3 The linguistic philosophies: Bhartrhari and Mandana-Mishra.

The linguistic philosophers considered here are the grammarians led by Bhartrhari (7th century AD) and Mandana-Mishra (8th century AD); the latter, reputed to be a disciple of Kumarila, held views widely different from the Mimamsakas. The grammarians share with the Mimamsakas their interest in the problems of language and meaning. But their own theories are so different that they cut at the roots of the Mimamsa realism. The chief text of this school is Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya. Mandana's chief works are Brahma-siddhi ("Establishment of Brahman"), Sphota-siddhi ("Establishment of Word Essence"), and Vidhiviveka ("Inquiry into the Nature of Injunctions").

As his first principle, Bhartrhari rejects a doctrine on which the realism of Mimamsa and Nyaya had been built--the view that there is a kind of perception that is nonconceptualized and that places persons in direct contract with things as they are. For Bhartrhari this is not possible, for all knowledge is "penetrated" by words and "illuminated" by words. Thus, all knowledge is linguistic, and the distinctions of objects are traceable to distinctions among words. The metaphysical monism of word (shabdadvaita) is not far from this--i.e., the view that the one word essence appears as this world of "names and forms" because of man's imaginative construction (kalpana). Metaphysically, Bhartrhari comes close both to Shankara's Advaita and the Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmakirti. This metaphysical theory also uses the doctrine of sphota ("that from which the meaning bursts forth"). Most Indian philosophical schools were concerned with the problem of what precisely is the bearer of the meaning of a word or a sentence. If the letters are evanescent and if, as one hears the sounds produced by the letters of a word, each sound is replaced by another, one never comes to perceive the word as a whole, and the question is how one grasps the meaning of the word. The same problem could be stated with regard to a sentence. The Mimamsakas postulated an eternity of sounds and distinguished between the eternal sounds and sound complexes (words, sentences) from their manifestations. The grammarians, instead, distinguished between the word and sound and made the word itself the bearer of meaning. As bearer of meaning, the word is the sphota.

Sounds have spatial and temporal relations; they are produced differently by different speakers. But the word as meaning bearer has to be regarded as having no size or temporal dimension. It is indivisible and eternal. Distinguished from the sphota are the abstract sound pattern (prakrtadhvani) and the utterances (vikrtadhvani). Furthermore, Bhartrhari held that the sentence is not a collection of words or an ordered series of them. A word is rather an abstraction from a sentence; thus, the sentence-sphota is the primary unit of meaning. A word is also grasped as a unity by an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha). This theory of sphota, which is itself a linguistic theory required by the problems arising from the theory of meaning, was employed by the grammarians to support their theory of word monism.

Mandana-Mishra, in his Vidhiviveka, referred to three varieties of this monism: shabdapratyasavada (the doctrine of superimposition on the word; also called shabdadhyasavada), shabda-parinamavada (the doctrine of transformation of the word), and shabdavivartavada (the doctrine of unreal appearance of the word). According to the first two, the phenomenal world is still real, though either falsely superimposed on words or a genuine transformation of the word essence. The last, and perhaps most consistent, doctrine holds that the phenomenal distinctions are unreal appearances of an immutable word essence.

Mandana attempted to integrate this linguistic philosophy into his own form of advaitavada, though later followers of Sankara did not accept the doctrine of sphota. Even Vacaspati, who accepted many of Mandana's theories, rejected the theory of sphota and in general conformed to the Shankarite's acceptance of the Bhatta epistemology.


3.6.4 Nyaya-Vaishesika. The old school.

Although as early as the commentators Prashastapada (5th century AD) and Uddyotakara (7th century AD) the authors of the Nyaya-Vaisesika schools used each other's doctrines and the fusion of the two schools was well on its way, the two schools continued to have different authors and lines of commentators. About the 10th century AD, however, there arose a number of texts that sought to combine the two philosophies more successfully. Well known among these syncretist texts are the following: Bhasarvajña's Nyayasara ("The Essence of Nyaya"; written c. 950), Varadaraja's Tarkikaraksa ("In Defense of the Logician"; c. 1150), Vallabha's Nyayalilavati ("The Charm of Nyaya"; 12th century), Keshava Mishra's Tarkabhasa ("The Language of Reasoning"; c. 1275), Annam Bhatta's Tarkasamgraha ("Compendium of Logic"; c. 1623), and Vishvanatha's Bhasapariccheda ("Determination of the Meaning of the Verses"; 1634). (see also  Vaisheshika)

Both the Nyaya-Vaishesika schools are realistic with regard to things, properties, relations, and universals. Both schools are pluralistic (also with regard to individual selves) and theistic. Both schools admit external relations (the relation of inherence being only partly internal), atomistic cosmology, new production, and the concept of existence (satta) as the most comprehensive universal. Both schools regard knowledge as a quality of the self, and they subscribe to a correspondence theory regarding the nature of truth and a theory of pragmatism-cum-coherence regarding the test of truth. The points that divide the schools are rather unimportant: they concern, for example, their theories of number, and some doctrines in their physical and chemical theories.

Gautama's sutras were commented upon about AD 400 by Vatsayana, who replied to the Buddhist doctrines, especially to some varieties of Shunyavada skepticism. Uddyotakara's Varttika (c. 635) was written after a period during which major Buddhist works, but no major Hindu work, on logic were written. Uddyotakara undertook to refute Nagarjuna and Dignaga. He criticized and refuted Dignaga's theory of perception, the Buddhist denial of soul, and the anyapoha (exclusion of the other) theory of meaning. Positively, he introduced, for the first time, the doctrine of six modes of contact (samnikarsa) of the senses with their objects, which has remained a part of Nyaya-Vaishesika epistemology. He divided inferences into those whose major premise (sadhya) is universally present, those in which one has to depend only upon the rule "Wherever there is absence of the major, there is absence of the middle (hetu)," and those in which both the positive and the negative rules are at one's disposal. He rejected the sphota theory and argued that the meaning of a word is apprehended by hearing the last letter of the word together with recollection of the preceding ones. Vacaspati Mishra in the 9th century wrote his Tatparyatika (c. 840) on Uddyotakara's Varttika and further strengthened the Nyaya viewpoint against the Buddhists. He divided perception into two kinds: the indeterminate, nonlinguistic, and nonjudgmental and the determinate and judgmental. In defining the invariable connection (vyapti) between the middle and the major premises, he introduced the concept of a vitiating condition (upadhi) and stressed that the required sort of connection, if an inference is to be valid, should be unconditional. He also proposed a modified version of the theory of the extrinsic validity of knowledge by holding that inferences as well as knowledges that are the last verifiers (phalajñana) are self-validating.

Prashastapada's Vaishesika commentary (c. 5th century) does not closely follow the sutras but is rather an independent explanation. Prashastapada added seven more qualities to Kanada's list: heaviness (gurutva), fluidity (dravatva), viscidity (sneha), traces (samskara), virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), and sound. The last quality was regarded by Kanada merely as a mark of ether, whereas Prashastapada elevated it to a defining quality of the latter. He also made the Vaishesika fully theistic by introducing doctrines of creation and dissolution.

The Nyaya-Vaishesika general metaphysical standpoint allows for both particulars and universals, both change and permanence. There are ultimate differences as well as a hierarchy of universals, the highest universal being existence. Substance is defined as the substrate of qualities and in terms of what alone can be an inherent cause. A quality may be defined as what is neither substance nor action and yet is the substratum of universals (for universals are supposed to inhere only in substances, qualities, and actions). Universal is defined as that which is eternal and inheres in many. Ultimate particularities belong to eternal substances, such as atoms and souls, and these account for all differences among particulars that cannot be accounted for otherwise. Inherence (samavaya) is the relation that is maintained between a universal and its instances, a substance and its qualities or actions, a whole and its parts, and an eternal substance and its particularity. This relation is such that one of the relations cannot exist without the other (e.g., a whole cannot exist without the parts). Negation (abhava), the seventh category, is initially classified into difference ("A is not B") and absence ("A is not in B"), absence being further divided into absence of a thing before its origin, its absence after its destruction, and its absence in places other than where it is present. For these schools, all that is is knowable and also nameable.

Knowledge is regarded as a distinguishing but not essential property of a self. It arises when the appropriate conditions are present. Consciousness is defined as a manifestation of object but is not itself self-manifesting; it is known by an act of inner perception (anuvyavasaya). Knowledge either is memory or is not; knowledge other than memory is either true or false; and knowledge that is not true is either doubt or error. In its theory of error, these philosophers maintained an uncompromising realism by holding that the object of error is still real but is only not here and now. True knowledge (prama) apprehends its object as it is; false knowledge apprehends the object as what it is not. True knowledge is either perception, inference, or knowledge derived from verbal testimony or comparison. Perception is defined as knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with their objects, and is viewed as either indeterminate and nonlinguistic or as determinate and judgmental. Both aspects of the definition of perception are viewed as valid--a point that is made against both the Buddhists and the grammarians. Furthermore, perception is either ordinary (laukika) or extraordinary (alaukika). The former takes place through any of the six modes of sense-object contact recognized in the system. The latter takes place when one perceives the proper object of one sense through another sense ("The cushion looks soft") or when, on recognizing universal in a particular, one perceives all instances of the universal as its instances. Also extraordinary are the perceptions of the yogins, who are supposed to be free from the ordinary spatiotemporal limitations.

Four conditions must be satisfied in order that a combination of words may form a meaningful sentence: a word should generate an intention or expectancy for the words to follow ("Bring"--"What?"--"A jar"); there should be mutual fitness ("Sprinkle"--"With what?"--"Water, not fire"); there should be proximity in space and time; and the proper intention of the speaker must be ascertained, otherwise there would be equivocation.

Among theistic proofs offered in the system, the most important are the causal argument ("The world is produced by an agent, since it is an effect, as is a jar"); the argument from a world order to a lawgiver; and the moral argument from the law of karma to a moral governor. Besides adducing these and other arguments, Udayana in his Nyaya-kusumañjali stressed the point that the nonexistence of God could not be proved by means of valid knowledge. The new school.

The founder of the school of Navya-(New) Nyaya, with an exclusive emphasis on the pramanas, was Gangesha Upadhyaya (13th century), whose Tattvacintamani ("The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things") is the basic text for all later developments. The logicians of this school were primarily interested in defining their terms and concepts and for this purpose developed an elaborate technical vocabulary and logical apparatus that came to be used by, other than philosophers, writers on law, poetics, aesthetics, and ritualistic liturgy. The school may broadly be divided into two subschools: the Mithila school represented by Vardhamana (Gangesha's son), Paksadhara or Jayadeva (author of Aloka gloss), and Shankara Mishra (author of Upaskara); and the Navadvipa school, whose chief representatives were Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (1450-1525), Raghunatha Shiromani (c. 1475-c. 1550), Mathuranatha Tarkavagisha (fl. c. 1570), Jagadisha Tarkalankara (fl. c. 1625), and Gadadhara Bhattacarya (fl. c. 1650). (see also  Navya-Nyaya)

By means of a new technique of analyzing knowledge, judgmental knowledge can be analyzed into three kinds of epistemological entities in their interrelations: "qualifiers" (prakara); "qualificandum," or that which must be qualified (vishesya); and "relatedness" (samsarga). There also are corresponding abstract entities: qualifierness, qualificandumness, and relatedness. The knowledge expressed by the judgment "This is a blue pot" may then be analyzed into the following form: "The knowledge that has a qualificandumness in what is denoted by 'this' is conditioned by a qualifierness in blue and also conditioned by another qualifierness in potness."

A central concept in the Navya-Nyaya logical apparatus is that of "limiterness" (avacchedakata), which has many different uses. If a mountain possesses fire in one region and not in another, it can be said, in the Navya-Nyaya language, "The mountain, as limited by the region r, possesses fire, but as limited by the region r' possesses the absence of fire." The same mode of speech may be extended to limitations of time, property, and relation, particularly when one is in need of constructing a description that is intended to suit exactly some specific situation and none other.

Inference is defined by Vatsayana as the "posterior" knowledge of an object (e.g., fire) with the help of knowledge of its mark (e.g., smoke). For Navya-Nyaya, inference is definable as the knowledge caused by the knowledge that the minor term (paksa, "the hill") "possesses" the middle term (hetu, "smoke"), which is recognized as "pervaded by" the major (sadhya, "fire"). The relation of invariable connection, or "pervasion," between the middle (smoke) and the major (fire)--"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire"--is called vyapti.

The logicians developed the notion of negation to a great degree of sophistication. Apart from the efforts to specify a negation with references to its limiting counterpositive (pratiyogi), limiting relation, and limiting locus, they were constrained to discuss and debate such typical issues as the following: Is one to recognize, as a significant negation, the absence of a thing x so that the limiter of the counterpositive x is not x-ness but y-ness? In other words, can one say that a jar is absent as a cloth even in a locus in which it is present as a jar? Also, is the absence of an absence itself a new absence or something positive? Furthermore, is the absence of colour in general nothing but the sum total of the absences of the particular colours, or is it a new kind of absence, a generic absence? Gangesha argued for the latter alternative, though he answers the first of the above three questions in the negative.

Though the philosophers of this school did not directly write on metaphysics, they nevertheless did tend to introduce many new kinds of abstract entities into their discourse. These entities are generally epistemological, though sometimes they are relational. Chief of these are entities called "qualifierness," "qualificandumness," and "limiterness." Various relations were introduced, such as direct and indirect temporal relations, paryapti relation (in which a number reside, in sets rather than in individual members of those sets), svarupa relation (which holds, for example, between an absence and its locus), and relation between a knowledge and its object.

Among the Navya-Nyaya philosophers, Raghunatha Shiromani in Padarthatattvanirupana undertook a bold revision of the traditional categorial scheme by (1) identifying "time," "space," and "ether" with God; (2) eliminating the category of mind by reducing it to matter; (3) denying atoms (paramanu) and dyadic (paired) combinations of them (dvyanuka), (4) eliminating "number," "separateness," "remoteness," and "proximity" from the list of qualities; and (5) rejecting ultimate particularities (vishesa) on the grounds that it is more rational to suppose that the eternal substances are by nature distinct. He added some new categories, however, such as causal power (shakti) and the moment (ksana), and recognized that there are as many instances of the relation of inherence as there are cases of it (as contrasted with the older view that there is only one inherence that is itself present in all cases of inherence).


3.6.5 Samkhya and Yoga. Texts and commentaries until Vacaspati and the "Samkhya-sutras."

There are three commentaries on the Samkhya-karika: that by Raja, much referred to but not extant; that by Gaudapada (7th century), on which there is a subcommentary Candrika by Narayanatirtha; and the Tattva-kaumudi by Vacaspati (9th century). The Samkhya-sutras are a much later work (c. 14th century) on which Aniruddha (15th century) wrote a (see also  Yoga, Samkhya, "Samkhya-sutra")

vrtti and Vijñanabhiksu (16th century) wrote the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya ("Commentary on the Samkhya Doctrine"). Among independent works, mention may be made of Tattvasamasa ("Collection of Truths"; c. 11th century).

The Yoga-sutras were commented upon by Vyasa in his Vyasa-bhasya (5th century), which again has two excellent subcommentaries: Vacaspati's Tattvavaisharadi and Vijñanabhiksu's Yogavarttika, besides the vrtti by Bhoja (c. 1000). Metaphysics and epistemology.

For Vacaspati, creation was viewed in terms of the mere presence of the selves and the mere presentation to them of Matter (the undifferentiated primeval stuff). Such a view has obvious difficulties, for it would make creation eternal, because the selves and Matter are eternally copresent. Vijñanabhiksu considered the relation between the selves and Matter to be a real relation that affects Matter but leaves the selves unaffected. Creation, in accordance with Bhiksu's theism, is due to the influence of the chief self--i.e., God. Furthermore, whereas the earlier Samkhya authors, including Vacaspati, did not consider the question about the ontological status of the gunas, Bhiksu regards them as real, as extremely subtle substances--so that each guna is held to be infinite in number. In general, the Samkhya-sutras show a greater Brahmanical influence, and there is a clear tendency to explain away the points of difference between the Samkhya and the Vedanta. The author of the sutras tried to show that the Samkhya doctrines are consistent with theism or even with the Upanisadic conception of Brahman. Vijñanabhiksu made use of such contexts to emphasize that the atheism of Samkhya is taught only to discourage men to try to be God, that originally the Samkhya was theistic, and that the original Vedanta also was theistic. The Upanisadic doctrine of the unity of selves is interpreted by him to mean an absence of difference of kind among selves, which is consistent with the Samkhya. Maya (illusion) for Bhiksu means nothing but the prakrti (Matter) of the Samkhya. The sutras also give cosmic significance to mahat, the first aspect to evolve from Matter, which then means cosmic Intelligence; a sense not found in the karikas.

In epistemology the idea of reflection of the spirit in the organs of knowing, particularly in the buddhi, or intelligence, comes to the forefront. Every cognition ( jñana) is a modification of the buddhi, with consciousness reflected in it. Though this is Vacaspati's account, it does not suffice according to Bhiksu. If there is the mere reflection of the self in the state of the buddhi, this can only account for the fact that the state of cognition seems to be a conscious state; it cannot account for the fact that the self considers itself to be the owner and experiencer of that state. Accounting for this latter fact, Bhiksu postulated a real contact between the self and buddhi as a reflection of the buddhi state back in the self.

Vacaspati, taking over a notion emphasized in Indian epistemology for the first time by Kumarila, introduced into the Samkhya theory of knowledge a distinction between two stages of perceptual knowledge. In the first, a stage of nonconceptualized (nirvikalpaka) perception, the object of perception is apprehended vaguely and in a most general manner. In the second stage, this vague knowledge (alocanamatram) is then interpreted and conceptualized by the mind. The interpretation is not so much synthesis as analysis of the vaguely presented totality into its parts. Bhiksu, however, ascribed to the senses the ability to apprehend determinate properties, even independently of the aid of manas. For Samkhya, in general, error is partial truth; there is no negation of error, only supplementation, though later Samkhya authors tended to ascribe error to wrong interpretation.

An important contribution to epistemology was made by the writers on the Yoga: this concerns the key notion of vikalpa, which stands for mental states referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words. Such mental states are neither "valid" nor "invalid" and are said to be unavoidable accompaniments of one's use of language. Ethics.

Because the self is not truly an agent acting in the world, neither merit nor demerit, arising from one's actions, attaches to the self. Morality has empirical significance. In the long run, what really matters is knowledge. Nonattached performance of one's duties is an aid toward purifying intelligence so that it may be conducive to the attainment of knowledge: hence the importance of the restraints and observances laid down in the Yoga-sutras. The greatest good is freedom--i.e., aloofness (kaivalya) from matter. Raja Yoga and Hatha Yoga.

Though Patañjali's yoga is known as Raja Yoga (that in which one attains to self-rule), Hatha Yoga (hatha = "violence," "violent effort": ha = "sun," tha = "moon," hatha = "sun and moon," breaths, or breaths travelling through the right and left nostrils) emphasizes bodily postures, regulation of breathing, and cleansing processes as means to spiritual perfection. A basic text on Hatha Yoga is the Hatha-yoga-pradipika ("Light on the Hatha Yoga"; c. 15th century). As to the relation between the two yogas, a well-known maxim lays down that "No raja without hatha, and no hatha without raja." Religious consequences.

The one religious consequence of the Samkhya-Yoga is an emphasis on austere asceticism and a turning away from the ritualistic elements of Hinduism deriving from the Brahmanical sources. Though they continue to remain as an integral part of the Hindu faith, no major religious order thrived on the basis of these philosophies.


3.6.6 Vedanta. Fragments from the Mandukya-karika until Shankara.

No commentary on the Vedanta-sutras survives from the period before Shankara, though both Shankara and Ramanuja referred to the vrttis by Bodhayana and Upavarsa (the two may indeed be the same person). There are, however, pre-Shankara monistic interpreters of the scriptures, three of whom are important: Bhartrhari, Mandana (both mentioned earlier), and Gaudapada. Shankara referred to Gaudapada as the teacher of his own teacher Govinda, complimented him for having recovered the advaita (nondualism) doctrine from the Vedas, and also wrote a bhasya on Gaudapada's main work: the karikas on Mandukya Upanisad.

Gaudapada's karikas are divided into four parts: the first part is an explanation of the Upanisad itself, the second part establishes the unreality of the world, the third part defends the oneness of reality, and the fourth part, called Alatasanti ("Extinction of the Burning Coal"), deals with the state of release from suffering. It is not accidental that Gaudapada used as the title of the fourth part of his work a phrase in common usage among Buddhist authors. His philosophical views show a considerable influence of Madhyamika Buddhism, particularly of the Yogacara school, and one of his main purposes probably was to demonstrate that the teachings of the Upanisads are compatible with the main doctrines of the Buddhist idealists. Among his principal philosophical theses were the following: All things are as unreal as those seen in a dream, for waking experience and dream are on a par in this regard. In reality, there is no production and no destruction. His criticisms of the categories of change and causality are reminiscent of Nagarjuna's. Duality is imposed on this one reality by maya, or the power of illusion-producing ignorance. Because there is no real coming into being, Gaudapada's philosophy is often called ajativada ("discourse on the unborn"). Though thus far agreeing with the Buddhist Yogacarins, Gaudapada rejected their thesis that citta, or mind, is real and that there is a real flow of mental conception.

Shankara greatly moderated Gaudapada's extreme illusionistic theory. Though he regarded the phenomenal world as a false appearance, he never made use of the analogy of dream. Rather, he contrasted the objectivity of the world with the subjectivity of dreams and hallucinations. The distinction between the empirical and the illusory--both being opposed to the transcendental--is central to his way of thinking. Varieties of Vedanta schools.

Though Vedanta is frequently referred to as one darshana (viewpoint), there are, in fact, radically different schools of Vedanta; what binds them together is common adherence to a common set of texts. These texts are the Upanisads, the Vedanta-sutras, and the Bhagavadgita--known as the three prasthanas (the basic scriptures, or texts) of the Vedanta. The founders of the various schools of Vedanta have all substantiated their positions by commenting on these three source books. The problems and issues around which their differences centre are the nature of Brahman; the status of the phenomenal world; the relation of finite individuals to the Brahman; and the nature and the means to moksa, or liberation. The main schools are: Shankara's unqualified nondualism (shuddhadvaita); Ramanuja's qualified nondualism (vishistadvaita), Madhva's dualism (dvaita); Bhaskara's doctrine of identity and difference (bhedabheda); and the schools of Nimbarka and Vallabha, which assert both identity and difference though with different emphasis on either of the two aspects. From the religious point of view, Shankara extolled metaphysical knowledge as the sole means to liberation and regarded even the concept of God as false; Ramanuja recommended the path of bhakti combined with knowledge and showed a more tolerant attitude toward the tradition of Vedic ritualism; and Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabha all propounded a personalistic theism in which love and devotion to a personal God are rated highest. Although Shankara's influence on Indian philosophy could not be matched by these other schools of Vedanta, in actual religious life the theistic Vedanta schools have exercised a much greater influence than the abstract metaphysics of Shankara. The concepts of nondualism.

Shankara's philosophy is one among a number of other nondualistic philosophies: Bhartrhari's shabdadvaita, the Buddhist's vijñanadvaita, and Gaudapada's ajativada. Shankara's system may then be called atmadvaita--the thesis that the one, universal, eternal, and self-illuminating self whose essence is pure consciousness without a subject (ashraya) and without an object (visaya) from a transcendental point of view alone is real. The phenomenal world and finite individuals, though empirically real, are--from the higher point of view--merely false appearances. In substantiating this thesis Shankara relied as much on the interpretation of scriptural texts as on reasoning. He set down a methodological principle that reason should be used only to justify truths revealed in the scriptures. His own use of reasoning was primarily negative; he showed great logical skill in refuting his opponents' theories. Shankara's followers, however, supplied what is missed in his works--i.e., a positive rational support for his thesis.

Shankara's metaphysics is based on a criterion of reality, which may be briefly formulated as follows: the real is that whose negation is not possible. It is then argued that the only thing that satisfies this criterion is consciousness, because denial of consciousness presupposes the consciousness that denies. It is conceivable that any object is not existent, but the absence of consciousness is not conceivable. Negation may be either mutual negation (of difference) or absence. The latter is either absence of a thing prior to its origination or after its destruction or absence of a thing in a place other than where it is present. If the negation of consciousness is not conceivable, then none of these various kinds of negations can be predicated of consciousness. If difference cannot be predicated of it, then consciousness is the only reality and anything different from it would be unreal. If the other three kinds of absence are not predicable of it, then consciousness should be beginningless, without end, and ubiquitous. Consequently, it would be without change. Furthermore, consciousness is self-intimating; all objects depend upon consciousness for their manifestation. Difference may be either among members of the same class or of one individual from another of a different class or among parts of one entity. None of these is true of consciousness. In other words, there are not many consciousnesses; the plurality of many centres of consciousness should be viewed as an appearance. There is no reality other than consciousness--i.e., no real prakrti; such a thing would only be an unreal other. Also, consciousness does not have internal parts; there are not many conscious states. The distinction between consciousness of blue and consciousness of yellow is not a distinction within consciousness but one superimposed on it by a distinction among its objects, blue and yellow. With this, the Samkhya, Vijñanavadin Buddhist, and Nyaya-Vaishesika pluralism are refuted. Reality is one, infinite, eternal, and self-shining spirit; it is without any determination, for all determination is negation. Shankara's theory of error and religious and ethical concerns.

The basic problem of Shankara's philosophy is how such pure consciousness appears, in ordinary experience, to be individualized ("my consciousness") and to be of an object ("consciousness of blue"). As he stated it, subject and object are as opposed to each other as light and darkness, yet the properties of one are superimposed on the other. If something is a fact of experience and yet ought not to be so--i.e., is rationally unintelligible--then this must be false. According to Shankara's theory of error, the false appearance is a positive, presented entity that is characterized neither as existent (because it is sublated when the illusion is corrected) nor as nonexistent (because it is presented, given as much as the real is). The false, therefore, is indescribable either as being or as nonbeing, it is not a fiction, such as a round square. Shankara thus introduced a new category of the "false" apart from the usual categories of the existent and the nonexistent. The world and finite individuals are false in this sense: they are rationally unintelligible, their reality is not logically deducible from Brahman, and their experience is cancelled with the knowledge of Brahman. The world and finite selves are not creations of Brahman; they are not real emanations or transformations of it. Brahman is not capable of such transformation or emanation. They are appearances that are superimposed on Brahman because of man's ignorance. This superimposition was sometimes called adhyasa by Shankara and was often identified with avidya. Later writers referred to avidya as the cause of the error. Thus, ignorance came to be regarded as a beginningless, positive something that conceals the nature of reality and projects the false appearances on it. Shankara, however, did distinguish between three senses of being: the merely illusory (pratibhasika), the empirical (vyavaharika; which has unperceived existence and pragmatic efficacy), and transcendental being of one, indeterminate Brahman.

In his epistemology, Shankara's followers in general accepted the point of view of the Mimamsa of Kumarila's school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, nonperception, and postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner sense in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by respective mental modifications. The truth of cognitions is regarded as intrinsic to them, and a knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not rejected as false. In perception a sort of identity is achieved between the form of the object and the form of the inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said to assume the form of the object. In their theory of inference, the Nyaya five-membered syllogism is rejected in favour of a three-membered one. Furthermore, the sort of inference admitted by the Nyaya, in which the major term is universally present, is rejected, because nothing save Brahman has this property according to the system.

Shankara regarded moral life as a necessary preliminary to metaphysical knowledge and thus laid down strict ethical conditions to be fulfilled by one who wants to study Vedanta. For him, however, the highest goal of life is to know the essential identity of his own self with Brahman, and though moral life may indirectly help in purifying the mind and intellect, over an extended period of time knowledge comes from following the long and arduous process whose three major stages are study of the scriptures under appropriate conditions, reflection aimed at removing all possible intellectual doubts about the nondualistic thesis, and meditation on the identity of atman and Brahman. Moksa is not, according to Shankara, a perfection to be achieved; it is rather the essential reality of one's own self to be realized through destruction of the ignorance that conceals it. God is how Brahman appears to an ignorant mind that regards the world as real and looks for its creator and ruler. Religious life is sustained by dualistic concepts: the dualism between man and God, between virtue and vice, and between this life and the next. In the state of moksa, these dualisms are transcended. An important part of Shankara's faith was that moksa was possible in bodily existence. Because what brings this supreme state is the destruction of ignorance, nothing need happen to the body; it is merely seen for what it really is--an illusory limitation on the spirit.

Shankara's chief direct pupils were Sureshvara, the author of Varttika ("Gloss") on his bhasya and of Naiskarmya-siddhi ("Establishment of the State of Non-Action"), and Padmapada, author of Pañcapadika, a commentary on the first five padas, or sections, of the bhasya. These early pupils raised and settled issues that were not systematically discussed by Shankara himself--issues that later divided his followers into two large groups: those who followed the Vivarana (a work written on Padmapada's Pañcapadika by one Prakashatman in the 12th century) and those who followed Vacaspati's commentary (known as Bhamati) on Shankara's bhasya. Among the chief issues that divided Shankara's followers was the question about the locus and object of ignorance. The Bhamati school regarded the individual self as the locus of ignorance and sought to avoid the consequent circularity (arising from the fact that the individual self is itself a product of ignorance) by postulating a beginningless series of such selves and their ignorances. The Vivarana school regarded both the locus and the object of ignorance to be Brahman and sought to avoid the contradiction (arising from the fact that Brahman is said to be of the nature of knowledge) by distinguishing between pure consciousness and valid knowledge (pramajñana). The latter, a mental modification, destroys ignorance, and the former, far from being opposed to ignorance, manifests ignorance itself, as evidenced by the judgment "I am ignorant." The two schools also differed in their explanations of the finite individual. The Bhamati school regarded the individual as a limitation of Brahman just as the space within the four walls of a room is a limitation of the big space. The Vivarana school preferred to regard the finite individual as a reflection of Brahman in the inner sense. As the moon is one, but its reflections are many, so also Brahman is one, but its reflections are many. Later followers of Shankara, such as Shriharsa in his Khandanakhandakhadya and his commentator Citsukha, used a destructive, negative dialectic in the manner of Nagarjuna to criticize man's basic concepts about the world. Concepts of bhedabheda.

The philosophies of transcendence and immanence (bhedabheda) assert both identity and difference between the world and finite individuals, on the one hand, and Brahman, on the other. The world and finite individuals are real and yet both different and not different from the Brahman.

Among pre-Shankara commentators on the Vedanta-sutras, Bhartrprapañca defended the thesis of bhedabheda, and Bhaskara (c. 9th century) closely followed him. Bhartrprapañca's commentary is not extant; the only known source of knowledge is Shankara's reference to him in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, in which Bhartrprapañca is said to have held that though Brahman as cause is different from Brahman as effect, the two are identical inasmuch as the effect dissolves into the cause, as the waves return into the sea. Bhaskara viewed Brahman as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The doctrine of maya was totally rejected. Brahman undergoes the modifications by his own power. As waves are both different from and identical with the sea, so are the world and the finite individuals in relation to Brahman. The finite selves are parts of Brahman, as sparks of fire are parts of fire. But the finite soul exists, since beginningless time, under the influence of ignorance. It is atomic in extension and yet animates the whole body. Corresponding to the material world and the finite selves, Bhaskara ascribed to God two powers of self-modification. Bhaskara, in his theory of knowledge, distinguished between self-consciousness that is ever-present and objective knowledge that passively arises out of appropriate causal conditions but is not an activity. Mind, thus, is a sense organ. Bhaskara subscribed to the general Vedanta thesis that knowledge is intrinsically true, though falsity is extrinsic to it. In his ethical views, Bhaskara regarded religious duties as binding at all stages of life. He upheld a theory known as jñana-karmasamuccaya-vada: performance of duties together with knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation. In religious life, Bhaskara was an advocate of bhakti, but bhakti is not a mere feeling of love or affection for God, but rather is dhyana, or meditation, directed toward the transcendent Brahman who is not exhausted in his manifestations. Bhaskara denied the possibility of liberation in bodily existence.

The bhedabheda point of view had various other adherents: Vijñanabhiksu, Nimbarka, Vallabha, and Caitanya.

Ramanuja (11th century) sought to synthesize a long tradition of theistic religion with the absolutistic monism of the Upanisads, a task in which he had been preceded by no less an authority than the Bhagavadgita. In his general philosophical position, he followed the vrttikara Bodhayana, the Vakyakara (to whom he referred but whose identity is not established except that he advocated a theory of real modification of Brahman), Nathamuni (c. 1000), and his own teachers' teacher Yamunacarya (c. 1050). Ramanuja.

The main religious inspirations are from the theistic tradition of the Alvar poet-saints and their commentators known as the Acaryas, who sought to combine knowledge with action (karma) as the right means to liberation. There is also, besides the Vedic tradition, the religious tradition of Agamas, particularly of the Pañcaratra literature. It is within this old tradition that Ramanuja's philosophical and religious thought developed.

Ramanuja rejected Shankara's conception of Brahman as an indeterminate, qualityless, and differenceless reality on the ground that such a reality cannot be perceived, known, thought of, or even spoken about, in which case it is nothing short of a fiction. In substantiating this contention, Ramanuja undertook, in his Shri-bhasya on the Vedanta-sutras, a detailed examination of the different ways of knowing. Perception, either nonconceptualized or conceptualized, always apprehends its object as being something, the only difference between the two modes of perception being that the former takes place when one perceives an individual of a certain class for the first time and thus does not subsume it under the same class as some other individuals. Nor can inference provide one with knowledge of an indeterminate reality, because in inference one always knows something as coming under a general rule. The same holds true of verbal testimony. This kind of knowledge arises from understanding sentences. For Ramanuja there is nothing like a pure consciousness without subject and without object. All consciousness is of something and belongs to someone. He also held that it is not true that consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness. In fact, one's own past consciousness becomes the object of present consciousness. Consciousness is self-shining only when it reveals an object to its own owner--i.e., the self.

Rejecting Shankara's conception of reality, Ramanuja defended the thesis that Brahman is a being with infinitely perfect excellent virtues, a being whose perfection cannot be exceeded. The world and finite individuals are real, and together they constitute the body of Brahman. The category of body and soul is central to his way of thinking. Body is that which can be controlled and moved for the purpose of the spirit. The material world and the conscious spirits, though substantive realities, are yet inseparable from Brahman and thus qualify him in the same sense in which body qualifies the soul. Brahman is spiritual-material-qualified. Ramanuja and his followers undertook criticisms of Shankara's illusionism, particularly of his doctrine of avidya (ignorance) and the falsity of the world. For Ramanuja, such a beginningless, positive avidya could not have any locus or any object, and if it does conceal the self-shining Brahman, then there would be no way of escaping from its clutches.

A most striking feature of Ramanuja's epistemology is his uncompromising realism. Whatever is known is real, and only the real can be known. This led him to advocate the thesis that even the object of error is real--error is really incomplete knowledge--and correction of error is really completion of incomplete knowledge.

The state of moksa is not a state in which the individuality is negated. In fact, the sense of "I" persists even after liberation, for the self is truly the object of the notion of "I." What is destroyed is egoism, the false sense of independence. The means thereto is bhakti, leading to God's grace. But by bhakti Ramanuja means dhyana, or intense meditation with love. Obligation to perform one's scriptural duties is never transcended. Liberation is a state of blessedness in the company of God. A path emphasized by Ramanuja for all persons is complete self-surrender (prapatti) to God's will and making oneself worthy of his grace. In his social outlook, Ramanuja believed that bhakti does not recognize barriers of caste and classes.

The doctrinal differences among the followers of Ramanuja is not so great as among Shankara's. Writers such as Sudarshana Suri and Venkatanatha continued to elaborate and defend the theses of the master, and much of their writing is polemical. Some differences are to be found regarding the nature of emancipation, the nature of devotion, and other ritual matters. The followers are divided into two schools: the Uttara-kalarya, led by Venkatanatha, and the Daksina-kalarya, led by Lokacarya. One of the points at issue is whether or not emancipation is destructible; another, whether there is a difference between liberation attained by mere self-knowledge and that attained by knowledge of God. There also were differences in interpreting the exact nature of self-surrender to God and the degree of passivity or activity required of the worshipper. Madhva.

Madhva (born 1199?) belonged to the tradition of Vaisnava religious faith and showed a great polemical spirit in refuting Shankara's philosophy and in converting people to his own fold. An uncompromising dualist, he traced back dualistic thought even to some of the Upanisads. His main works are his commentaries on the Upanisads, the Gita, and the Vedanta-sutras. He also wrote a commentary on the Mahabharata and several logical and polemical treatises. (see also  dualism)

He glorified difference. Five types of differences are central to Madhva's system: difference between soul and God, between soul and soul, between soul and matter, between God and matter, and that between matter and matter. Brahman is the fullness of qualities, and by his own intrinsic nature, Brahman produces the world. The individual, otherwise free, is dependent only upon God. The Advaita concepts of falsity and indescribability of the world were severely criticized and rejected. In his epistemology, Madhva admitted three ways of knowing: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In Madhva's system the existence of God cannot be proved; it can be learned only from the scriptures.

Bondage and release both are real and devotion is the only way to release, but ultimately it is God's grace that saves. Scriptural duties, when performed without any ulterior motive, purify the mind and help one to receive God's grace.

Among the other theistic schools of Vedanta, brief mention may be made of the schools of Nimbarka (c. 12th century), Vallabha (15th century), and Caitanya (16th century). Nimbarka.

Nimbarka's philosophy is known as Bhedabheda because he emphasized both identity and difference of the world and finite souls with Brahman. His religious sect is known as the Sanaka-sampradaya of Vaisnavism. Nimbarka's commentary of the Vedanta-sutras is known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and is commented on by Shrinivasa in his Vedanta-kaustubha. Of the three realities admitted--God, souls, and matter--God is the independent reality, self-conscious, controller of the other two, free from all defects, abode of all good qualities, and both the material and efficient cause of the world. The souls are dependent, self-conscious, capable of enjoyment, controlled, atomic in size, many in number, and eternal but seemingly subject to birth and death because of ignorance and karma. Matter is of three kinds: nonnatural matter, which constitutes divine body; natural matter constituted by the three gunas; and time. Both souls and matter are pervaded by God. Their relation is one of difference-with-nondifference. Liberation is because of a knowledge that makes God's grace possible. There is no need for Vedic duties after knowledge is attained, nor is performance of such duties necessary for acquiring knowledge. Vallabha.

Vallabha's commentary on the Vedanta-sutras is known as Anubhasya ("The Brief Commentary"), which is commented upon by Purusottama in his Bhasya-prakasha ("Lights on the Commentary"). His philosophy is called pure nondualism--"pure" meaning "undefiled by maya." His religious sect is known as the Rudra-sampradaya of Vaisnavism and also Pustimarga, or the path of grace. Brahman, or Shri Krishna, is viewed as the only independent reality; in his essence he is existence, consciousness, and bliss, and souls and matter are his real manifestations. Maya is but his power of self-manifestation. Vallabha admitted neither parinama (of Samkhya) nor vivarta (of Shankara). According to him, the modifications are such that they leave Brahman unaffected. From his aspect of "existence" spring life, senses, and body. From "consciousness" spring the finite, atomic souls. From "bliss" spring the presiding deities, or antaryamins, for whom Vallabha finds place on his ontology. This threefold nature of God pervades all beings. World is real; but samsara, the cycle of birth and death, is unreal, and time is regarded as God's power of action. Like all other Vedantins, Vallabha rejected the Vaishesika relation of samavaya and replaced it by tadatmya, or identity. The means to liberation is bhakti, which is defined as firm affection for God and also loving service (seva). Bhakti does not lead to knowledge, but knowledge is regarded as a part of bhakti. The notion of "grace" plays an important role in Vallabha's religious thought. He is also opposed to renunciation. Caitanya.

Caitanya (1485-1533) was one of the most influential and remarkable of the medieval saints of India. His life is characterized by almost unique emotional fervour, hovering on the pathological, which was directed toward Shri Krishna (the incarnation of Vishnu). He has not written anything, but the discourses recorded by contemporaries give an idea of his philosophical thought that was later developed by his followers, particularly by Rupa Gosvamin and Jiva Gosvamin. Rupa is the author of two great works: Bhakti-rasamrta-sindhu ("The Ocean of the Nectar of the Essence of Bhakti") and Ujjvalanilamani ("The Shining Blue Jewel"). Jiva's main work is the great and voluminous Satsamdarbha. These are the main sources of the philosophy of Bengal Vaisnavism. Caitanya rejected the conception of an intermediate Brahman. Brahman, according to him, has three powers: the transcendent power that is threefold (the power of bliss, the power of being, and the power of consciousness) and the two immanent powers, namely, the powers of creating souls and the material world. Jiva Gosvamin regarded bliss to be the very substance of Brahman who, with the totality of all his powers, is called God. Jiva distinguished between God's essential power, his peripheral power that creates the souls, and the external power (called maya) that creates cosmic forms. The relation between God and his powers is neither identity nor difference, nor identity-with-difference. This relation, unthinkable and suprarational, is central to Caitanya's philosophy. For Jiva, the relation between any whole and its parts is unthinkable. Bhakti is the means to emancipation. Bhakti is conceived as a reciprocal relation between man and God, a manifestation of God's power in man. The works of Jiva and Rupa delineated a detailed and fairly exhaustive classification of the types and gradations of bhakti.


3.6.7 Vaisnava schools.

The main philosophers of the medieval Vaisnavism have been noted above. Vaisnavism, however, has a long history, traceable to the Vishnu worship of the Rigveda, the Bhakti conception of the epics, and the Vasudeva cult of the pre-Christian era. Of the two main Vaisnava scriptures, or agamas, the Pañcaratra ("Relating to the Period of Five Nights") and the Vaikhanasa ("Relating to a Hermit or Ascetic") are the most important. Though Vaisnava philosophers trace the Pañcaratra works to Vedic origin, absolutists such as Shankara refused to acknowledge this claim. The main topics of the Pañcaratra literature concern rituals and forms of image worship and religious practices of the Vaisnavas. Of philosophical importance are the Ahirbudhnya-samhita ("Collection of Verses for Shiva") and Jayakhya-samhita ("Collection of Verses Called Jaya"). The most well-known Pañcaratra doctrine concerns the four spiritual forms of God: the absolute, transcendent state, known as Vasudeva; the form in which knowledge and strength predominate (known as Samkarsana); the form in which wealth and courage predominate (known as Pradyumna); and the form in which power and energy predominate (known as Aniruddha). Shankara identified Samkarsana with the individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with the ego sense. Furthermore, five powers of God are distinguished: creation, maintenance, destruction, favour, and disfavour. Bhakti is regarded as affection for God and associated with a sense of his majesty. The doctrine of prapatti, or complete self-surrender, is emphasized. (see also  "Vaikhanasa Samhita")


3.6.8 Shaiva schools.

The Shaiva schools are the philosophical systems within the fold of Shaivism, a religious sect that worships Shiva as the highest deity. There is a long tradition of Shiva worship going back to the Rudra hymns of the Rigveda, the Shiva-Rudra of the Vajasaneyi-Samhita, the Atharvaveda, and the Brahmanas. Madhava in his Sarva-darshana-samgraha referred to three Shaiva systems: the Nakulisha-Pashupata, the Shaiva, and the Pratyabhijña systems. The Shaiva system of Madhava's classification probably corresponds to Shaiva-siddhanta of Tamil country, and the Pratyabhijña is known as Kashmir Shaivism. The Shaiva-siddhanta is realistic and dualistic; the Kashmir system is idealistic and monistic. (see also  Shaivism, Pashupata) Shaiva-siddhanta.

The source literature of the Shaiva-siddhanta school consists of the Agamas, Tamil devotional hymns written by Shaiva saints but collected by Nambi (c. AD 1000) in a volume known as Tirumurai, Civa-ñana-potam ("Understanding of the Knowledge of Shiva") by Meykantatevar (13th century), Shivacarya's Shiva-jñana-siddhiyar ("Attainment of the Knowledge of Shiva"), Umapati's Shivaprakasham ("Lights on Shiva") in the 14th century, Shrikantha's commentary on the Vedanta-sutras (14th century), and Appaya Diksita's commentary thereon. This school admits three categories (padarthas): God (Shiva or Pati, Lord), soul (pashu), and the bonds (pasha), and the 36 principles (tattvas). These 36 are divided into three groups: at the top, in order of manifestation from Shiva, are the five pure principles--shivatattva (the essence of Shiva), shakti (power), sada-shiva (the eternal good), ishivara (lord), and shuddha-vidya (true knowledge); seven mixed principles--pure maya, five envelopes (destiny, time, interest, knowledge, and power), and purusa, or self; and 24 impure principles beginning with prakrti (this list is broadly the same as that of Samkhya). Shiva is the first cause: his shakti, or power, is the instrumental cause, maya the material cause. This maya-shakti is not God's essential power but is assumed by him; it is parigraha-shakti ("Assumed Power"). The relation of Shiva to his essential power is one of identity. Bonds are of three kinds: karma, maya, and avidya. The world and souls are real, and emancipation requires the grace of Shiva. The Shaiva-siddhanta always insisted on the preservation of the individuality of the finite soul, even in the state of emancipation, and rejected Shankara's nondualism. Appaya Diksita's commentary shows the tendency to attempt a reconciliation between the Agama tradition of realism and pluralism with the Advaita tradition. The soul is eternal and all-pervasive, but, owing to original ignorance, it is reduced to the condition of anava, which consists in regarding oneself as finite and atomic. Knowledge of its own nature as well as God's is possible only by God's grace. Kashmir Shaivism.

The source literature of this school consists in the Shiva-sutra, Vasugupta's Spanda-karika ("Verses on Creation"; 8th-9th centuries), Utpala's Pratyabhijña-sutra ("Aphorisms on Recognition"; c. 900), Abhinavagupta's Paramarthasara ("The Essence of the Highest Truth"), Pratyabhijña-vimarshini ("Reflections on Recognition"), and Tantraloka ("Lights on the Doctrine") in the 10th century, and Ksemaraja's Shiva-sutra-vimarshini ("Reflections on the Aphorisms on Shiva"). As contrasted with the Shaiva-siddhanta, this school is idealist and monist, and, although it accepts all the 36 tattvas and the three padarthas, it is Shiva, the Lord, who is the sole reality. God is viewed as both the material and efficient cause of the universe. Five aspects of God's power are distinguished: consciousness (cit), bliss (ananda), desire (iccha), knowledge (jñana), and action (kriya). Shiva is one--without a second, infinite spirit. He has a transcendent aspect and an immanent aspect, and his power with its fivefold functions constitutes his immanent aspect. The individual soul of a person is identical with Shiva; recognition of this identity is essential to liberation.



Jainism, founded in about the 6th century BC by Vardhamana Mahavira, the 24th in a succession of religious leaders known as Jinas (Conquerors), rejects the idea of God as the creator of the world but teaches the perfectibility of man, to be accomplished through the strictly moral and ascetic life. Central to the moral code of Jainism is the doctrine of ahimsa, or noninjury to all living beings, an idea that may have arisen in reaction to Vedic sacrifice ritual. There is also a great emphasis on vows (vratas) of various orders. (see also  ahimsa, or ahimsa)

Although earlier scriptures, such as the Bhagavati-sutra, contained assorted ideas on logic and epistemology, Kundakunda of the 2nd century AD was the first to develop Jaina logic. The Tattvarthadhigama-sutra of Umasvatis, however, is the first systematic work, and Siddhasena (7th century AD) the first great logician. Other important figures are Akalanka (8th century), Manikyanandi, Vadideva, Hemchandra (12th century), Prabhachandra (11th century), and Yasovijaya (17th century).

The principal ingredients of Jaina metaphysics are: an ultimate distinction between "living substance" or "soul" ( jiva) and "nonliving substance" (ajiva); the doctrine of anekantavada, or nonabsolutism (the thesis that things have infinite aspects that no determination can exhaust); the doctrine of naya (the thesis that there are many partial perspectives from which reality can be determined, none of which is, taken by itself, wholly true, but each of which is partially so); and the doctrine of karma, in Jainism a substance, rather than a process, that links all phenomena in a chain of cause and effect.

As a consequence of their metaphysical liberalism, the Jaina logicians developed a unique theory of seven-valued logic, according to which the three primary truth values are "true," "false," and "indefinite," and the other four values are "true and false," "true and indefinite," "false and indefinite," and "true, false, and indefinite." Every statement is regarded as having these seven values, considered from different standpoints. (see also  many-valued logic)

Knowledge is defined as that which reveals both itself and another (svaparabhasi). It is eternal, as an essential quality of the self; it is noneternal, as the perishable empirical knowledge. Whereas most Hindu epistemologists regarded pramana as the cause of knowledge, the Jainas identified pramana with valid knowledge. Knowledge is either perceptual or nonperceptual. Perception is either empirical or nonempirical. Empirical perception is either sensuous or nonsensuous. The latter arises directly in the self, not through the sense organs, but only when the covering ignorance is removed. With the complete extinction of all karmas, a person attains omniscience (kevala-jñana). (See also JAINISM .)



Reference has been made earlier to the Sufi (Islamic mystics), who found a resemblance between the ontological monism of Ibn al-'Arabi and that of Vedanta. The Shattari order among the Indian Sufis practiced Yogic austerities and even physical postures. Various minor syncretistic religious sects attempted to harmonize Hindu and Muslim religious traditions at different levels and with varying degrees of success. Of these, the most famous are Ramananda, Kabir, and Guru Nanak. Kabir harmonized the two religions in such a manner that, to an enquiry about whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim, the answer given by a contemporary was "It is a secret difficult to comprehend. One should try to understand." Guru Nanak rejected the authority of both Hindu and Muslim scriptures alike and founded his religion (Sikhism) on a rigorously moralistic, monotheistic basis. (see also  Mughal dynasty, Shattariyah)

Among the great Mughals, Akbar attempted, in 1581, to promulgate a new religion, Din-e Ilahi, which was to be based on reason and ethical teachings common to all religions and which was to be free from priestcraft. This effort, however, was short-lived, and a reaction of Muslim orthodoxy was led by Shaykh Ahmed Sirhindi, who rejected ontological monism in favour of orthodox unitarianism and sought to channel mystical enthusiasm along Qur`anic (Islamic scriptural) lines. By the middle of the 17th century, the tragic figure of Dara Shikoh, the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan's son and disciple of the Qadiri sufis, translated Hindu scriptures, such as the Bhagavadgita and the Upanisads, into Persian and in his translation of the latter closely followed Shankara's commentaries. In his Majma' al-bahrayn he worked out correlations between Sufi and Upanisadic cosmologies, beliefs, and practices. During this time, the Muslim elite of India virtually identified Vedanta with Sufism. Later, Shah Wali Allah's son, Shah 'Abd-ul-'Aziz, regarded Krishna among the awliya` (saints).



In the 19th century, India was not marked by any noteworthy philosophical achievements, but the period was one of great social and religious reform movements. The newly founded universities introduced Indian intellectuals to Western thought, particularly to the empiricistic, utilitarian, and agnostic philosophies in England, and John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and Herbert Spencer had become the most influential thinkers in the Indian universities by the end of the century. These Western-oriented ideas served to generate a secular and rational point of view and stimulated social and religious movements, most noteworthy among them being the Brahmo (Brahma) Samaj movement founded by Rammohan Ray. Toward the later decades of the century, the great saint Ramakrishna Paramahamsa of Calcutta renewed interest in mysticism, and many young rationalists and skeptics were converted into the faith exemplified in his person. Ramakrishna taught, among other things, an essential diversity of religious paths leading to the same goal, and this teaching was given an intellectual form by Swami Vivekananda, his famed disciple.

The first Indian graduate school in philosophy was founded in the University of Calcutta during the first decades of the 20th century, and the first incumbent of the chair of philosophy was Sir Brajendranath Seal, a versatile scholar in many branches of learning, both scientific and humanistic. Seal's major published work is The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, which, besides being a work on the history of science, shows interrelations among the ancient Hindu philosophical concepts and their scientific theories. Soon, however, the German philosophers Kant and Hegel came to be the most studied philosophers in the Indian universities. The ancient systems of philosophy came to be interpreted in the light of German idealism. The Hegelian notion of Absolute Spirit found a resonance in the age-old Vedanta notion of Brahman. The most eminent Indian Hegelian scholar is Hiralal Haldar, who was concerned with the problem of the relation of the human personality with the Absolute, as is evidenced by his book Neo-Hegelianism. The most eminent Kantian scholar is K.C. Bhattacharyya. (see also  Hegelianism)

Among those who deserve mention for their original contributions to philosophical thinking are Sri Aurobindo (died 1950), Mahatma Gandhi (died 1948), Rabindranath Tagore (died 1941), Sir Muhammed Iqbal (died 1938), K.C. Bhattacharyya (died 1949), and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (died 1975). Of these, Sri Aurobindo was first a political activist and then a yogin, Tagore and Iqbal poets, Gandhi a political and social leader, and only Radhakrishnan and Bhattacharyya university professors. This fact throws some light on the state of Indian philosophy in this century.

In his major work, The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo starts from the fact of human aspiration for a kingdom of heaven on earth and proceeds to give a theoretical framework in which such an aspiration would be not a figment of imagination but a drive in nature, working through man toward a higher stage of perfection. Both the denial of the materialist and that of the ascetic are rejected as being one-sided. The gulf between unconscious matter and fully self-conscious spirit is sought to be bridged by exhibiting them as two poles of a series in which spirit continuously manifests itself. The Vedantic concept of a transcendent and all-inclusive Brahman is sought to be harmonized with a theory of emergent evolution. Illusionism is totally rejected. The purpose of man is to go beyond his present form of consciousness. Yoga is interpreted as a technique not for personal liberation but for cooperating with the cosmic evolutionary urge that is destined to take mankind ahead from the present mental stage to a higher, supramental stage of consciousness. A theory of history, in accordance with this point of view, is worked out in his The Human Cycle.

Rabindranath Tagore's philosophical thinking is no less based on the Upanisads, but his interpretation of the Upanisads is closer to Vaisnava theism and the Bhakti cults than to traditional monism. He characterized the absolute as supreme person and placed love higher than knowledge. In his Religion of Man, Tagore sought to give a philosophy of man in which human nature is characterized by a concept of surplus energy that finds expression in creative art. In his lectures on Nationalism, Tagore placed the concept of society above that of the modern nation-state.

Mahatma Gandhi preferred to say that the truth is God rather than God is the truth, because the former proposition expresses a belief that even the atheists share. The belief in the presence of an all-pervading spirit in the universe led Gandhi to a strict formulation of the ethics of nonviolence (ahimsa). But he gave this age-old ethical principle a wealth of meaning so that ahimsa for him became at once a potent means of collective struggle against social and economic injustice, the basis of a decentralized economy and decentralized power structure, and the guiding principle of one's individual life in relation both to nature and to other persons. The unity of existence, which he called the truth, can be realized through the practice of ahimsa, which requires reducing oneself to zero and reaching the furthest limit of humility. (see also  ahimsa, or ahimsa)

Influenced by the British philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart's form of Hegelian idealism and the French philosopher Henri Bergson's philosophy of change, Muhammed Iqbal conceived reality as creative and essentially spiritual, consisting of egos. "The truth, however, is that matter is spirit," he wrote,

in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when we look at it as acting in regard to what we call external world; it is mind or soul when we look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.

Influenced by British Neo-Hegelianism in his interpretation of the Vedantic tradition, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was primarily an interpreter of Indian thought to the Western world. He defended a realistic interpretation of the concept of maya--thereby playing down its illusionistic connotation, a theory of intuition as the means of knowing reality, and a theory of emergent evolution of spirit (not unlike Sri Aurobindo, but without his doctrine of supermind) in nature and history. The most original among modern Indian thinkers, however, is K.C. Bhattacharyya, who rejected the conception of philosophy as a construction of a worldview and undertook a phenomenological description of the various grades of subjectivity: (1) the bodily, (2) the psychic, and (3) the spiritual. With regard to (1), he distinguished between the objective body and the felt body and regarded the latter as the most primitive level of the subjective sense of freedom from the objective world. The stage (2) includes the range of mental life from image to free thought. In introspection, the level (2) is transcended, but various levels of introspection are distinguished, all leading to greater freedom from objectivity. It would seem, however, that for Bhattacharyya absolute freedom from objectivity was a spiritual demand. According to his theory of value, value is not an adjective of the object but a feeling absolute, of which the object evaluated appears as an adjective, and his logic of alternation is a modern working out of the Jaina theories of anekanta (non-absolutism) and syadvada (doctrine of "may be").

Among later philosophers, N.V. Banerjee (1901-81) and Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1911-84), the son of K.C. Bhattacharyya, have made important contributions. In Language, Meaning and Persons (1963), Banerjee examines the development of personhood from a stage of individualized bondage to liberation in a collective identity, a life-with-others. This liberation, according to Banerjee, also entails an awareness of time and freedom from spatialized objects.

In his earlier writings such as Object, Content and Relation (1951) and Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (1953), Bhattacharyya developed his father's idea of theoretically undecidable alternatives in philosophy. In the later works Philosophy, Logic and Language (1965) and Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy (1974), he developed the concept of metaphysics as a science of the nonempirical a priori essences that are initially discerned as the structure of the empirical but are subsequently recognized as autonomous entities. The method of metaphysics for him is reflection, phenomenological and transcendental. Kalidas Bhattacharyya was concerned with the nature and function of philosophical reflection and its relation of unreflective experience. What reflection brings to light, he held, is present in pre-reflective experience, but only as undistinguished and fused, in a state of objective implicitness. The essences as such are not real but demand realization in pure reflective consciousness. At the same time, he emphasized the limitations of any doctrine positing the constitution of nature in consciousness. Such a doctrine, he insisted, cannot be carried out in details.

Among those who apply the phenomenological method and concepts to understanding the traditional Indian philosophies, D. Sinha, R.K. Sinari, and J.N. Mohanty are especially noteworthy. Others who interpret the Indian philosophies by means of the methods and concepts of analytical philosophy include B.K. Matilal and G. Misra. In the field of philosophy of logic, P.K. Sen has worked on the paradoxes of confirmation and the concept of quantification, and Sibajiban on the liar paradox and on epistemic logic. Sibajiban and Matilal have made important contributions toward rendering the concepts of Navya-Nyaya logic into the language of modern logic. In ethics and social philosophy, notable work has been done by Abu Sayyid Ayub, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, and D.P. Chattopadhyaya.

인도철학 (印度哲學, Indian philosophy). 인도에서 성립·발전한 철학·종교 사상의 총칭 및 그것을 연구대상으로 하는 학문.


인도철학은 니아야·바이셰시카·상키야·요가·푸르바미망사·베단타 학파의 정통철학(stika)과 불교·자이나교·순세파(Crvka) 등의 비정통철학(nstika)으로 대별되며, 여러 가지 철학적 물음에 관심을 가지고 있다. 주요관심사로는 세계의 본성을 탐구하는 우주론, 실재의 본성(형이상학), 논리학, 지식의 본성(인식론), 윤리학, 종교 등이 있다.

일반적 고찰

인도철학은 서양철학적 사유와의 관계에서 놀랄 만한 유사성과 해명적인 차이점을 제공한다. 차이점을 통해서 우리는 인도철학자들이 제기한 근본적으로 다른 새로운 물음들을 드러낼 수 있다. 반면에 유사성을 살펴보면, 인도와 서양철학자들이 동일한 문제를 다루거나 유사한 이론들을 제시할 때도 인도철학자들은 진기한 형식화와 논의들을 진전시키고 있음을 알 수 있다. 서양철학자들과는 달리 인도철학자들만이 제기했던 문제들 가운데는 진리(prmya)의 생성(utpatti)과 가지성(可知性 : jñapti)의 문제가 포함되어 있다. 반대로 인도인은 거의 무시했으나 서양철학의 형성에 기여했던 물음 중에는 지식의 기원이 경험인가 이성인가 하는 질문, 분석판단과 종합판단의 구분, 그리고 우연적 진리와 필연적 진리간의 구별 등이 포함된다. 따라서 인도사상은 서양철학사가에게 서양적 사유에서 획득한 것을 보완할 수 있는 관점을 제공하고 있다. 나아가서 인도사상 연구는 서양철학적 사유의 부적합성을 표출시키고, 몇몇 개념들과 구분들이 필수적이지 않음을 잘 보여준다. 인도철학자들이 얻어낸 서양철학에 관한 지식도 유사한 방식으로 그들에게 유익한 것이 되어왔다.

베다 찬가는 BC 2000년까지 소급하는 힌두 성전이며, 현존하는 인도 문헌 중 가장 오래된 것으로, 인간심성이 신들을 만들어가는 과정과 신화 만들기의 내면적·심리적 흐름들이 심원한 우주론적 관념에 도달하는 과정을 기록하고 있다. 〈 우파니샤드 Upaniads〉(인도의 철학적 문헌)는 극단적인 일원론(絶對的不二論, 즉 물질과 정신의 본질적 동일성)으로 이어지는 보편적이며 정신적인 실재의 최초의 관념들 중의 하나를 포함하고 있다. 〈우파니샤드〉는 윤리학과 사회철학은 물론이며 자연·인생·마음·신체 등의 제개념에 대한 인도철학자들의 초기 성찰을 담고 있다. 고전적 또는 정통적 체계(darana)들은, 때로는 날카로운 통찰력을 가지고 때로는 지루할 정도로 반복해가면서 여러 가지 문제들, 즉 한정된 자아의 지위·신체·마음, 자아의 구분 및 관계, 지식의 본성과 정당한 지식의 유형들, 진리의 본성과 기원, 실재한다고 여겨지는 실체들의 유형들, 실재론과 관념론에 대한 관계, 보편자 또는 관계가 기본적인가 하는 문제, 해탈(moka)의 문제, 그 본성과 그것을 달성하는 방법 등에 대해서 토론을 벌였다.

일반적 특성

인도의 여러 철학들은 매우 다양한 견해·이론·체계를 담고 있으므로, 모두에게 공통된 특성들을 골라내기란 거의 불가능하다. 베다 권위의 인정은 모든 정통체계의 특성은 되겠지만, 순세파·불교·자이나교라는 비정통체계는 제외된다. 철학자들이 베다에 대해서 충성을 고백하더라도 이것이 사변적 작업의 자유를 거의 억누르지 않았다. 반대로 베다 권위의 인정은 어떤 철학자의 견해가 정통파에게 수용될 수 있게 하는 편리한 방도였는데 이것은 어떤 사상가가 전혀 새로운 관념을 소개할 때도 마찬가지였다. 그래서 광범위하게 다양한 견해가 확증을 얻기 위해서 베다를 언급했다. 예를 들면, 개인적 영혼과 원자라는 궁극 원소의 존재를 믿고 있는 바이셰시카 철학자들도, 불이론자도 모두 베다를 인용하고 있다.

성전의 권위에 대한 충성과 마찬가지로 거의 모든 인도철학체계들이 해탈이라는 이상을 인정하고 있으나, 해탈은 그것들이 제시하고 있는 체계적 교리들과 느슨하게 연관되어 있다. 해탈의 이상과 직접적인 관계 없이 수많은 인식론적·논리적, 심지어 형이상학적 이론들이 논의되고 순수하게 합리적인 토대 위에서 결론이 도출되었다. 오직 베단타 철학과 상키야 철학만이 해탈의 이상과 밀접한 관계를 맺고 있다고 할 수 있다. 니아야·바이셰시카·푸르바미망사의 논리적 체계들은 해탈과 약간의 관계만을 가지고 있다. 그러나 〈카마 수트라 Kma-stra〉·〈아르타샤스트라 Arthastra〉를 포함한 여러 철학들과 다른 과학적 문헌들마저도, 해탈의 이상을 인정하고 해탈의 달성을 위한 자기체계의 효율성을 공언하고 있을 정도로 해탈이 형식적 중요성을 갖고 있음도 사실이다.

인도철학자들이 직관적 지식을 말할 때, 그들은 논리학의 조력으로 직관의 여지와 가능성을 증명하려고 했다. 그들에게 철학의 의무는 바로 여기에서 종결된다. 그들은 종교적 신앙을 정당화하고자 하지 않는다. 철학적 지혜가 바로 종교적 진리의 존엄을 가지는 것이다. 이론은 실천에 종속되지 않으며, 그것 자체로 매우 가치 있고 효과적인 것으로 간주된다.

영혼(tman)·업(karma)·해탈이라는 3개의 기본적 개념들이 인도철학사유의 주춧돌을 이루고 있다. 이들 개념들의 객관적 타당성을 수용하는 방식은 다르지만, 순세파를 제외한 모든 인도철학자들은 3개의 개념과 그것들의 상호관계에 대해서 관심을 지니고 있다. 이중에서 인간행위의 도덕적 효용성을 의미하는 업개념이 가장 인도 전형의 것으로 보인다. 아트만 개념은 서양사유에서 완전히 부재한다고는 할 수 없다. 중요한 차이점을 부인할 수 없지만 어떤 의미로는 초월적·절대적 정신자아라는 서양 개념에 상응하고 있다. 최고이상이란 의미를 지닌 해탈이란 개념도 서양사유가 지닌 관심사의 하나였다. 인도심성이 중시했던 정도만큼은 아니지만 해탈과 유사한 개념은 특히 그리스도교시대에 중요 관심사였다. 대부분의 인도철학자들은 해탈의 가능성을 상정하고 있으며, '해탈의 불가능성'(anirmoka)은 철학이론을 공론화(空論化)시키는 중대오류로 간주되었다. 업개념과 더불어 2가지 관심사의 결여가 인도철학적 사유를 서양철학 일반과 구별짓는다. 고대 그리스 시대 이래 서양적 사유는 수학과, 그리스도교시대에는 역사와 관계해왔다. 그런데 인도인에게 수학과 역사가 철학적 문제를 야기한 적은 결코 없었다. 상이한 학파가 수용했던 프라마나, 즉 지식수단의 목록에도 수학적·역사적 지식의 포함은 전혀 없다. 인도철학자들이 형식논리학을 발전시키지 않았다는 중요한 사실도 수학에 대한 무관심과 관계가 있는 듯하다. 그런데도 삼단논법(2개의 전제와 하나의 결론으로 이루어진 타당한 연역논증)이 발달되었고, 상당히 정교하고 치밀한 논리이론이 성취되었다. 인도논리학은 추상적 명제들에 대해서가 아니라 지식들(jñnni)의 논리에 대해서 교훈적인 예증을 제공하고 있다. 인도 논리학은 심리학과 인식론에서 분리될 수 없는데, 그것은 세계에 대해서 진리를 알려고 하는 인간의 실제적인 노력에 관한 것이기 때문이다.


미망사 학파의 제사철학

푸르바미망사 수트라와 샤바라의 주석

푸르바 미망사('최초의 미망사') 또는 제사(祭祀) 미망사(Karma-mms)는 베다의 명령을 탐구하는 체계이다. 이것이 1차적인 목적이지만 이 학파는 곧 경전에 대한 해석원리의 발전, 의미론과 해석학적 이론들로 나아갔다. BC 4세기경에 경전을 지은 자이미니는 초기 미망사 작가들, 특히 바다리(Bdari)에 대해서 비판적이었다. 바다리의 주장으로 간주되는 견해에 따르면 베다 명령은 자기의 이익에 대한 기대 없이 수행되어야 한다. 그런데 자이미니에 따르면 베다 명령은 행위의 명령일 뿐만 아니라, 원하는 목표를 획득하기 위한 수단으로 이러한 행위들에 대한 권유이기도 하다. 자이미니와 그의 주요주석가인 샤바라(3세기)에게 베다의 희생제의는 생천(生天)의 획득을 위해서 도움이 되는 것이다. 이들은 행복으로 나가는 수단이 되지 못한다면 어떤 것도 의무일 수 없음을 강조했다.

자이미니의 주요관심은 다르마이며, 그것은 욕구된 대상(artha)이고, 이것의 소망성은 베다 경전의 명령적 선언(codan-lakao)에 의해서만 증명된다. 반드시 해야할 일(dharma)은 지각이나 추리에 의해서 결정될 수 없다는 함축된 이론을 지지하기 위해서 자이미니는 지식수단을 논구한다. 다르마는 현재 존재하는 실재가 아니며, 미래의 행위의 길은 지각으로 알려질 수 없다. 지각적 지식이란 감각기관과 현재 실재하는 것과의 접촉에서 발생하는 것이고, 추론도 지각에 의존하고 있는 것이므로 모두 무용이다. 오직 명령적 선언만이 반드시 해야 할 일을 언명할 수 있다.

푸르바미망사 : 바타 학파와 프라바카라 학파

쿠마릴라(7세기)는 자이미니의 경전과 샤바라의 주석에 평석(Vrttika)을 붙였다. 프라바카라는 쿠마릴라 이후의 사람으로 추정되는 바, 샤바라 주석의 평석인 브리하티를 지은 자이다. 쿠마릴라와 프라바카라는 기본적 문제에 있어서 다른 점이 많은데 전자는 자이미니와 샤바라에 더욱 가깝다. 그는 자이미니와 샤바라처럼 미망사를 다르마의 탐구에 국한시킨 반면, 프라바카라는 미망사에 베다 성전의 의미탐구라는 보다 포괄적인 임무를 부여했다. 쿠마릴라는 베다의 명령이 획득할 결과에 대한 명제까지 포함하는 것으로 이해했으며, 프라바카라는 바다리를 추종하면서 명령 그 자체로부터 결과에 대한 일체의 고려를 배제하고 의무감만을 사람의 행동동기로 상정했다.

형이상학과 인식론

바타 학파(쿠마릴라 학파를 지칭)와 프라바카라 학파는 형이상학적으로는 실재론자들이며 모두 불교적 관념론과 허무주의를 반박했다. 바타 존재론은 실체·성질·행위·보편·부정의 5가지 종류를 인정하고 있다. 실체는 10종이 있다고 했다. 프라바카라 존재론에서는 오직 8종의 실체가 인정되었으며, 부정을 제외하고 대신 힘·유사성·내속관계·수(數)를 첨가했다. 양 학파 모두 보편자의 실재를 인정하지만 상당히 다른 견해를 보이고 있다. 프라바카라는 지각의 예증 속에 내재하며 지각가능한 보편자만을 인정했다. 따라서 그들은 '존재' 등의 추상적 보편자나 브라만성(性)과 같이 단순히 상정된 보편자를 거부했다.

해석학과 의미론

경전 해석의 원리, 결과적으로 의미론에 있어서도 양 학파는 날카롭게 대립하고 있다. 프라바카라에 의하면 단어는 1차적으로 행위의 어떤 과정 또는 행위(krya)에 관련된 사물을 의미한다. 문장이 유의미한 담화의 단위를 구성하며, 단어 하나는 그것 자체로는 다른 것과 연결되지 않는 단일의 관념을 결코 표현할 수 없다. 문장은 단어의 의미들의 단순 복합물이 아닌 관계적 복합물을 지칭한다. 그에 따르면 예컨대 '소를 가져오너라'라는 어른들의 명령내리기와, 청년들의 복종하기를 관찰하면서 아이들은 문장의 의미를 배운다. 이러한 의미론적 접근법에서 베다 성전의 해석원리가 도출된다. 모든 베다 경전은 규정된 행위양식과 관계한다고 해석해야 하며, 경전에는 단순한 서술적 문장은 없다. 더욱이 베다 명령이 권위 있는 증언을 제시하고 있으므로 이것만이 인식과정의 유일한 방법으로 간주된다. 모든 다른 증언적 지식들은 성격상 추론적인 것이다. 해야 할 일에 관해서 프라바카라는 베다를 유일한 권위로 인정하고 있다. 쿠마릴라의 견해는 매우 다르다. 단어는 어떤 다른 것과의 관계성이 아니라 그것 자체의 의미를 전달한다. 따라서 그는 순전히 서술적인 문장도 유의미한 것으로 인정했다. 문장의 의미는 독립된 단어의 의미들이 어떤 관계적 구조하에서 연결된 것으로 간주되고 있으며, 구성된 단어의 의미는 그에게는 가장 간단한 의미단위였다. 사람들은 어른들의 충고에서뿐만 아니라 타인의 말하기를 보고서도 배운다.

니아야- 바이셰시카

바이셰시카 수트라는 BC 2세기에 활동했다고 추정되는 카나다라는 철학자에 의해 씌어졌다. 이 체계의 이름은 궁극개별자의 존재를 인정한다는 사실에서 얻었다. 니아야 수트라는 고타마 또는 악샤파다에 의해서 BC 2세기경에 씌어진 것 같으나, 그중 많은 부분이 후기에 편입되었다.

적어도 5세기의 주석가인 프라샤스타파와 7세기의 우드요타카라 같은 저자에 이르러서는 니아야와 바이셰시카 학파 사이에서 상대방 이론의 차용과 양 학파의 혼용이 본격적으로 진전되었지만, 이후에도 양 학파는 저자와 주석가에서 다른 전통을 갖게 된다. 10세기경에는 2개의 철학을 보다 성공적으로 결합하려는 많은 문헌이 산출되었는데, 그중에 바사르바지냐(950경)의 〈니아야사라 Nyyasra〉, 바라다라자(1100~50)의 〈타르키카락샤 Trkikarak〉, 케샤바 미슈라(1225~ 75)의 〈타르카바샤 Tarkabh〉, 안남 바타(17세기)의 〈타르카상그라하 Tarkasagraha〉 등이 있다.

니아야-바이셰시카 학파는 사물·성질·관계·보편자에 대해서 실재론적이다. 양 학파는 개인적 자아에 대해서는 다원론적이며, 또한 유신론적이다. 양자는 모두 외적 관계 (부분적으로만 내적인 [內屬] 관계), 원자론적 우주론, 새로운 결과물을 인정하고, 존재라는 개념을 가장 포괄적인 보편자로서 수용하고 있다. 지식을 자아의 성질로 간주하며, 진리의 본성에 대해서 대응론을, 진리의 검증에 대해서는 실용주의-정합설을 각각 지지하고 있다. 주로 수(數)에 대한 이론이나 물리이론과 화학이론 등을 다루므로, 이 두 학파를 구별짓는 요점은 대수롭지 않다.

고타마의 수트라는 400년경 바차야나가 주석을 달았고, 특히 공사상(空思想 nyavda)을 중심으로 하는 불교이론에 대해서 응수했다. 우드요타카라의 〈평석 Vrttika〉(635경)은 주요불교논리서 이후에 지어졌다. 그는 용수와 진나에 대한 반박을 시도했으며 진나의 지각설, 불교의 자아부정, 타자배제(anypoha)의 의미론을 비판했다. 긍정적으로 그는 감각과 대상과의 여섯 양상의 접촉(sanikarsa)을 최초로 도입했는데 이것은 이 학파의 주장으로 남게 된다. 우드요타카라는 추론을 둘로 나누는데, 첫째는 대전제(sdhya 所證)가 항상 현존하는 추론식, 그래서 대전제가 없으면 매개(hetu 能證)도 있을 수 없다는 규칙에만 의존하는 추론식이며, 둘째는 긍정적이며 부정적인 규칙들을 모두 사용하는 추론식이다. 그는 스포타 이론을 부정하고, 단어의 의미는 최후의 음절을 듣고 이전의 음절을 상기함으로써 파악된다고 주장했다. 9세기의 바차스파티 미슈라는 우드요타카라의 〈평석〉에다 타트파리아티카를 지었는데 이것으로 불교도에 대한 니아야의 입장을 강화시켰다. 그는 지각을 무규정적·비언어적·비판단적 지각과 규정적·언어적·판단적 지각의 둘로 나누었다. 중전제와 대전제 사이의 변충(遍充 vypti)개념을 정의하면서 그는 무효조건(updhi)이라는 개념을 도입하고 추론의 정당화를 위해서 필요한 관계의 종류가 무조건적이어야 한다는 점을 강조했다.

니아야 - 바이셰시카의 일반 형이상학적 입장은 개별자와 보편자, 변화와 영원성을 인정했다. 보편자 사이에는 수직계열과 궁극적 차이가 존재하며, 최고의 보편자는 존재이다. 실체는 성질의 기체와 내적 원인을 구성하는 것으로 정의된다. 성질은 실체도 아니고 행위도 아니지만 보편자의 기체이다. 왜냐하면 보편자란 오직 실체·성질·행위 속에만 내재할 수 있기 때문이다. 보편자는 영원하며 다(多) 속에 내재하는 것으로 정의된다. 궁극적 개별성은 원자, 영혼과 같은 영원한 실체에 속하며, 이 개별성들이 다른 방식으로는 설명이 불가능한 개별자들 사이의 모든 차별을 설명하고 있다. 내속(內屬 samavya : 화합관계)이란 보편자와 그 예증, 실체와 성질 또는 행위, 전체와 부분, 영원한 실체와 그것의 개별성 사이에 성립하는 것인데, 이 관계 아래에서는 한쪽이 존재하지 않으면 다른 쪽도 존재하지 않는다. 비존재(abhva)란 범주는 차이('갑은 을이 아니다')와 부재('갑은 을 속에 없다')로 나누어지는데, 부재는 다시 생성 이전의 부재, 소멸 이후의 부재, 다른 장소에서의 부재로 나누어진다. 이 학파에서는 알 수 있는 모든 것은 명명할 수 있는 것이다.


이슈바라크리슈나의 〈 수론송(數論頌) Skhya-krik〉은 상키야의 가장 오래된 작품이다. 그는 아수리가 판차시카에게 가르친 카필라의 핵심적 가르침을 정리하고 있다고 말했다.

자아의 본성

송(頌)에 따르면 수많은 자아들이 있으며 이들은 각각 순수의식이라는 본성을 지니고 있다. 자아(purua)는 원질(原質 prakti)도 아니며 거기에서 산출된 전개물도 아니다. 물질은 3가지 성질(guna : 구성요소)로 구성되어 있으나, 자아는 그렇지 않다. 물질은 비이지적이며 분별력이 없으나, 자아는 분별한다. 물질은 대상(viaya)이지만 자아는 그렇지 않다. 물질은 공통적이나 자아는 개성적(asmnya)이다. 물질과는 달리 자아는 비창조적(aprasavadharmin)이다. 자아들의 존재증명은 자연이 질서 있는 배열을 갖고 있다는 사실에 토대를 두고 있는데, 이 질서는 자연과는 다른 타자의 존재성(parrthatva)을 의미하여, 이 타자가 바로 의식적 정신임에 틀림없다는 것이다. 다수 자아의 존재증명은 사람들이 각각 다른 때에 태어나고 죽어간다는 사실, 그들이 같은 순간에 행동하지 않는다는 사실, 상이한 성질·태도·성벽 등을 표출한다는 사실에 근거해서 가능하다고 한다. 그러나 모든 자아는 수동적인 목격자(skin)이며, 본질적으로 독존하며(kevala), 중립적(madhyastha)이며, 비행위자(akart)이다.

세계(prakti)의 본성·기원·구조

갖가지 차별을 가지고 있는 사물과 사람들(심리적·물리적인 유기체로 간주될 때)로 구성된 현상적 자연은 물질의 원상(原狀)으로부터의 전개물이다. 이 관념은 인중유과론(因中有果論 satkryavda)에 근거하고 있다. 결과는 그것의 산출 이전에 이미 원인 속에 선재해 있는 것이다. 만약 그렇지 않다면, 무로부터의 생성을 인정해야 할 것이다. 원초적 프라크리트(시원적 재료)는 1차적 모태인데 여기에서 모든 차별상들이 발생하며, 이들 모두가 그 속에 무차별의 상태로 내재해 있다. 원질은 무원인적이며, 영원하고 편만하고 유일하며, 독립적·자기완결적이며, 구분되는 여러 부분을 갖고 있지 않다. 반면에 이러한 1차적 모태에서 생성되어 나오는 사물들은 원인을 가지고 영원하지 않고, 제한적이고 다수이며 의존적이고, 부분으로 이루어진 전체이며 구현되어 있는 것이다. 그러나 물질은 원초의 미현현의 상태이든 구현의 상태이든 3개의 구나(guna)로 구성되어 있으며, 분별력이 없고 대상이며, 무의식적이지만 창조적이다.


윤리학에서 수론송은 주지주의를 표방하며, 이것이 상키야 체계의 특성이다. 고(苦)는 자아의 본성에 대한 무지에서 나오는 것으로, 자유 및 최고선은 자아와 물질 사이의 구별에 대한 지식을 통해서 도달가능하다. 자유의 상태에서 자아는 자연에 대해 무심하게 되며, 행위자와 향수자(享受者)이기를 멈춘다. 자아는 그 본성인 순수목격의식이 된다.

요가 수트라

BC 2세기에 활동한 파탄잘리의 〈요가 수트라 Yoga-stras〉는 요가에 대해서 현존하는 책 중 최초의 것이다. 〈요가 수트라〉의 저자인 파탄잘리가 문법학자 파탄잘리는 아닌 것 같다. 요가 수트라는 상키야 체계와 긴밀한 관계를 가지고 있어 전통적으로 이 둘은 하나로 간주되기도 한다. 요가는 상키야의 체계에다 이슈바라라는 지고(至高)의 신을 부가하고 있으므로 유신론적 상키야로 불린다. 양자의 차이를 보면 상키야는 주지주의적이고 해탈의 수단으로써 형이상학적 지식을, 요가는 의지주의적이어서 동일한 원리의 자각을 위한 엄격한 자기억제의 필요성을 각각 강조하고 있다.

라자 요가와 하타 요가

파탄잘리의 요가는 그것으로 우리가 자기통제를 확보한다는 의미에서 라자 요가로 불리지만, 하타 요가(하타는 좌우 콧구멍을 통과하는 호흡을 의미)는 영적인 완성을 위한 방법으로써 신체의 자세, 호흡의 통어와 청결의 과정을 강조하고 있다. 하타 요가의 근본경전은 〈하타 요가 프라디피카 Haha-yoga-pradpik〉('하타 요가의 빛', 15세기)이다. 두 요가의 상호 관계는 "라자 없이 하타 없으며, 하타 없이 라자 없다"라는 격률로 표시된다.

종교적 결과

상키야-요가의 종교적 결과 중의 하나는 엄격한 고행주의에 대한 강조와 브라만주의에서 나온 제식주의적 요소들의 회피이다. 비록 두 철학이 힌두 신앙의 핵심부분으로 남아 있지만, 이 철학을 토대로 주요 종교적 교단이 형성된 적은 없다.


샹카라 이전의 망두키아 송(頌) 단편들

샹카라와 라마누자가 보다야나와 우파바르샤에 의해 지어졌다고 여겨지는 〈평석〉에 대해서 언급하고 있으나, 샹카라 이전에 지어진 〈베단타 수트라〉에 대한 주석은 전해지지 않는다. 그렇지만 샹카라 이전에도 경전에 대한 일원론적 해석가들은 있었다. 바르트리하리·만다나· 가우다파다가 그중에서 중요하다. 샹카라는 가우다파다를 그의 스승인 고빈다의 스승으로, 베다에서 불이론(advaita)을 발견했던 사람으로 칭송하고 있으며, 샹카라 자신은 가우다파다의 주요저작인 망두키아 우파니샤드 송에 대해서 주석을 달았다.

가우다파다 송은 4부분으로 나누어진다. 제1부는 우파니샤드 자체에 대한 설명이며, 제2부는 세계의 허망을 수립하고, 제3부는 실재의 유일성을 옹호하며, 제4부는 고(苦)로부터의 해탈 상태를 다루고 있다. '불타는 연료의 지멸'이라는 제4부의 제목이 시사하는 대로, 가우다파다의 철학적 견해는 불교의 중관철학, 유식학파에서 상당한 영향을 받고 있는데, 그의 기본목표 중의 하나는 우파니샤드의 가르침이 불교관념론자들의 주요이론과 부합한다는 사실을 증명하기 위한 것이었다. 그의 주요 철학적 원리에는, 만물은 꿈속에 보여진 것처럼 비실재적이며, 실재에는 생성도 소멸도 없다는 것이 포함되어 있다. 변화와 인과론에 대한 그의 비판은 용수를 상기시킨다. 이분법이란 망상의 생산력인 마야가 유일의 실재 위에 부탁(附託)한 것이다. 진정한 생성이란 없으므로, 가우다파다의 철학은 흔히 무생론(無生論 ajtivda)으로 불렸다. 여기까지 그는 불교의 유식학파에 동의하지만, 유식학파에서의 마음(citta)이 실재하고 정신적 관념의 실재적 흐름이 있다는 주장은 거부하고 있다.

샹카라는 가우다파다의 극단적인 환영주의(幻影主義)를 완화시켰다. 비록 그는 현상세계를 잘못된 현상으로 간주하고 있지만, 꿈을 비유로 사용하지는 않았다. 오히려 그는 세계의 객관성을 꿈과 환영의 주관성과 대조시키고 있다. 둘 다 초월적인 것과는 반대되지만, 경험계와 환영계의 차이는 그의 사유방식에 중심적인 것이었다.

베단타의 여러 학파들

베단타가 흔히 하나의 철학체계로 지칭되지만, 여기에는 서로 매우 다른 여러 학파들이 존재한다. 이들을 하나로 묶어주는 것은 일련의 공통경전에 대한 충성일 것이다. 이들은 〈우파니샤드〉·〈베단타 수트라〉·〈바가바드기타〉즉 베단타의 3개의 근본경전(prasthna)이다. 베단타의 여러 학파들은 모두 자신들의 입장을 지지하기 위해서 이들 3가지 근본자료들에 주석을 달았다. 그 차이점들의 핵심이 되는 문제 속에는 브라만의 본성, 현상계의 지위, 유한한 개인과 브라만과의 관계, 해탈의 본성과 수단이 포함되어 있다. 주요학파로는 샹카라의 무제한적 불이론(uddhdvaita), 라마누자의 제한불이론(viidvaita), 마드바의 이원론(dvaita), 바스카라의 불일불이설(不一不異說 bhedbheda), 그리고 동일과 차별을 다른 방식으로 강조하는 님바르카·발라바 학파들이 있다. 종교적 관점에서 보면 샹카라는 해탈의 유일한 수단으로써 형이상학적 지식을 찬양하고 신의 관념조차도 잘못으로 간주하고 있다. 라마누자는 반면에 지식에 수반된 박티(bhakti 信愛)의 길을 추천하고, 베다의 제식주의에 대해서 보다 관용의 태도를 보이고 있다. 마드바·님바르카·발라바는 모두 인격주의적 유신론을 주창하고 있는데, 여기서는 인격신에 대한 사랑과 헌신이 최고로 여겨졌다. 비록 인도철학에 대한 샹카라의 영향은 다른 학파들이 따라갈 수 없었다고 하더라도 실제의 종교적 삶에서는 유신론적 베단타가 샹카라의 추상적인 형이상학보다 훨씬 큰 영향을 행사했다. 샹카라 철학의 근본주장은 자아(유일하고 보편적이며, 영원하고 자증적인 자아)가 존재한다는 것이다. 자아의 본성은 초월적인 관점에서는 주관(raya)과 객관(viaya)이 없는 순수의식이다. 이런 의미에서 바르트리하리의 어불이론(語不二論 abddvaita), 불교도의 식불이론(識不二論), 가우다파다의 무생불이론(無生不二論)과 나란히 샹카라의 불이론은 자아불이론(tmdvaita)으로 불릴 수 있을 것이다. 현상계와 유한 개별적 자아는 경험적으로 실재하지만 고차적인 관점에서는 단순한 화현(化現)일 뿐이다. 이 주장을 뒷받침하기 위해서 샹카라는 논증과 성전의 해석에 의존했다. 그의 방법론적 원리에 의하면, 이성은 성전에 나타난 진리들을 정당화하기 위해서만 사용되어야 한다고 해서 주로 부정적 용법이었다. 그는 적수의 이론들을 반박하는 데 탁월한 논리적 기술을 보여주었으나, 그의 제자들은 불이론의 주장에 대해서 긍정적인 이성적 토대부여를 시도했다.

샹카라의 형이상학은 실재의 기준에 근거를 두고 있는데 다음과 같이 간략하게 공식화될 수 있다. 실재는 부정이 불가능한 것이다. 이 기준을 충족시키는 유일한 것은 의식이다. 왜냐하면 의식의 부정도 부정하는 의식의 존재를 전제로 하고 있기 때문이다. 부정은 상호부정(차이)이거나 부재일 것이다. 부재는 생성 이전 또는 소멸 이후의 어떤 사물의 부재이거나 또는 어떤 다른 장소에서의 부재일 것이다. 의식의 부정은 생각될 수 없으며, 어떤 종류의 부정도 의식의 술어가 될 수 없다. 의식은 자증적이다. 모든 다른 대상의 현현은 의식에 의존해야 한다. 의식에는 차별성도, 다(多)에 대한 의식도 없다. 복수의 의식 중심체들로 보이는 것은 화현으로 간주되어야 한다. 의식 이외에 진실로 존재하는 프라크리트 같은 것은 없다. 그런 것은 비실재적 타자이다. 의식에는 내적 부분들이나, 복수의 의식적 상태란 없다. 푸름의 의식과 노랑의 의식의 차이는 의식 내의 차이가 아니라 대상 사이의 차별이 의식에 부탁된 것이다. 이런 관점에서 상키야·불교유식론·니아야 - 바이셰시카의 다원론은 반박되었다. 실재는 유일, 무한, 영원, 자기조명적 정신이다. 이것은 어떤 한정도 갖지 않는다. 한정은 곧 부정이기 때문이다.

샹카라 철학의 근본문제는 순수자아가 어떻게 일상적 경험에서 '나의 의식'이라는 방식으로 개별화될까? 또는 '푸름에 대한 의식'에서처럼 의식이 어떻게 대상과 관계를 맺을까 하는 점이다. 어떤 것이 경험적 사실이나 동시에 그것이 그렇게 되어서는 안 된다면, 그것은 합리적으로 설명할 수 없다. 샹카라의 오류이론에 따르면 잘못된 화현(예를 들면 뱀으로 보인 새끼줄)은 적극적인 것이며, 제시된 실체이므로 존재도 비존재도 아니다. 오류는 따라서 둥근 4각형 같은 허구가 아니다. 샹카라는 존재·비존재라는 범주 이외에 오류라는 또하나의 범주를 설정했다. 세계와 제한된 개인들은 이런 의미에서 오류인 것이다. 이들은 합리적으로 설명될 수 없다. 이들은 브라만으로부터 논리적으로 도출될 수 있는 존재가 아니다. 또한 그들에 대한 경험은 브라만에 대한 명지(明知 vidy)로 지양(止揚)되는 것이다. 그들은 무명(avidy)에 의해서 브라만의 존재 위에 부탁된 화현인 것이다. 무명은 무시(無始)이며, 실재의 본성을 숨기고 그 위에 오류의 화현을 제시하는 어떤 적극적인 것이다.

샹카라에 따르면 해탈은 획득해야 하는 완전은 아니다. 자아의 참된 본성을 숨기고 있는 무명의 파괴를 통해서 그것이 실현되는 것이다. 신(神)이란 세상을 참으로 간주하고 그 창조주와 지배자를 찾으려고 하는 무명의 마음을 가진 자에게 나타나는 것이다. 종교적 삶은 인간과 신, 덕과 악, 금생과 내생이라는 이분법적 관념들에 의해서 유지된다. 해탈의 상태에서는 이러한 이분법은 극복된다. 해탈이 육신을 지닌 상태에서 가능하다는 것도 샹카라 신념의 중요한 일부분이다. 지고의 상태를 가져오는 것은 무명의 파괴이므로 신체에는 아무런 일도 일어나지 않는다. 이는 정신에 대한 비실재적 한계일 따름이다.


라마누자는 샹카라의 무한정적·무성질적·무차별적인 실재로서의 브라만 관념을 부정했다. 그런 실재는 지각되지도 알려지지도 사고되지도 않으며 언급조차 할 수 없으므로 허구와 다름없기 때문이다. 이 주장의 유지를 위해서 라마누자는 〈베단타 수트라〉에 대한 주석 〈슈리 바시아 r-bhya〉에서 지식의 여러 가지 방법을 자세히 논구하고 있다. 그에게는 주관도 객관도 없는 순수의식은 없다. 모든 의식은 무엇에 대한 의식이며 누구에게 속해 있다. 한 의식이 다른 의식의 대상이 될 수 없다는 점도 사실이 아니다. 자신의 과거의식은 현재의식의 대상이 된다. 의식은 자아라는 의식소유주에게 대상을 제시할 때만 자증적이다.

샹카라의 실재론을 부정하면서 라마누자는 브라만이란 한량없이 완전하고 탁월한 덕성을 가진 존재로서 그의 완전성은 초월될 수 없다고 한다. 세계와 유한의 개인은 실재하며 함께 브라만의 신체를 구성하고 있다. 신체와 영혼이란 범주는 그의 사유방식에 중심적이다. 신체는 영혼에게 봉사하기 위해서 통제되고 움직여진다. 물질적 세계와 의식적 영혼들은 실체적 실재들이지만 브라만과 불가분리적이며 신체가 영혼의 성격이 될 수 있듯이 브라만의 성격이 될 수도 있다. 브라만은 영혼으로도 물질적으로도 성격화된다. 라마누자와 그의 추종자들은 샹카라의 환영주의, 특히 그의 무명론과 세계의 허망성에 대한 비판을 시도했다. 라마누자에게는 무시(無始)의 적극적 무명은 어떤 장소와 어떤 대상도 갖지 못한다. 만일 그 무명이 스스로 빛나는 브라만을 정말로 숨긴다면, 무명의 손아귀에서 벗어날 길이 없다. 라마누자 인식론의 특징은 타협할 줄 모르는 실재론이다. 알려진 것은 무엇이든 실재적이며 실재만이 알려진다. 이런 이론에서 그는 오류의 대상도 실재한다는 주장으로 나아간다. 오류란 불완전한 지식이다. 오류의 교정은 불완전한 지식의 완성이다. 해탈은 개인이 부정되는 상태가 아니다. 사실 '나'라는 생각은 해탈 이후에도 잔존한다. 왜냐하면 자아야말로 '나'라는 관념의 대상이기 때문이다. 파괴된 것은 자아주의, 즉 독립되었다는 잘못된 생각이다. 거기로 나아가는 방법은 신의 은총으로 이끌어주는 박티이다. 라마누자의 박티란 사랑을 수반한 강렬한 명상(dhyna)이다. 자기자신에게 부과된 경전적 의무는 초극될 수 없다. 해탈이란 신과 함께 하는 가운데의 축복이다. 라마누자가 강조한 만인의 길은 신의 의지에 대한 완전 복종이며, 그의 은총을 받기에 합당한 자로 자신을 만드는 것이다. 사회관에서 라마누자는 박티가 카스트 및 계급간의 장애물을 인정하지 않는다고 한다.

언어철학자들 : 바르트리하리와 만다나 미슈라

여기에서 논의되는 언어철학자들은 바르트리하리(7세기)와 만다나 미슈라(8세기)가 이끌었던 문법학자들이다. 특히 후자는 쿠마릴라의 제자로 알려져 있지만 미망사 학파와는 매우 다른 견해를 가지고 있었다. 문법학자들은 미망사 학파처럼 언어와 의미의 문제에 관심을 가지고 있었다. 그러나 이들의 주요경전으로는 바르트리하리의 〈바키아파디야 Vkyapadya〉('文章單語篇'), 만다나의 주요작품으로 〈브라마 성취 Brahmasiddhi〉·〈스포타 성취 Spoa-siddhi〉·〈명령본성탐구 Vidhiviveka〉 등이 있다.

바르트리하리는 그의 최초의 원리로서 미망사와 니아야 실재론의 한 원리, 즉 사물자체와 접촉한다는 비개념적 지각이 존재한다는 원리를 부정한다. 그에게는 이것은 불가능한 일이다. 왜냐하면 모든 지식은 말에 의해서 관통되며 밝혀지기 때문이다. 따라서 모든 지식은 언어적이며 대상의 차이는 말의 차이로 환원된다. 형이상학적 어불이론은 이 이론에서 멀지 않다. 즉 한 단어의 본질은 인간의 상상적 구성력(kalpan)에 의해서 명색(名色)의 세계로 나타난다. 형이상학적으로 바르트리하리는 샹카라의 불이론이나 법칭과 같은 불교철학자의 학설과 매우 유사하다. 이 형이상학이론은 다른 또하나의 이론, 즉 스포타('의미가 거기에서 발생하게 되는 그것') 이론을 이용하고 있다. 대부분의 인도철학자들은 말이나 문장이 지닌 의미의 정확한 담지자가 무엇인가 하는 문제에 관심을 가지고 있었다. 만일 음절들이 일시적이며, 우리가 한 단어의 음절들에 의해서 생긴 음성을 듣는 데 있어서 각 음성이 그 다음 음성에 의해서 대체된다면, 어느 누구도 그 단어를 전체로 파악할 수 없다. 그러면 단어의 의미를 어떻게 파악할까 하는 것이 문제가 된다. 문장의 경우도 마찬가지이다. 미망사 학파는 음성의 영원성을 상정했고 영원한 음성 및 음성복합체(단어와 문장들)를 그것들의 화현에서 구별했다. 문법학자는 그 대신에 단어와 음성을 구분했고 단어 자체를 의미의 담지자로 간주했다. 이런 면에서 단어는 스포타인 것이다.

음성은 공간적이며 시간적 관계를 갖는다. 즉 상이한 화자(話者)에 의해서 다르게 산출된다. 그러나 의미담지자로서의 단어가 크기와 시간적 측면을 지닌다고 할 수는 없다. 그것은 분할불가능하며 영원하다. 스포타와 구별되는 것으로는 추상적 음성모형(prktadhvani)과 발화된 음(viktadhvani)이 있다. 나아가 바르트리하리에게 문장이란 단어의 집성이나 그것들의 질서 있는 계열이 아니다. 단어는 오히려 문장에서 추상화된 것이다. 그러므로 문장 스포타가 의미의 1차적 단위이다. 단어도 역시 프라티바로 불리는 순간적 직각에 의해서 한 단위로 파악된다.

마하바라타〉의 철학적 부분들

대서사시 〈마하바라타 Mahbhrata〉는 여러 가지 비아리안 공동체를 아리안화하는 과정에서 접하게 되는 새로운 환경에 적응하기 위해서 보여준 베다 브라만주의의 시도를 대변하고 있다. 다양한 여러 종교적·철학적 전통은 이 작품 속에 종합되었다.

〈해탈의 법〉, 상키야 이전의 문헌

서사시의 철학적 견해 속에는 상키야 신념(실재적 물질과 개인적 영혼들의 다수성에 대한 신념)의 초기형태(이슈바라 크리슈나의 고전 상키야 철학 이전의 것)를 간직하고 있다. 〈마하바라타〉 제12권의 〈해탈의 법 Mokadharma〉은 초기의 원형 상키야 경전으로 가득 차 있다. 카필라의 상키야-요가, 비슈누의 판차라트라, 베다, 파슈파타(가축의 主)의 4개 철학파에 대한 언급도 있다. 판차라트라에 속하는 이 서사시는 기본적으로 바가바타 신앙 속에 초기의 비체계적인 상키야 이념들을 혼융시키려고 시도했다. 상키야의 25원리(tattva)에 대해서 새로운 범주화가 시도되고 있으며 비상키야의 제26원리인 이슈바라가 도입되고 있다.

왕권과 국가에 대한 초기이론들

〈마하바라타〉의 제12권 '위로의 책'인 〈샨티 파르반 nti Parvan〉 속에는, 왕권과 왕법(rjadharma)의 기원에 관해서 괄목할 만한 설명이 있다. 이야기의 주인공인 비슈마는 왕권의 기원에 관련해서 2개의 이론에 대해 긍정적으로 언급했는데, 두 이론은 모두 국왕이 부재하던 시대에 대해서 말하고 있다. 한 설명에 따르면 국왕 이전의 시대는 약자에 대한 불안전과 강자의 무제한의 권력으로 특징지어지는 시대이다. 다른 설명에 의하면 그 시대는 평화와 안전의 시대였다. 이러한 이상적 상태로부터 인류가 타락했으며, 그래서 조직적인 힘, 즉 왕권의 필수성이 발생했다는 것이다. 전자의 설명에 따르면 인류에 대한 보호와 안정을 위해서 왕권수립 이전 시대의 불안정으로부터 신적인 지배자에 의한 왕권수립으로 이행했다는 것이다. 이와같이 왕권은 역사적인 기원을 갖는다. 왕의 1차적 기능은 보호의 기능이며, 형률(刑律 daanti)은 왕법에 종속된다. 비록 이 서사시가 왕의 반신성(半神性)을 인정하고는 있으나 〈마하바라타〉는 다르마·도덕법을 왕보다 우위에 두고 있다.

〈실리론〉의 세계관

카우틸리아의 〈 실리론(實利論) Artha stra〉(BC 321~296)은 인생의 4대 목표 중의 하나인 아르타, 즉 물질적 실리에 대한 학문이다. 카우틸리아는 아르타를 '인생을 유지하는 수단들'로 이해하고 있으며, 부와 토지가 그 핵심이다. 실리론은 토지를 효율적으로 유지·사용하는 방법에 관심을 가지고 있는 정치와 경제에 대한 저작이다.

왕권이론과 치국책

카우틸리아는 왕권이 종족(kula)에 속할 수 있다고 하면서도 군주제에 관심을 가졌다. 그는 국왕의 신성한 성격, 국왕의 직분에 대한 신의 재가란 이념을 지지했으나 동시에 국왕의 선출적 기원이론과 타협하기를 모색했다. 그는 국왕이 없는 자연상태를 강자가 약자를 집어삼키는 일종의 무정부상태로 보고 있다. 국왕의 4가지 기능은 획득하지 못한 것의 획득, 획득한 것의 보호, 보호한 것의 확충, 필요한 사람에 대한 잉여물의 수여이다. 정치조직은 국왕·대신·영토·성채·국고·군대·우방의 7요소로 구성되며, 이들은 상호유기적으로 연결되어 있다. 국왕의 3가지 권력은 선량한 행정관의 힘, 국왕 자신의 위엄, 국왕의 권면하는 힘이다. 사제(司祭)는 국가조직의 요소가 아니다. 국왕이라도 다르마의 법칙에서 면제되지 않는다. '다르마의 선포자'로서의 국왕은 스스로 성애·분노·탐욕·허영심·거만·열광이라는 6가지 정염에서 자유로워야 한다. 카우틸리아가 주창하고 있는 것은 계몽적 군주의 온정주의이다.

공동선의 이념

신하의 행복이 국왕의 행복이다. 국왕의 주요임무는 보호하는 일이다. 군주제란 무정부주의에 대한 유일한 대안이다. 왕의 임무는 기근·홍수·전염병이라는 천재를 막는 일이다. 농업·공업·광업, 노인·병자·빈민의 보호, 간첩의 도움을 받아 범죄 통제하기, 소송의 해결 등이 국왕의 의무이다.

국가간의 관계

타국과의 관계에 대해서는 카우틸리아의 사고는 고차원적인 도덕이상주의가 아니라 국가이익의 필요에 근거하고 있다. 그는 외교의 6가지 책략을 기술하고 있다. 조약, 전쟁, 진주(進駐), 중립, 강력한 군주의 보호확보, 이중정책이 그것이다. 타국과 비교해서 약하면 평화를 추구할 것, 힘이 세면 전쟁을 일으킬 것, 승산이 없다고 생각하면 중립을 지킬 것, 유리하다고 판단되면 진주할 것, 부족하다고 생각되면 보호를 확보할 것, 조력이 필요한 일을 도모할 때는 이중정책을 채용할 것이 외교책략의 핵심이다.


불교는 인도종교사 가운데 완전히 새로운 현상은 아니었다. 이미 현존하고 있는 브라만 또는 비아리안적인 관념들을 토대로 해서 성립되었기 때문이다. 석가모니 이전 BC 6세기경에는 아트만·카르마·목샤(해탈)라는 브라만적인 이론들에 대한 반대의 목소리들이 있었다. 푸라나 카샤파류의 자연주의자, 아지비카 즉 마칼리 고살라류의 결정론자, 아지타 케사캄발린류의 물질주의자, 자기훈련의 고행과 업의 효용성을 믿었던 니간타 나타푸타, 회의주의자인 산자야 베탈리푸타 등이 반대의 대표자들이었다. 불교·자이나교·아지비카는 모두 브라마나의 제식주의적 다신론, 〈우파니샤드〉의 일원론적 신비주의를 함께 부정했다. 이들 모두는 우주 속에 있는 자연법의 지배를 인정했다. 불교는 아트만이라는 근본개념은 거부했으나, 카르마와 해탈이라는 베다적 관념은 간직했다.

4성제와 8정도

석가모니는 고집멸도(苦集滅道)와 8정도를 가르쳤다. 비록 두카(dukha)라는 말이 통상적으로 고통을 의미하지만 고타마의 용법은 고와 낙, 행복과 고통도 여기에 포함시켰다. 고에는 일상적인 고, 무상고, 오온성고(五蘊盛苦)의 3가지가 있다. 한마디로 무상한 것, 무엇이든 인과율에 종속되는 것은 고인데 이것이 인간의 상황이다. 고의 본성을 아는 자는 그 원인도 안다. 고의 원인을 갈애(渴愛 tn)와 무명에서 찾고 그 과정을 설명한 것이 12연기설이다. 석가모니는 쾌락과 고행의 삶을 부정하고 중도를 제시했는데, 이것은 8정도로 이루어졌다.

무아의 관념과 열반

초기불교의 중요한 2가지 개념은 무아(antman)와 열반(nirva)이다. 석가모니는 무아의 도리를 이론이 아니라 사물의 여실한 모습에 대한 현상학적인 기술로 제시했다. 유랑승 바차고타와의 대화 가운데 석가모니는 상주론(vatavda)과 단멸론(ucchedavda)을 거부했다. 상주론은 무아와 합치하지 않으며, 단멸론은 존재하지도 않는 자아를 가졌을 때만 의미가 있다. 어떤 형이상학자에도 동의하지 않으면서, 색(色)·수(受)·상(想)·행(行)·식(識)의 오온으로부터 의식의 흐름속에 '내가 있다'라는 의식이 스스로를 형성하는 과정을 석가모니는 기술하고 있다. 무아론은 푸드갈라라는 개인적 인격과 담마스라는 존재요소에 각각 적용되는 2가지 면을 갖고 있다. 전자의 측면에서는 개인은 5온으로 되어 있음을 주장하고, 후자의 측면에서는 모든 요소들의 절대 비실재성을 의미한다. 전자의 진리에 대한 직관적 통찰로 정염과 욕망이 사라지며, 후자의 진리에 대한 통찰로 사물 일반에 대한 오해를 불식한다. 전자는 번뇌장(煩惱障 klevaraa)을, 후자는 소지장(所知障 jñey-varaa)을 제거하면서 마침내 열반으로 이끈다. 초기 경전에는 열반에 대한 긍정적 설명과 부정적 설명이 함께 보인다. 열반이란 극단적인 지멸(止滅)의 상태이지만, 생존의 지멸이 아니라 정염과 고통의 지멸이다. 이는 인과계열의 초월이며, 자유와 자발성, 희열의 상태이다. 열반은 그러나 어떤 과정의 결과가 아니다. 그렇다면 그것도 또하나의 멸망하는 상태일 따름이기 때문이다. 이것은 진리이지만 〈우파니샤드〉에서 말하는 불멸의 실체는 아니다. 이 진리는 극단적인 무아, 사물의 무상, 자아의 공, 모든 사물의 무상에 대한 진리이다. 이 진리의 깨달음과 함께 무명은 없어지고, 모든 갈애·고·증오는 함께 사라진다( → 불교).

대승불교 : 용수와 공(空)의 철학

대승불교의 시초는 비록 대중부(大衆部)·설일체유부(說一切有部)·경량부(經量部) 등의 여러 부파이지만, 철학적 토대를 부여한 자는 용수(龍樹 Ngrjuna)였다. 그에 따르면 개인도 공이며 법도 공이다. 그는 공(nyat)의 개념을 확장해서 모든 개념과 실체를 포괄했다. '공'이란 연기론에로의 종속과 무자성(無自性)을 의미한다. 용수는 공의 도리로 제한된 것과 무제한의 것, 주관과 객관, 상대적인 것과 절대적인 것, 윤회와 열반 사이에 존재하는 이분법을 거부하면서, 존재론적 일원론에 도달했다. 그러면서 그는 진제와 속제라는 2개의 진리질서를 주장하면서 인식론적인 이원론을 지지했다. 유일의 실재는 불가설(不可設)이다. 용수는 철학자들이 실재를 이해하기 위해서 동원했던 주요철학범주들을 비판하고 이들 모두가 자기모순에 빠져 있음을 보여주었다. 그들 가운데는 관계, 부분적 동일성과 차이성, 인과, 변화, 자아, 지식, 보편자, 그리고 적당한 지식수단(prama) 등의 개념들이 포함되어 있다. 용수의 철학은 중관철학으로 불리기도 한다. 그것은 중도를 따른다는 의미인데, 중도란 '실재는 영원하다'는 주장과 '실재는 변화한다'와 같은 상반된 두 주장의 종합이 아니라, 두 주장 모두가 공이며 오류임을 보이는 데 있다. '실재는 영원하기도 하며 변화하기도 한다'는 주장은 또하나의 형이상학적 언명이며, '실제는 영원하지도 변화하지도 않는다'는 정반대의 주장이 전자보다는 고차원적이긴 하지만 여전히 하나의 형이상학적 견해(di)에 불과하다. 용수에게는 일체의 형이상학적 견해는 잘못이다. 용수는 이성의 비판을 위해서 이성을 사용했다. 논리의 용법을 이처럼 프라상가로 알려진 부정적이며 간접적인 방법에 국한시킨 그의 제자들은 귀류논증파(歸謬論證派 prsagika)로 알려졌으며, 성천(聖天 ryadeva)·불호(佛護)·월칭(月稱 Candrakrti) 등이 여기에 속한다. 그러나 청변(淸弁) 등은 직접적 논증의 방법을 따르며, 자재논증파(自在論證派)로 불린다. 용수와 더불어 불교논리학은 자신의 특성을 확립하고, 그무렵 유식학파가 중관학파에서 분리되어 나간다.


형 무착(無着 Asaga)에 의해서 유식으로 돌아선 세친(世親 Vasubandhu)은 〈 유식론 Vijñpti mtrta Siddhi〉을 저술하여 이른바 외적 대상은 단지 정신적 관념에 불과하다는 주장을 옹호했다. 유식학파의 관념론은 경량부의 표상론의 논리적 발전이다. 외계의 존재가 단지 추론되었다는 생각은 만족스럽지 못하기 때문이다. 만일 의식이 자기조명적(svapraksa)이고 형상을 지닌다면, 이른바 외적 대상에 속한다고 여겨지는 형상을 의식의 형상으로 주장하는 것이 보다 논리적이라는 것이다. 여기에 또하나의 다른 관념, 즉 의식이 형상을 취하고 이를 외화(外化)하려는 경향성을 설명해주는 무시(無始)의 힘이란 관념이 필요하다. 이것이 바로 상상력(kalpan)이다. 유식은 전통적인 6식(六識)에 말라식(末那識 manas)과 장식(藏識 laya-vijñna)이라는 의식양상을 부가한 것이다. 장식은 청결하고 불결한 과거경험의 종자를 간직하고 있다. 잠재의식이나 무의식의 초기형태라고 볼 수 있는 이러한 의식양상들은 개인적 경험의 질서를 설명하기 위한 이론적 구조물이다. 그렇지만 일상적 세계를 어떻게 설명할 것인가 하는 문제가 유식파의 주요난제로 남아 있다. 열반의 상태는 장식이 그 종자와 함께 없어지는 상태(layaparvtti)인 것이다. 개인적 관념들은 결국 단순한 상상에 불과하며, 의식은 그 본성상 주관과 객관의 구별이 없다. 이 불가설의 의식이 만물의 근본이 되는 여시(如始 tathat)이다. 장식도 여시도 실체적인 것으로 여겨지지는 않는다. 세친과 무착은 불교논리학의 발전에도 책임이 있다. 세친은 '지각'을 대상에 의해서 야기된 지식으로 정의했으나 이것은 5세기의 논리학자 진나에 의해서 세친 초기의 실재론적 시기에 속한 것으로 거부당했다. 세친은 또한 추론을 특성을 통해서 대상을 아는 것으로 정의했으나, 8세기의 다르마못타라는 이것이 추론의 본질에 대한 정의가 아니라 그것의 생성기원일 따름이라고 했다.


진나(陳那 Dignga)의 〈 양집성론(量集成論) Pramasamuccaya〉은 불교논리학의 가장 위대한 저서 중의 하나이다. 진나는 지각을 '이름이나 류(類)개념을 포함한 모든 개념적 구성물에서 자유로운 지식'으로 새롭게 정의했다. 그에게는 순수지각만이 지각이다. 추론에서는 그는 위자비량(爲自比量)·위타비량(爲他比量)으로 나누고, 정당한 증인(證因 hetu)의 3조건을 제시했다. 주장의 주제(paka)에 대한 속성일 것, 동례군(同例群 sapaka)에만 존재할 것, 이례군(異例群 vipaka)에는 결코 존재하지 않을 것이 그것들이다. 진나는 그의 〈헤투 차크라〉('因의 輪')에서 증인을 9가지 유형으로 나누고, 올바른 이유(正因), 잘못된 이유(相違似因), 진위부정의 이유(不正似因)로 분류했다. 진나의 전통은 7세기의 법칭(法稱 Dharmakrti)에 의해서 더욱 발전되었는데, 법칭은 지각에 대한 진나의 정의를 수정하여 '무착란'(abrnta)이라는 규정을 첨가했다. 그리고 〈정리일적(正理一滴) Nyyabindu〉에서 지각을 감관지, 마음에 의한 지각(manovijñana), 자증지(自證知), 요긴에 의한 지각 등 4가지로 구분하고 있다. 법칭은 또한 타당한 추리근거로서 본질적 속성(syabhva), 결과(krya), 비인식(anupalabdhi)의 3가지를 제시했다. 법칭은, 지각의 대상은 순수개별자, 추론의 대상은 보편자라는 사실을 불교인식론의 중심적 이론으로 확립했다. 진나와 법칭은 완화된 형태의 관념론을 대변하고 있다.


인도의 현대철학은 서양철학과의 만남을 통해 전통적 인도철학의 현대적 재해석을 시도하고 있다. 대표적 철학자로서 오로 빈도라다크리슈난이 널리 알려져 있다. 오로 빈도 고스(1872~1950)는 진화의 개념을 받아들이고 현상 세계의 실재를 긍정함으로써 인류의 영적 진화를 중심으로 베단타 철학의 독창적 재해석을 시도했다. 사르베팔리 라다크리슈난(1888~1975)은 전통적으로 종교적 다원성을 수용해온 힌두교의 포용적 태도를 바탕으로 하는 종교철학을 전개하여 오늘날 종교간의 대화와 이해가 진전되는 데 크게 기여했다. 그는 종교를 외적 표현과 체험으로 나누어 교리·신학·제도·의례 등 종교의 외적 표현은 종교들마다 서로 많은 차이를 보이지만, 모든 언어적 표현과 논리를 초월하는 내적 체험은 모든 종교에서 근본적으로 일치한다고 했으며, 내적인 체험과 외적인 표현을 각각 종교의 영혼과 육체라고 하여 종교의 핵심이 내적인 체험에 있음을 강조했다.

J. N. Mohanty 글


4 Bibliography



4.1 General:

S.N. DASGUPTA, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vol. (1922-55, reprinted 1977), a comprehensive account, though its scholarship tends to outweigh philosophical insight; M. HIRIYANNA, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (1932, reissued 1975), lucidly written, based on reliable acquaintance with original source material but leaving out many minor, though important, schools of thought; S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Indian Philosophy, 2 vol. (1923-27), a very readable account written from an idealistic point of view--may often mislead; S.C. VIDYABHUSAN, A History of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic (1909), still indispensable, though outdated and containing many inaccuracies; U.N. GHOSHAL, A History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages (1959); DONALD H. BISHOP (ed.), Indian Thought: An Introduction (1975), 15 historical essays by Indian scholars; BALBIR SINGH, The Conceptual Framework of Indian Philosophy (1976), a study of 12 fundamental concepts; KARL H. POTTER (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (1970- ), a very valuable source. For current articles on Indian philosophy, see Philosophy East and West (quarterly) and The Journal of Indian Philosophy (quarterly).


4.2 Critical studies from the point of view of modern Western thought:

KARL H. POTTER, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (1963, reprinted 1976); NINIAN SMART, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy (1964); and B.K. MATILAL, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971), three books that, together, form a good introduction to the logical, dialectical, and analytical aspects of Indian philosophy; KEWAL KRISHAN MITTAL, Materialism in Indian Thought (1974).


4.3 English translations of Sanskrit sources:

S. RADHAKRISHNAN and C.A. MOORE (eds.), A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (1957), an excellent one-volume collection of source materials (does not include many medieval masterpieces on logic and epistemology); The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd ed., trans. by R.E. HUME (1931); The Bhagavadgita, trans. by S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1948).


4.4 Selected readings on the systems and texts:

(Upanisads): ARUN SHOURIE, Hinduism, Essence and Consequence: A Study of the Upanishads, the Gita, and the Brahma-Sutras (1980), an analysis and assessment of Brahmanical Hinduism; R.D. RANADE, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1968). (Bhagavadgita): SRI AUROBINDO, Essays on the Gita (1916-20, reissued 1974). (Mahabharata): EDWARD W. HOPKINS, The Great Epic of India (1901, reprinted 1973). (Carvakas and Ajivikas): DAKSHINARANJAN SHASTRI, A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism (1930); DALE RIEPE, Early Indian Philosophical Materialism (1954); A.L. BASHAM, The History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas (1951, reprinted 1981). (Buddhism): BENIMADHAB BARUA, Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1974); DAVID J. KALUPAHANA, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis (1976); A.L. HERMAN, An Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism (1983); TH. STCHERBATSKY, Buddhist Logic, 2 vol. (Eng. trans. 1930-32, reissued 1970), a work of great scholarship, marred by too-hasty comparisons with 19th-century European philosophers, and containing an English translation of Dharmakirti's Nyayavindu; T.R.V. MURTY, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1955, reissued 1980); (Mimamsa): A. BERRIEDALE KEITH, Karma-mimamsa (1921, reprinted 1978); P. SHASTRI, Introduction to the Purva Mimamsa, 2nd ed. (1980). (Vedanta): ERIC J. LOTT, Vedantic Approaches to God (1980), a clear introduction to the religious philosophies of Vedanta; JACOB KATTACKAL, Religion and Ethics in Advaita (1980, reprinted 1982); T.M.P. MAHADEVAN, Gaudapada: A Study in Early Advaita (1952; 4th ed., 1975); ELIOT DEUTSCH, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (1969, reissued 1973); P.N. SRINIVASACHARI, The Philosophy of Vishistadvaita (1943, reprinted 1973). (Vaisnavism and Shaivism): R.G. BHANDARKAR, Vaisnavism, Shaivism and Minor Religious Systems (1913, reissued 1980). (Nyaya-Vaishesika): H. UI, The Vaisheshika Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1962); N.S. JUNANKAR, Gautama: The Nyaya Philosophy (1978); S.C. CHATTERJEE, Nyaya Theory of Knowledge (1939); D.H. INGALLS, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (1951); J.N. MOHANTY (trans.), Gangesa's Theory of Truth (1966); B.K. MATILAL, The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation (1969). (Samkhya-Yoga): S.N. DASGUPTA, The Study of Patanjali (1920); MIRCEA ELIADE, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, 2nd ed. (1969; originally published in French, 1954); KAREL WERNER, Yoga and Indian Philosophy (1977), a wide-ranging introduction. (Mughal philosophy): AZIZ AHMAD, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (1964).


4.5 Contemporary Indian philosophy:

S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy (1920); RABINDRANATH TAGORE, Religion of Man (1931, reprinted 1981); S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (1939, reissued 1974); SRI AUROBINDO, The Life Divine (1949, reissued 1982); S. RADHAKRISHNAN and J.H. MUIRHEAD (eds.), Contemporary Indian Philosophy, 2nd ed. (1952); P.T. RAJU, Idealistic Thought of India (1953, reprinted 1973); KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA, Studies in Philosophy, 2 vol. (1956-58), and (ed.), Recent Indian Philosophy (1962), and Philosophical Papers (1969); G. MISRA, Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical Problems (1970); K.S. MURTY and K.R. RAO (eds.), Current Trends in Indian Philosophy (1972); MARGARET CHATTERJEE (ed.), Contemporary Indian Philosophy (1974); J.N. MOHANTY, "Philosophy in India: 1967-1973," Review of Metaphysics, 28:54-84 (1974); N.K. DEVARAJA (ed.), Indian Philosophy Today (1975); DALE RIEPE, Indian Philosophy Since Independence (1979), an assessment from the perspective of historical and dialectical materialism; T.M.P. MAHADEVAN and G.V. SAROJA, Contemporary Indian Philosophy (1981), brief accounts of the lives and thought of eight philosophers of the first half of the 20th century.



  • 개론서
    • 인도철학 : H. Hiriyanna, 김형준 역, 예문서원, 1993
    • 인도의 철학 : 하인리히 짐머, J. 캠벨 편, 김용환 역, 대원사, 1992
    • 인도철학 : 인도철학회 편, 민족사, 1992
    • 인도철학 : R. 풀리간들라, 이지수 역, 민족사, 1991
    • 인도철학 : 정태혁, 학연사, 1988
    • 인도사상의 역사 : 조도경정 외, 정호영 역, 민족사, 1988
    • 인도의 생철학(탐구신서 287) : 라다크리슈난, 김석진 역, 탐구당, 1985
    • 인도철학사 : 길희성, 민음사, 1984
    • 인도사상사 : 中村元, 김용식·박재천 공역, 서광사, 1983
  • 각론
    • 아드바이타 베단타 : 엘리엇 도이치, 허우성 역, 서광사, 1993
    • 불교철학 : 칼루파하나, 최유진 역, 천지, 1992
    • 우파니샤드(정음신서 59) : 박석일, 정음사, 1991
    • 인도불교철학 : 카지야마 유이치, 권오민 역, 민족사, 1990
    • 베단타철학 : 김선근, 불광출판부, 1990
    • 요가(다르마총서 6) : M. 엘리아데, 정위교 역, 고려원, 1989
    • 파탄잘리(성자시리즈 2) : M. 엘리아데, 박인철 역, 대원사, 1988
    • 바가바드기타(다르마 총서 7) : 석진오, 고려원, 1987
    • 인도의 사상 : 석진오 편저, 홍법원, 1984
    • 인도정신 : 한성규, 명문당, 1983
    • 샹카철학의 전변설 연구 - 불교에서 유관한 사고와의 대비를 중심으로 : 정승석, 동국대학교 박사학위논문, 1991
    • 인도부료철학의 몇가지 문제들 - 마드하와의 전철학 강요와 관련하여 〈한국불교학〉 11 : 이지수, 1986



[ ] [ 위로 ] [ 지식의 분야 ] [ 학파와 학설 ] [ 서양 철학사 ] [ 형이상학 ] [ 인식론 ] [ 윤리학 ] [ 미 학 ] [ 인류학 ] [ 이데올로기 ] [ 인문주의 ] [ 초월주의 ] [ 중국 철학 ] [ 인도 철학 ] [ 그리스 철학 ]


 게시판  검색  자료실  사이트맵  예수와나?

[ 뒤로 ] [ ] [ 위로 ] [ 다음 ] Homepage

This page was last modified 2001/05/30