Indian philosophy,
which includes both orthodox (astika)
systems, namely, the Nyaya, Vaishesika, Samkhya,
Yoga, Purva-mimamsa, and Vedanta schools of
philosophy, and unorthodox (nastika)
systems, such as Buddhism and Jainism, has been concerned with various
philosophical problems. Significant among these concerns have been the nature of
the world (cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics),
logic, the nature of knowledge (epistemology), ethics,
and religion.
In relation to Western philosophical
thought, Indian philosophy offers both surprising points of affinity and
illuminating differences. The differences highlight certain fundamentally new
questions that the Indian philosophers asked. The similarities reveal that, even
when philosophers in India and the West were grappling with the same problems
and sometimes even suggesting similar theories, Indian thinkers were advancing
novel formulations and argumentations. Problems that the Indian philosophers
raised for consideration, but that their Western counterparts never did, include
such matters as the origin (utpatti) and apprehension ( jñapti)
of truth (pramanya). Problems that the
Indian philosophers for the most part ignored but that helped shape Western
philosophy include the question of whether knowledge arises from experience or
from reason and distinctions such as that between analytic and synthetic
judgments or between contingent and necessary truths. Indian thought, therefore,
provides the historian of Western philosophy with a point of view that may
supplement that gained from Western thought. A study of Indian thought, then,
reveals certain inadequacies of Western philosophical thought and makes clear
that some concepts and distinctions may not be as inevitable as they may
otherwise seem. In a similar manner, knowledge of Western thought gained by
Indian philosophers has also been advantageous to them.
Vedic hymns, Hindu scriptures dating
from the 2nd millennium BC, are the oldest extant record from India of the
process by which the human mind makes its gods and of the deep psychological
processes of mythmaking leading to profound cosmological concepts. The Upanisads
(Hindu philosophical treatises) contain one of the first conceptions of a
universal, all-pervading, spiritual reality leading to a radical monism
(absolute nondualism, or the essential unity of matter and spirit). The Upanisads
also contain early speculations by Indian philosophers about nature, life, mind,
and the human body, not to speak of ethics and social philosophy. The classical,
or orthodox, systems (darshanas)
debate, sometimes with penetrating insight and often with a degree of repetition
that can become tiresome to some, such matters as the status of the finite
individual; the distinction as well as the relation between the body, mind, and
the self; the nature of knowledge and the types of valid knowledge; the nature
and origin of truth; the types of entities that may be said to exist; the
relation of realism to idealism; the problem of whether universals or relations
are basic; and the very important problem of moksa,
or salvation--its nature and the paths leading up to it. (see also Veda,
Hinduism)
The various Indian philosophies contain
such a diversity of views, theories, and systems that it is almost impossible to
single out characteristics that are common to all of them. Acceptance of the
authority of the Vedas characterizes all the orthodox (astika) systems, but not the unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Carvaka (radical
materialism), Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers professed
allegiance to the Vedas, their allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of
their speculative ventures. On the contrary, the acceptance of the authority of
the Vedas was a convenient way for a philosopher's views to become acceptable to
the orthodox, even if a thinker introduced a wholly new idea. Thus, the Vedas
could be cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the
Vaishesika thinkers (i.e., those
who believe in ultimate particulars, both individual souls and atoms) as much as
by the Advaita (monist) philosophers.
In most Indian philosophical systems,
the acceptance of the ideal of moksa, like
allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with
the systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological,
logical, and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely
rational grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksa.
Only the Vedanta ("end of the
Vedas") philosophy and the Samkhya (a system that accepts a real
matter and a plurality of the individual souls) philosophy may be said to have a
close relationship to the ideal of moksa. The logical systems--Nyaya,
Vaishesika, and Purva-mimamsa--are
only very remotely related. Also, both the philosophies and other scientific
treatises, including even the Kama-sutra ("Aphorisms
on Love") and the Arthashastra ("Treatise
on Material Gain"), recognized the same ideal and professed their efficacy
for achieving it.
When Indian philosophers speak of
intuitive knowledge, they are concerned with making room for it and
demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logic--and there, as far as they
are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers do not seek to
justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the dignity of
religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as
theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious.
Three basic concepts form the
cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: the self,
or soul (atman),
works (karma, or karman), and salvation (moksa).
Leaving the Carvakas aside, all Indian philosophies concern
themselves with these three concepts and their interrelations, though this is
not to say that they accept the objective validity of these concepts in
precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma, signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the
most typically Indian. The concept of atman,
not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds, in a certain sense,
to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit self--important
differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksa
as the concept of the highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of
Western thought, especially during the Christian Era, though it probably has
never been as important as for the Hindu mind. Most Indian philosophies assume
that moksa is possible, and the
"impossibility of moksa"
(anirmoksa) is regarded as a
material fallacy likely to vitiate a philosophical theory.
In addition to karma, the lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian
philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the
Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics, and, in the
Christian Era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised
philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramanas, or ways of knowing accepted by the different schools,
there is none that includes mathematical knowledge or historical knowledge.
Possibly connected with their indifference toward mathematics is the significant
fact that Indian philosophers have not developed formal logic.
The theory of the syllogism (a valid deductive argument having two premises and
a conclusion) is, however, developed, and much sophistication has been achieved
in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive example of a logic of
cognitions (jñanani) rather than of abstract propositions--a logic not
sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it is meant
to be the logic of man's actual striving to know what is true of the world. (see
also mathematics,
philosophy of)
There is, in relation to Western
thought, a striking difference in the manner in which Indian philosophical
thinking is presented as well as in the mode in which it historically develops.
Out of the presystematic age of the Vedic hymns and the Upanisads and many diverse philosophical ideas current in the
pre-Buddhistic era, there emerged with the rise of the age of the sutras
(aphoristic summaries of the main points of a system) a neat classification of
systems (darshanas), a classification that was never to be contradicted and
to which no further systems are added. No new school was founded, no new darshana
came into existence. But this conformism, like conformism to the Vedas, did
not check the rise of independent thinking, new innovations, or original
insights. There is, apparently, an underlying assumption in the Indian tradition
that no individual can claim to have seen the truth for the first time and,
therefore, that an individual can only explicate, state, and defend in a new
form a truth that had been seen, stated, and defended by countless others before
him: hence the tradition of expounding one's thoughts by affiliating oneself to
one of the darshanas.
If one is to be counted as a great
master (acarya), one has to write a
commentary (bhasya)
on the sutras of the darshana
concerned, or one must comment on one of the bhasyas
and write a tika (subcommentary). The
usual order is sutra-bhasya-varttika (collection
of critical notes)-tika. At any stage,
a person may introduce a new and original point of view, but at no stage can he
claim originality for himself. Not even an author of the sutras
could do that, for he was only systematizing the thoughts and insights of
countless predecessors. The development of Indian philosophical thought has thus
been able to combine, in an almost unique manner, conformity to tradition and
adventure in thinking.
The role of the sacred texts in the
growth of Indian philosophy is different in each of the different systems. In
those systems that may be called adhyatmavidya,
or sciences of spirituality, the sacred texts play a much greater role than
they do in the logical systems (anviksikividya).
In the case of the former, Shankara, a leading Advaita Vedanta
philosopher (c. 788-820), perhaps best
laid down the principles: reasoning should be allowed freedom only as long as it
does not conflict with the scriptures. In matters regarding supersensible
reality, reasoning left to itself cannot deliver certainty, for, according to Shankara,
every thesis established by reasoning may be countered by an opposite thesis
supported by equally strong, if not stronger, reasoning. The sacred scriptures,
embodying as they do the results of intuitive experiences of seers, therefore,
should be accepted as authoritative, and reasoning should be made subordinate to
them.
Whereas the sacred texts thus continued
to exercise some influence on philosophical thinking, the influence of mythology
declined considerably with the rise of the systems. The myths of creation and
dissolution of the universe persisted in the theistic systems but were
transformed into metaphors and models. With the Nyaya (problem of
knowledge)-Vaishesika (analysis of nature) systems, for example,
the model of a potter making pots determined much philosophical thinking, as did
that of a magician conjuring up tricks in the Advaita (nondualist) Vedanta.
The nirukta (etymology) of Yaska,
a 5th-century-BC Sanskrit scholar, tells of various attempts to interpret
difficult Vedic mythologies: the adhidaivata
(pertaining to the deities), the aitihasika
(pertaining to the tradition), the adhiyajña
(pertaining to the sacrifices), and the adhyatmika
(pertaining to the spirit). Such interpretations apparently prevailed in the
Upanisads; the myths were turned into
symbols, though some of them persisted as models and metaphors. (see also Vaisheshika)
The issue of theism
vis-à-vis atheism, in the ordinary senses
of the English words, played an important role in Indian thought. The ancient
Indian tradition, however, classified the classical systems (darshanas)
into orthodox (astika) and unorthodox
(nastika). Astika does not mean "theistic," nor does nastika
mean "atheistic." Panini, a
5th-century-BC grammarian, stated that the former is one who believes in a
transcendent world (asti paralokah) and the latter is one who does not believe in it (nasti
paralokah). Astika may also mean one who accepts the authority of the Vedas; nastika
then means one who does not accept that authority. Not all among the astika
philosophers, however, were theists, and even if they were, they did not all
accord the same importance to the concept of God in their systems. The Samkhya
system did not involve belief in the existence of God, without ceasing to be astika,
and Yoga (a mental-psychological-physical meditation system) made room for
God not on theoretical grounds but only on practical considerations. The Purva-Mimamsa
of Jaimini, the greatest philosopher of the Mimamsa
school, posits various deities to account for the significance of Vedic rituals
but ignores, without denying, the question of the existence of God. The Advaita
Vedanta of Shankara rejects atheism in order to prove that
the world had its origin in a conscious, spiritual being called Ishvara,
or God, but in the long run regards the concept of Ishvara as a concept
of lower order that becomes negated by a metaphysical knowledge of Brahman, the
absolute, nondual reality. Only the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta and
the Nyaya-Vaishesika remain zealous theists, and of these
schools, the god of the Nyaya-Vaishesika school does not
create the eternal atoms, universals, or individual souls. For a truly theistic
conception of God, one has to look to the non-Advaita schools of Vedanta,
the Vaisnava, and the Shaiva philosophical systems. Whereas Hindu
religious life continues to be dominated by these last-mentioned theistic
systems, the philosophies went their own ways, far removed from that religious
demand.
S.N. Dasgupta,
a 20th-century Indian philosopher, has divided the history of Indian philosophy
into three periods: the prelogical (up to the beginning of the Christian Era),
the logical (from the beginning of the Christian Era up to the 11th century AD),
and the ultralogical (from the 11th century to the 18th century). What Dasgupta
calls the prelogical stage covers the pre-Mauryan and the Mauryan periods (c.
321-185 BC) in Indian history. The logical period begins roughly with the Kusanas
(1st-2nd centuries AD) and finds its highest development during the Gupta era
(3rd-5th centuries AD) and the age of imperial Kanauj (7th century AD).
In its early prelogical phase, Indian
thought, freshly developing in the Indian subcontinent, actively confronted and
assimilated the diverse currents of pre-Aryan and non-Aryan elements in the
native culture that the Aryans sought to conquer
and appropriate. The marks of this confrontation are to be noted in every facet
of Indian religion and thought: in the Vedic hymns in the form of conflicts,
with varying fortunes, between the Aryans and the non-Aryans; in the conflict
between a positive attitude toward life that is interested in making life fuller
and richer and a negative attitude emphasizing asceticism and renunciation; in
the great variety of skeptics, naturalists, determinists, indeterminists,
accidentalists, and no-soul theorists that filled the Ganges Plain; in the rise
of the heretical, unorthodox schools of Jainism and Buddhism protesting against
the Vedic religion and the Upanisadic theory of atman;
and in the continuing confrontation, mutually enriching and nourishing, that
occurred between the Brahmanic (Hindu priestly)
and Buddhist logicians, epistemologists, and dialecticians. The Aryans, however,
were soon followed by a host of foreign invaders, Greeks, Shakas and Hunas
from Central Asia, Pushtans (Pathans), Mongols, and Mughals (Muslims). Both
religious thought and philosophical discussion received continuous challenges
and confrontations. The resulting responses have a dialectical character:
sometimes new ideas have been absorbed and orthodoxy has been modified;
sometimes orthodoxy has been strengthened and codified in order to be preserved
in the face of the dangers of such confrontation; sometimes, as in the religious
life of the Christian Middle Ages, bold attempts at synthesis of ideas have been
made. Nevertheless, through all the vicissitudes of social and cultural life,
Brahmanical thought has been able to maintain a fairly strong current of
continuity.
In the chaotic intellectual climate of
the pre-Mauryan era, there were skeptics (ajñanikah)
who questioned the possibility of knowledge. There were also materialists, the
chief of which were the Ajivikas (deterministic ascetics) and the
Lokayatas (the name by which Carvaka
doctrines--denying the authority of the Vedas and the soul--are generally
known). Furthermore, there existed the two unorthodox schools of yadrchhavada
(accidentalists) and svabhavavada (naturalists),
who rejected the supernatural. Kapila, the
legendary founder of the Samkhya school, supposedly flourished during the
7th century BC. Pre-Mahavira Jaina ideas were already in existence
when Mahavira (flourished 6th century BC), the
founder of Jainism, initiated his reform. Gautama the Buddha
(flourished 6th-5th centuries BC) apparently was familiar with all of these
intellectual ideas and was as dissatisfied with them as with the Vedic
orthodoxy. He sought to forge a new path--though not new in all respects--that
was to assure blessedness to man. Orthodoxy, however, sought to preserve itself
in a vast Kalpa- (ritual) sutra
literature--with three parts: the Shrauta-,
based on shruti (revelation); the Grhya-,
based on smrti (tradition); and the Dharma-,
or rules of religious law, sutras--whereas
the philosophers tried to codify their doctrines in systematic form, leading to
the rise of the philosophical sutras. Though the writing of the sutras
continued over a long period, the sutras
of most of the various darshanas
probably were completed between the 6th and 3rd centuries BC. Two of the sutras
appear to have been composed in the pre-Maurya period, but after the rise of Buddhism;
these works are the Mimamsasutras of
Jaimini (c. 400 BC) and the Vedanta-sutras
of Badarayana (c. 500-200
BC). (see also Kalpa-sutra,
Shrauta-sutra, Grhya-sutra,
dharmasutra, "Mimamsa-sutra,"
)
The Maurya period brought, for the first
time, a strong centralized state. The Greeks had been ousted, and a new
self-confidence characterized the beginning of the period. This seems to have
been the period in which the epics Mahabharata
and Ramayana were initiated,
though their composition went on through several centuries before they took the
forms they now have. Manu, a legendary lawgiver, codified the Dharma-shastra;
Kautilya, a minister of King Candragupta
Maurya, systematized the science of political economy (Arthashastra);
and Patañjali, an ancient author or authors, composed the Yoga-sutras. Brahmanism tried to adjust itself to the new
communities and cultures that were admitted into its fold: new gods--or rather,
old Vedic gods that had been rejuvenated--were worshipped; the Hindu trinity of Brahma
(the creator), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva
(the destroyer) came into being; and the Pashupata (Shaivite), Bhagavata
(Vaisnavite), and the Tantra (esoteric meditative) systems were
initiated. The Bhagavadgita--the
most famous work of this period--symbolized the spirit of the creative synthesis
of the age. A new ideal of karma as
opposed to the more ancient one of renunciation was emphasized. Orthodox notions
were reinterpreted and given a new symbolic meaning, as, for example, the Gita
does with the notion of yajña ("sacrifice").
Already in the pre-Christian era, Buddhism had split up into several major
sects, and the foundations for the rise of Mahayana ("Greater
Vehicle") Buddhism had been laid. (see also Mauryan empire, Vajrayana)
The logical period of Indian thought
began with the Kusanas (1st-2nd centuries). Gautama
(author of the Nyaya-sutras; probably
flourished at the beginning of the Christian Era) and his 5th-century
commentator Vatsyayana established the
foundations of the Nyaya as a school almost exclusively preoccupied with
logical and epistemological issues. The Madhyamika
("Middle Way"), or Shunyavada ("Voidist")
school of Buddhism, arose and the thought of Nagarjuna
(c. 200), the great propounder of Shunyavada
(dialectical thinking), reached great heights. Though Buddhist logic in the
strict sense of the term had not yet come into being, a logical style of
philosophizing was in existence in such schools of thought.
During the reign of the Guptas, there
was a revival of Brahmanism of a gentler and more refined form. Vaisnavism
of the Vasudeva cult, centring on the prince-god Krishna and advocating
renunciation by action, and Shaivism prospered,
along with Buddhism and Jainism. Both the Mahayana and the Hinayana
("Lesser Vehicle"), or Theravada ("Way of the
Elders"), schools flourished. The most notable feature, however, was the
rise of the Buddhist Yogacara school, of which Asanga
(4th century AD) and his brother Vasubandhu were
the great pioneers. Toward the end of the 5th century, Dignaga,
a Buddhist logician, wrote the Pramanasamuccaya
("Compendium of the Means of True Knowledge"), a work that laid
the foundations of Buddhist logic. (see also Gupta dynasty)
The greatest names of Indian philosophy
belong to the post-Gupta period from the 7th to the 10th century. At that time
Buddhism was on the decline and the Tantric cults were rising, a situation that
led to the development of the tantric forms of Buddhism. Shaivism was
thriving in Kashmir, and Vaisnavism in the
southern part of India. The great philosophers Mimamsakas Kumarila
(7th century), Prabhakara (7th-8th centuries), Mandana
Mishra (8th century), Shalikanatha (9th century), and Parthasarathi Mishra (10th century) belong to this age. The
greatest Indian philosopher of the period, however, was Shankara. All of these men defended Brahmanism against the
"unorthodox" schools, especially against the criticisms of Buddhism.
The debate between Brahmanism and Buddhism was continued, on a logical level, by
philosophers of the Nyaya school--Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Mishra,
and Udayana (Udayanacarya).
Muslim rule in India had consolidated
itself by the 11th century, by which time Buddhism, for all practical purposes,
had disappeared from the country. Hinduism had absorbed Buddhist ideas and
practices and reasserted itself, with the Buddha appearing in Hindu writings as
an incarnation of Vishnu. The Muslim conquest created a need for orthodoxy to
readjust itself to a new situation. In this period the great works on Hindu law
were written. Jainism, of all the "unorthodox" schools, retained its
purity, and great Jaina works, such as Devasuri's Pramananayatattvalokalamkara ("The Ornament of the Light of
Truth of the Different Points of View Regarding the Means of True
Knowledge," 12th century AD) and Prabhachandra's
Prameyakamalamartanda ("The Sun
of the Lotus of the Objects of True Knowledge," 11th century AD), were
written during this period. Under the Cola (Chola) kings (c.
850-1279) and later in the Vijayanagara
kingdom (which, along with Mithila in the north, remained strongholds of
Hinduism until the middle of the 16th century), Vaisnavism flourished.
The philosopher Yamunacarya (flourished AD 1050) taught the path of prapatti,
or complete surrender to God. The philosophers Ramanuja
(11th century), Madhva, and Nimbarka
(c. 12th century) developed theistic
systems of Vedanta and severely criticized Shankara's
Advaita Vedanta. (see also Cola
dynasty)
Toward the end of the 12th century,
creative work of the highest order began to take place in the fields of logic
and epistemology in Mithila and Bengal. The 12th-13th-century philosopher
Gangesa's Tattvacintamani
("The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things") laid the
foundations of the school of Navya-Nyaya
("New-Nyaya"). Four great members of this school were Paksadhara
Mishra of Mithila, Vasudeva Sarvabhauma
(16th century), his disciple Raghunatha Shiromani
(both of Bengal), and Gadadhara Bhattacaryya.
(see also Gangesha)
Religious life was marked by the rise of
great mystic saints, chief of which are Ramananda, Kabir,
Caitanya, and Guru Nanak, who emphasized the path of bhakti,
or devotion, a wide sense of humanity, freedom of thought, and a sense of
unity of all religions. Somewhat earlier than these were the great Muslim Sufi
(mystic) saints, including Khwaja Mu'in-ud-Din Hasan,
who emphasized asceticism and taught a philosophy that included both love of God
and love of humanity.
The British period in Indian history was
primarily a period of discovery of the ancient tradition (e.g., the two histories by Radhakrishnan,
scholar and president of India from 1962 to 1967, and S.N. Dasgupta) and of
comparison and synthesis of Indian philosophy with the philosophical ideas from
the West. Among modern creative thinkers have been Mahatma
Gandhi, who espoused new ideas in the fields of social, political, and
educational philosophy; Sri Aurobindo, an
exponent of a new school of Vedanta that he calls Integral Advaita; and K.C.
Bhattacharyya, who developed a phenomenologically oriented philosophy of
subjectivity that is conceived as freedom from object.
All "orthodox" philosophies
can trace their basic principles back to some statement or other in the Vedas.
The Vedanta schools, especially, had an affiliation with the authority of
shruti, and
the school of Mimamsa concerned itself chiefly with the
questions of interpreting the sacred texts. The Hindu tradition regards the
Vedas as being apauruseya--i.e., as
not composed by any person. Sayana, a famous Vedic commentator, said that
this means an absence of a human author. For Sayana, the eternality of
the Vedas is like that of space and time; man does not experience their
beginning or end. But they are, in fact, created by Brahma, the supreme
creator. For the Advaita Vedanta, because no author of the Vedas is
mentioned, an unbroken chain of Vedic teachers is quite conceivable, so that the
scriptures bear testimony to their own eternality. The authoritative character
of shruti may then be deduced from the
fact that it is free from any fault (dosa), or limitation, which characterizes human words. Furthermore,
the Vedas give knowledge about things--whether dharma (what ought to be done) or Brahman
(the absolute reality)--which cannot be known by any other empirical means of
knowledge. The authority of the Vedas cannot, therefore, be contradicted by any
empirical evidence. Later logicians of the "orthodox" schools sought
to give these arguments precision and logical rigour.
The Vedic hymns (mantras) seem to be addressed to
gods and goddesses (deva, one who
gives knowledge or light), who are personifications of natural forces and
phenomena (Agni, the fire god; Indra, the rain god; Vayu, the wind god).
But there are gods not identifiable with such phenomena (e.g., Aditi, the infinite mother of all gods; Mitra, the friend;
Varuna, the guardian of truth and righteousness; Vishvakarman, the
all-maker; shraddha, faith). Also, the
hymns show an awareness of the unity of these deities, of the fact that it is
one God who is called by different names. The famed conception of rta--meaning
at once natural law, cosmic order, moral law, and the law of truth--made the
transition to a monistic view of the universe as being but a manifestation of
one reality about which the later hymns continue to raise fundamental questions
in a poignant manner, without, however, suggesting any dogmatic answer.
The hymns may, in general, be said to
express a positive attitude toward human life and to show interest in the full
enjoyment of life here and hereafter rather than an anxiety to escape from it.
The idea of transmigration and the conception of
the different paths and worlds traversed by good men and those who are not
good--i.e., the world of Vishnu and
the realm of Yama--are found in the Vedas. The chain of rebirth as a product of
ignorance and the conception of release from this chain as the greatest good of
the spiritual life are markedly absent in the hymns.
The Upanisads
answer the question "Who is that one Being?" by establishing the
equation Brahman = atman.
Brahman--meaning now that which is the greatest, than which there is nothing
greater, and also that which bursts forth into the manifested world, the one
Being of which the hymn of creation spoke--is viewed as nothing but atman,
identifiable as the innermost self in man but also, in reality, the
innermost self in all beings. Both the words gain a new, extended, and spiritual
significance through this identification. Atman
was originally used to mean breath, the vital essence, and even the body.
Later etymologizing brought out several strands in its meaning: that which
pervades (yad apnoti), that which
gives (yadadatte), that which eats (yad
atti), and that which constantly accompanies (yacca
asya santato bhavam). Distinctions were made between the bodily self, the
vital self, the thinking self, and the innermost self, whose nature is bliss (ananda), the earlier ones being sheaths (koshas) covering the innermost being. Distinctions were sometimes
drawn between the waking ( jagrat),
dreaming (svapna), and dreamless-sleep
(susupti) states of the self, and
these three are contrasted with the fourth, or transcendent (turiya),
state that both transcends and includes them all. The identification of the
absolute reality underlying the universe with the innermost being within the
human person resulted in a spiritualization of the former concept and a
universalization of the latter. This final conception of Brahman or atman
received many different explications from different teachers in the Upanisads,
some of which were negative in character (neti
neti, "not this, not this")
while others positively affirmed the all-pervasiveness of Brahman. But there
were still others who insisted on both the transcendence and immanence of
Brahman in the universe. Brahman is also characterized as infinite, truth, and
knowledge and as existence, consciousness, and bliss.
Though the objective and the subjective,
the macrocosm (universal) and the microcosm (individual), came to be identified
according to their true essences, attempts were made to correlate different
macrocosmic principles with corresponding microcosmic principles. The manifested
cosmos was correlated with the bodily self; the soul of the world, or Hiranyagarbha,
with the vital self; and Ishvara, or God as a self-conscious being, with
the thinking self. The transcendent self and the Brahman as bliss are not
correlates but rather are identical.
Buddhism
was not a completely new phenomenon in the religious history of India; it was
built upon the basis of ideas that were already current, both Brahmanic and
non-Aryan. Protests against the Brahmanic doctrines of atman,
karma, and moksa were being voiced in the 6th century BC, prior to the Buddha,
by various schools of thought: by naturalists, such as Purana
("The Old One") Kassapa, who denied both virtue and vice (dharma
and adharma) and thus all moral efficacy of human deeds; by
determinists, such as the Ajivika Makkhali
Gosala, who denied sin and freedom of will; and by materialists, such as
Ajita Keshakambalin, who, besides denying virtue, vice, and afterlife,
resolved man's being into material elements, Nigantha Nataputta, who
believed in salvation by an ascetic life of self-discipline and hence in the
efficacy of deeds and the possibility of omniscience, and, finally, Sanjaya
Belathiputta, the skeptic, who, in reply to the question "Is there an
afterlife?" would not say "It is so" or "It is
otherwise," nor would he say "It is not so" or "It is not
not so."
Of these six, the Jaina tradition
identifies Nigantha with Mahavira; the designation "Ajivika"
is applied, in a narrow sense, to the followers of Makkhali and in a loose sense
to all nonorthodox sects other than the Jainas--the skeptics and the Lokayatas.
Buddhism, Jainism, and the Ajivikas
rejected, in common, the sacrificial polytheism of the Brahmanas and the monistic mysticism of the Upanisads. All three of them recognized the rule of natural law in
the universe. Buddhism, however, retained the Vedic notions of karma
and moksa, though rejecting the other fundamental concept of atman.
In such an intellectual climate Gautama
the Buddha taught his four noble truths: (1) duhkha
(generally but misleadingly translated as "suffering"); (2) the
origination of duhkha (duhkhasamudaya); (3) the cessation of duhkha; and finally (4) the way leading to the cessation.
Although the word duhkha in common parlance means suffering, its use by Gautama was
meant to include both pleasure and pain, both happiness and suffering. There are
three aspects of this conception: duhkha as
suffering in the ordinary sense; duhkha arising
out of the impermanence of things, even of a state of pleasure; and duhkha
in the sense of five aggregates meaning that the "I" constituted
by any individual is nothing but a totality of five aggregates--i.e.,
form, feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness.
In brief, whatever is noneternal--i.e., whatever
is subject to the law of causality--is characterized by duhkha; for Gautama, this is the human situation. One who recognizes
the nature of duhkha also knows its
causes. Duhkha arises out of craving (trsna),
craving arises out of sensation (vedana),
and sensation arises out of contact (sparsha),
so that man is faced with a series of conditions leading back to ignorance (avidya)--a
series in which the rise of each succeeding member depends upon the preceding
one (pratityasamutpada).
The four noble truths follow the golden
mean between the two extremes of sensual indulgence and ascetic self-torture,
both of which Gautama rejected as spiritually useless. Only the middle
path consisting in the eight steps--called the eightfold path--leads to
enlightenment and to Nirvana. The eight steps are (1) right views, (2)
right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6)
right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration. Of these
eight, steps 3, 4, and 5 are grouped under right morality (shila);
steps 6, 7, and 8 under right concentration (samadhi);
and steps 1 and 2 under right wisdom (prajña).
Two key notions, even in early Buddhism,
are those of anatman
(Sanskrit: "no-self"; Pali anatta) and Nirvana. The Buddha
apparently wanted his famed doctrine of anatman
to be a phenomenological account of how things are rather than a theory. In
his discourse to the wandering monk Vacchagotta, he rejected the theories of
both eternalism (shashvatavada) and
annihilationism (ucchedavada). The
former, he stated, would be incompatible with his thesis that all laws ( dharmas;
Pali dhammas) are selfless (sabbe
dhamma anatta); the latter would be significant only if one had a self that
is no more in existence. Thus, by not taking sides with the metaphysicians, the
Buddha described how the consciousness "I am" comes to constitute
itself in the stream of consciousness out of the five aggregates of form,
feeling, conception, disposition, and consciousness. The doctrine of
"no-self" actually has two aspects: as applied to pudgala,
or the individual person, and as applied to the dhammas,
or the elements of being. In its former aspect, it asserts the fact that an
individual is constituted out of five aggregates; in its latter aspect it means
the utter insubstantiality of all elements. Intuitive realization of the former
truth leads to the disappearance of passions and desires, realization of the
latter removes all misconceptions about the nature of things in general. The
former removes the "covering of the passions" (kleshavarana);
the latter removes "the concealment of things" ( jñeyavarana). Together, they result in Nirvana.
Both negative and positive accounts of
Nirvana are to be found in the Buddha's teachings and in early Buddhist
writings. Nirvana is a state of utter extinction, not of existence, but
of passions and suffering; it is a state beyond the chain of causation, a state
of freedom and spontaneity. It is in addition a state of bliss. Nirvana
is not the result of a process; were it so, it would be but another perishing
state. It is the truth--not, however, an eternal, everlasting substance like the
atman of the Upanisads, but the truth of utter selflessness and insubstantiality
of things, of the emptiness of the ego, and of the impermanence of all things.
With the realization of this truth, ignorance is destroyed, and, consequently,
all craving, suffering, and hatred is destroyed with it (see also the article BUDDHISM
).
The great epic Mahabharata represents the attempt
of Vedic Brahmanism to adjust itself to the new circumstances reflected in the
process of the aryanization (integration of Aryan beliefs, practices, and
institutions) of the various non-Aryan communities. Many diverse trends of
religious and philosophical thought have thus been synthesized in this work (see
also HINDUISM ).
In its philosophical views, the epic
contains an early version of Samkhya (a belief in real matter and the
plurality of individual souls), which is prior to the classical Samkhya
of Ishvarakrsna, a 3rd-century philosopher. The chapter on
"Moksadharma" in Book 12 of the Mahabharata is full of such proto- Samkhya
texts. Mention is made of four main philosophical schools: Samkhya-Yoga,
taught by Kapila (a sage living before the 6th century BC); Pañcaratra,
taught by Vishnu; the Vedas; and Pashupata ("Lord of
Creatures"), taught by Shiva. Belonging to the Pañcaratra
school, the epic basically attempts to accommodate certain presystematic Samkhya
ideas into the Bhagavata faith. Samkhya and Yoga are sometimes put
together, sometimes distinguished. Several different schemata of the 25
principles (tattvas) of the Samkhya
are recorded. One common arrangement is that of eight productive forms of prakrti
(the unmanifest, intellect, egoism, and five fine elements: sound, smell,
form or colour, taste, and touch) and 16 modifications (five organs of
perception, five organs of action, mind, and five gross elements: ether, earth,
fire, water, and air), and purusa (man).
An un-Samkhyan element is the 26th principle: Ishvara, or the
supreme Lord. One notable result is the identification of the four living forms
(vyuhas) of the Pañcaratra school with four Samkhya
principles: Vasudeva with spirit, Samkarsana
with individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with the ego-sense.
Besides the Samkhya-Yoga, which
is in the foreground of the epic's philosophical portions, there are Vedanta
texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts emphasizing not only a
personal deity but also the doctrine of avatar (avatara), or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult
characterizes the theistic part of the epic.
In the Shanti
Parvan ("Book of Consolation," 12th book) of the Mahabharata,
there is also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma,
or the dharma (law) of the king
as king. Bhisma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two
different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior
period in which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a
time characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the
strong; the other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter
account contains a theory of the fall of mankind from this ideal state,
which led to a need for institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account
leads directly from the insecurity of the prekingship era to the installation of
king by the divine ruler for the protection and the security of mankind.
Kingship is thus recognized as having a historical origin. The primary function
of the king is that of protection, and dandaniti,
or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma,
or dharma of the king. Though it
recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the dharma, the
moral law, superior to the king.
The Bhagavadgita
("Divine Song" or "Song of the Lord") forms a part of Mahabharata
and deserves separate consideration by virtue of its great importance in the
religious life and thought of the Hindus. Not itself a shruti,
it has, however, been accorded the status of an authoritative text and is
regarded as one of the sources of the Vedanta philosophy. At a
theoretical level, it brings together Samkhya metaphysics, Upanisadic
monism, and a devotional theism of the Krishna-Vasudeva cult. In its
practical teaching, it steers a middle course between the "path of
action" of the Vedic ritualism and the "path of renunciation" of
the Upanisadic mysticism, and it accommodates all the three major
"paths" to moksa: the paths
of action (karma), devotion (bhakti), and knowledge ( jñana).
This synthetic character of the work accounts for its great hold on the Hindu
mind. The Hindu tradition treats it as one homogenous work, with the status of
an Upanisad.
Neither performance of the duties
prescribed in the scriptures nor renunciation of all action is conducive to the
attainment of moksa. If the goal is
freedom, then the best path to the goal is to perform one's duties with a spirit
of nonattachment without caring for the fruits of one's actions and without the
thought of pleasure or pain, profit or loss, or victory or failure, with a sense
of equanimity and equality. The Kantian ethic of "duty for duty's
sake" seems to be the nearest Western parallel to Krishna's
(Kr{subdot}sna's) teaching at this stage. But Krishna soon went beyond
it, by pointing out that performance of action with complete nonattachment
requires knowledge ( jñana) of the true nature of the self, its distinction from prakrti,
or Matter (the primeval stuff, not the world
of matter perceived by the senses), with its three component elements (sattva--i.e.,
tension or harmony; rajas--i.e., activity;
and tamas--i.e., inertia), and of the
highest self (purusottama), whose
higher and lower aspects are Matter and finite individuals, respectively. This
knowledge of the highest self or the supreme lord, however, would only require a
devotional attitude of complete self-surrender and performance of one's duties
in the spirit of offering to him. Thus, karma-yoga (yoga of works) is made to depend on jñana-yoga
(yoga of knowledge), and the latter is shown to lead to bhakti-yoga
(yoga of devotion). Instead of looking upon Krishna's teaching as laying
down alternative ways for different persons in accordance with their aptitudes,
it would seem more logical to suppose that he taught the essential unity and
interdependence of these ways. How one should begin is left to one's aptitude
and spiritual makeup.
In the Tipitaka
(Pali: "The Three Baskets"; Sanskrit Tripitaka),
collected and compiled 300 years after the Buddha's mahaparinirvana (attainment of Buddhahood), at the council at Pataliputra
(3rd century BC), both the canonical and philosophical doctrines of early
Buddhism were codified. Abhidamma pitaka, the
last of the pitakas, has seven parts: Dhammasangani,
which gives an enumeration of dhammas,
or elements of existence; Vibhanga,
which gives further analysis of the dhammas;
Dhatukatha, which is a detailed
classification, following many different principles, of the elements; Puggalapaññatti,
which gives descriptions of individual persons
according to stages of their development; Kathavatthu,
which contains discussions and refutation of other schools (of Buddhism); Yamaka,
which derives its name from the fact that it deals with pairs of questions;
and Patthana,
which gives an analysis of relations among the elements. (see also "Abhidhamma
Pitaka," )
The key notion in all this is that of
the dhammas. Because Buddhist
philosophers denied any permanence, whether in outer nature or in inner life,
they felt compelled to undertake a detailed, systematic, and complete listing
and classification of the different elements that constitute both the external
world and the mental, inner life. Each of these elements, except for the three
elements that are not composed of parts (i.e.,
space, or akasha, and the two
cessations, Nirvana and a temporary stoppage, in states of meditation, of
the flow of passions, or apratisamkhyanivodha),
is momentary. The primary object of this exhaustive analysis was an
understanding not so much of outer nature as of the human
person (pudgala). The human person,
however, consists in material (rupa)
and mental (nama) factors, which led
to an account of the various elements of matter. The primary interest,
nevertheless, is in man, who is regarded as an aggregate of various elements.
The analysis of these components, together with the underlying denial of an
eternal self, was supposed to provide the theoretical basis for the possibility
of a good life conducive to the attainment of Nirvana.
The individual person was analyzed into
five aggregates (skandhas):
material form (rupa); feeling (vedana);
conception (samjña);
disposition (samskara); and
consciousness (vijñana). Of
these, the last four constitute the mental; the first alone is the material
factor. The material is further analyzed into 28 states, the samskara
into 50 (falling into three groups: intellectual, affectional, and
volitional), and the vijñana into
89 kinds of states of consciousness. Another principle of classification leads
to a list of 18 elements (dhatus):
five sense organs, five objects of those senses, mind, the specific object of
mind, and six kinds of consciousness (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory,
tactual, and purely mental). A third classification is into 12 bases (ayatanas),
which is a list of six cognitive faculties and their objects. The Buddhist
analysis of matter was in terms of sensations and sense data, to which the sense
organs were also added. The analysis of mind was also in terms of corresponding
modes of consciousness and their objects.
A unique feature of the development of
Indian thought was the systematization of each school of thought in the form of sutras,
or extremely concise expressions, intended to reduce the doctrines of a science
or of a philosophy into a number of memorizable aphorisms, formulas, or rules.
The word sutra, originally meaning "thread," came to mean such
concise expressions. A larger work containing such sutras also came to be called a sutra.
The aid of commentaries becomes indispensable for the understanding of the sutras,
and it is not surprising that philosophical composition took the form of
commentaries and subcommentaries. The earliest sutras,
the Kalpa-sutras,
however, are not philosophical but ritualistic. These Kalpa-sutras
fell into three major parts: the Shrauta-sutras,
dealing with Vedic sacrifices; the Grhya-sutras,
dealing with the ideal life of a householder; and the Dharma-sutras,
dealing with moral injunctions and prohibitions.
In the works of Panini,
a Hindu grammarian, the sutra style
reached a perfection never attained before and only imperfectly approximated by
the later practitioners. The sutra literature
began before the rise of Buddhism, though the philosophical sutras
all seem to have been composed afterward. The Buddhist sutta
(Pali form of the Sanskrit word sutra)
differs markedly in style and content from the Hindu sutra. The suttas are
rather didactic texts, discourses, or sermons, possibly deriving their name from
the sense in which they carry the thread of the tradition of the Buddha's
teachings.
The Purva-mimamsa
("First Reflection"), or Karmamimamsa
("Study of [Ritual] Action"), is the system that investigates the
nature of Vedic injunctions. Though this is the primary purpose of the system,
this task also led to the development of principles of scriptural interpretation
and, therefore, to theories of meaning and hermeneutics
(critical interpretations). Jaimini, who
composed sutras about the 4th century BC, was critical of earlier Mimamsa
authors, particularly of one Badari, to whom is attributed the view that
the Vedic injunctions are meant to be obeyed without the expectation of benefits
for oneself. According to Jaimini, Vedic injunctions do not merely prescribe
actions but also recommend these actions as means to the attainment of desirable
goals. For both Jaimini and Shabara (3rd
century), his chief commentator, performance of the Vedic sacrifices is
conducive to the attainment of heaven; both emphasize that nothing is a duty
unless it is instrumental to happiness in the long run.
Jaimini's central concern is dharma,
which is defined as the desired object (artha),
whose desirability is testified only by the injunctive statements of the
scriptures (codana-laksano). In order
to substantiate the implied thesis that what ought to be done--i.e.,
dharma--cannot be decided by either perception or reasoning, Jaimini
proceeds to a discussion of the nature of ways of knowing. Because perceptual
knowledge arises from contact of the sense organs with reality that is present, dharma
that is not an existent reality but a future course of action cannot
possibly be known by sense-experience. Reasoning based on such sense-experience
is for the same reason useless. Only injunctive statements can state what ought
to be done. Commands made by finite individuals are not reliable, because the
validity of what they say depends upon the presumption that the persons
concerned are free from those defects that render one's words dependable.
Therefore, only the injunctions contained in the scriptures--which, according to
Mimamsa and the Hindu tradition, are not composed by any
finite individual (apauruseya)--are
the sources of all valid knowledge of dharma.
The Mimamsa rejects the belief that the scriptures are
utterances of God. The words themselves are authoritative. In accordance with
this thesis, Jaimini developed the theory that the relation between words and
their meanings is natural (autpattikastu
shabdasyarthena sambandhah, or "the relation of word to its meaning is
eternal") and not conventional, that the primary meaning of a word is a
universal (which is also eternal), that in a sentence the principal element is
the verb, and that the principal force of the verb is that which specifically
belongs to the verb with an optative ending and which instigates a person to
take a certain course of action in order to effect the desired end.
Though this theory provided the Mimamsa
with a psychological and semantic technique for interpreting the sentences of
the scriptures that are clearly in the injunctive form, there are also other
kinds of sentences: prayers, glorifications, those referring to a thing by a
name, and prohibitions. Attempts were therefore made to show how each one of
these types of sentences bears, directly or indirectly, on the central,
injunctive texts. Furthermore, a systematic classification of the various forms
of injunctions is undertaken: those that indicate the general nature of an
action, those that show the connection of a subsidiary rite to the main course
of action, those that suggest promptness in performance of the action, and those
that indicate the right to enjoy the results to be produced by the course of
action enjoined.
The commentary of Shabara
elaborated on the epistemological themes of the sutras;
in particular, Shabara sought to establish the intrinsic validity of
experiences and traced the possibility of error to the presence of defects in
the ways of knowing. He also critically examined Buddhist subjective idealism
and the theory of utter emptiness of things and proved the existence of soul as
a separate entity that enjoys the results of one's actions in this or the next
life.
Along with Badari and Jaimini, Badarayana,
a contemporary of Jaimini, was the other major interpreter of Vedic thought.
Just as the Mimamsa-sutra traditions
of Badari's tradition were revived by Prabhakara, a
7th-8th-century scholar, and Jaimini's defended by Shabara and Kumarila,
a 7th-8th-century scholar, Badarayana's sutras
laid the basis for the development of Vedanta
philosophy. The relation of the Vedanta-sutras
to the Mimamsa-sutras, however, is
difficult to ascertain. Badarayana approves of the Mimamsa
view that the relation between words and their significations is eternal. There
are, however, clear statements of difference: according to Jaimini, for example,
the dispenser of the "fruits" of one's actions is dharma,
the law of righteousness itself, but for Badarayana it
is the supreme lord, Ishvara. Often, Jaimini's interpretation is
contrasted with that of Badari; in such cases, Badarayana
sometimes supports Badari's view and sometimes regards both as
defensible.
The overall difference that emerges is
that whereas Jaimini lays stress on the ritualistic parts of the Vedas, Badarayana
lays stress on the philosophical portions--i.e.,
the Upanisads. The former
recommends the path of Vedic injunctions, hence the ideal of karma;
the latter recommends the path of knowledge. The central concept of
Jaimini's investigation is dharma--i.e., what
ought to be done; the central theme of Badarayana's
investigations is Brahman--i.e., the
absolute reality. The relationship between these two treatises remains a matter
of controversy between later commentators--Ramanuja, a great South
Indian philosopher of the 11th-12th centuries, defending the thesis that they
jointly constitute a single work with Jaimini's coming first and Badarayana's
coming after it in logical order, and Shankara, an earlier great
South Indian philosopher of the 8th-9th centuries, in favour of the view that
the two are independent of each other and possibly also inconsistent in their
central theses.
Badarayana's sutras
have four books (adhyayas), each book
having four chapters (padas). The
first book is concerned with the theme of samanvaya
("reconciliation"). The many conflicting statements of the
scriptures are all said to agree in converging on one central theme: the concept
of Brahman, the one absolute being from whom all beings arise, in whom they are
maintained, and into whom they return. The second book establishes avirodha
("consistency") by showing the following: (1) that dualism and Vaishesika
atomism are neither sustainable interpretations of the scriptures nor defensible
rationally; (2) that though consciousness cannot conceivably arise out of a
nonconscious nature, the material world could arise out of spirit; (3) that the
effect in its essence is not different from the cause; and (4) that though
Brahman is all-perfect and has no want, creation is an entirely unmotivated free
act of delight (lila). The Buddhist (Vijñanavada) view that
there are no external objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted,
as also the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all that is. The Jaina
pluralism and the theism of the Pashupatas and the Bhagavatas are
also rejected. Because, according to Vedanta, only Brahman is external,
the third and the fourth chapters of the second book undertake to show that
nothing else is eternal. The third book concerns the spiritual discipline and
the various stages by which the finite individual ( jiva) may realize his essential identity with Brahman. The fourth
and last book deals with the final result of the modes of discipline outlined in
the preceding book and distinguishes between the results achieved by worshipping
a personal Godhead and those achieved by knowing the one Brahman. Included is
some discussion of the possible "worlds" through which the spirits
travel after death, but all this discussion is subordinate to the one dominant
goal of liberation and consequent escape from the chain of rebirth.
Badarayana's sutras
refer to interpreters of Vedanta before him who were concerned with such
central issues as the relation between the finite individual ( jiva)
and the absolute spirit (Brahman) and the possible bodily existence of a
liberated individual. To Ashmarthya, an early Vedanta interpreter,
is ascribed the view that the finite individual and the absolute are both
identical and different (as causes and their effects are different--a view that
seems to have been the ancestor of the later theory of Bhedabheda). Audulomi,
another pre-Badarayana Vedanta philosopher, is said
to have held the view that the finite individual becomes identical with Brahman
after going through a process of purification. Another interpreter, Kashakrtsna,
holds that the two are identical--a view that anticipates the later
"unqualified monism" of Shankara. Badarayana's
own views on this issue are difficult to ascertain: the sutras are so concise that they are capable of various
interpretations, though there are reasons to believe that Ramanuja's
is closer to their intentions than Shankara's.
Ishvarakrsna's
Samkhya-karika (or "Verses on Samkhya,"
c. 2nd century AD) is the oldest
available Samkhya work. Ishvarakrsna describes himself as
laying down the essential teachings of Kapila as
taught to Asuri and by Asuri to Pañcashikha. He
refers also to Sastitantra ("Doctrine
of 60 Conceptions"), the main doctrines of which he claims to have
expounded in the karikas. The Samkhya
of Caraka, which is substantially the same as is attributed to Pañcashikha
in the Mahabharata, is theistic and
regards the unmanifested (avyakta) as
being the same as the purusa (the
self). The Mahabharata refers to three
kinds of Samkhya doctrines: those that accept 24, 25, or 26 principles,
the last of which are theistic. The later Samkhya-sutra is more sympathetic
toward theism, but the karikas are
atheistic, and the traditional expositions of the Samkhya are based on
this work.
According to the karikas, there are many selves, each being of the nature of pure
consciousness. The self is neither the original matter (prakrti) nor an evolute of it. Though matter is composed of the
three gunas (qualities), the self is not; though matter, being nonintelligent,
cannot discriminate, the self is discriminating; though matter is object (visaya),
the self is not; though matter is common, the self is an individual (asamanya);
unlike matter, the self is not creative (aprasavadharmin).
The existence of selves is proved on the ground that nature exhibits an ordered
arrangement the like of which is known to be meant for another (pararthatva).
This other must be a conscious spirit. That there are many such selves is proved
on the grounds that different persons are born and die at different times, that
they do not always act simultaneously, and that they show different qualities,
aptitudes, and propensities. All selves are, however, passive witnesses (saksin), essentially alone (kevala),
neutral (madhyastha), and not agents (akarta).
(see also purusha)
Phenomenal nature, with its distinctions
of things and persons (taken as psychophysical organisms), is regarded as an
evolution out of a primitive state of matter. This conception is based on a
theory of causality known as the satkaryavada,
according to which an effect is implicitly pre-existent in its cause prior
to its production. This latter doctrine is established on the ground that if the
effect were not already existent in its cause, then something would have to come
out of nothing. The original prakrti
(primeval stuff) is the primary matrix out of which all differentiations
arose and within which they all were contained in an undistinguished manner.
Original Matter is uncaused, eternal,
all-pervading, one, independent, self-complete, and has no distinguishable
parts; the things that emerge out of this primitive matrix are, on the other
hand, caused, noneternal, limited, many, dependent, wholes composed of parts,
and manifested. But Matter, whether in its original unmanifested state or in its
manifested forms, is composed of three gunas, nondiscriminating (avivekin),
object (visaya), general,
nonconscious, and yet creative.
The order in which Matter evolves is
laid down as follows: prakrti
mahat
or buddhi
(Intelligence)
ahamkara
(ego-sense)
manas
(mind)
five
tanmatras (the sense data: colour,
sound, smell, touch, and taste)
five
sense organs
five
organs of action (tongue, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and of reproduction)
five
gross elements (ether, air, light, water, and earth). This emanation schema may
be understood either as an account of cosmic evolution or as a
logical-transcendental analysis of the various factors involved in experience or
as an analysis of the concrete human personality.
A striking feature of this account is
the conception of guna:
nature is said to consist of three gunas--originally
in a state of equilibrium and subsequently in varying states of mutual
preponderance. The karikas do not say
much about whether the gunas are to be
regarded as qualities or as component elements. Of the three, harmony or tension
(sattva) is light (laghu),
is pleasing, and is capable of manifesting others. Activity (rajas)
is dynamic, exciting, and capable of hurting. Inertia (tamas) is characterized by heaviness, conceals, is static, and
causes sadness. Man's varying psychological responses are thus hypostatized and
made into component properties or elements of nature--an argument whose fallacy
was exposed, among others, by Shankara.
The Samkhya-karika
delineates three ways of knowing (pramana):
perception, inference,
and verbal testimony. Perception is defined as the application of the sense
organs to their respective objects (prativisayadhyavasaya).
Inference, which is not defined, is divided first into three kinds, and then
into two. According to the former classification, an inference is called purvavat
if it is based on past experience (such as when one, on seeing a dark cloud,
infers that it will rain); it is called shesavat
when from the presence of a certain property in one part of a thing the
presence of the same property is inferred in the rest (such as when, on finding
a drop of sea water to be saline, one infers the rest to be so); it is called samanyato-drsta
when it is used to infer what is not perceivable (such as when one infers
the movement of a star on seeing it occupy two different positions in the
firmament at different times). According to the other classification, an
inference may be either from the mark to that of which it is the mark or in the
reverse direction. Verbal testimony, in order to be valid, must be the word of
one who has authoritative knowledge.
There is, in addition to the three ways
of knowing, consideration of the modes of functioning of the sense organs. The
outer senses apprehend only the present objects, the inner senses (manas,
antahkarana, and buddhi) have the
ability to apprehend all objects--past, present, and future. The sense organs,
on apprehending their objects, are said to offer them to buddhi,
or intelligence, which both makes judgments and enjoys the objects of the
senses. Buddhi is also credited with
the ability to perceive the distinction between the self and the natural
components of the person.
In its ethics, the karikas manifest an intellectualism that is characteristic of the Samkhya
system. Suffering is due to ignorance of the true nature of the self, and
freedom, the highest good, can be reached through knowledge of the distinction
between the self and nature. In this state of freedom, the self becomes
indifferent to nature; it ceases to be an agent and an enjoyer. It becomes what
it in fact is, a pure witness consciousness.
The Yoga-sutras
of Patañjali (2nd century BC) are the
earliest extant textbook on Yoga. Scholars now generally agree that the author
of the Yoga-sutras is not the
grammarian Patañjali. In any case, the Yoga-sutras
stand in close relation to the Samkhya system, so much so that
tradition regards the two systems as one. Yoga
adds a 26th principle to the Samkhya list of 25--i.e., the supreme lord, or Ishvara--and has thus earned the
name of Seshvara-Samkhya, or theistic Samkhya. Furthermore,
there is a difference in their attitudes: Samkhya is intellectualistic
and emphasizes metaphysical knowledge as the means to liberation; Yoga is
voluntaristic and emphasizes the need of going through severe self-control as
the means of realizing intuitively the same principles.
In the Yoga-sutras,
God is defined as a distinct self (purusa),
untouched by sufferings, actions, and their effects; his existence is proved on
the ground that the degrees of knowledge found in finite beings, in an ascending
order, has an upper limit--i.e., omniscience,
which is what characterizes God. He is said to be the source of all secular and
scriptural traditions; he both revealed the Vedas and taught the first fathers
of mankind. Surrender of the effects of action to God is regarded as a
recommended observance.
As in Samkhya, the self is
distinguished from the mind (citta):
the mind is viewed as an object, an aggregate. This argument is used to prove
the existence of a self other than the mind. The mental state is not
self-intimating; it is known in introspection. It cannot know both itself and
its object. It rather is known by the self, whose essence is pure, undefiled
consciousness. That the self is not changeable is proved by the fact that were
it changeable the mental states would be sometimes known and sometimes
unknown--which, however, is not the case, because a mental state is always
known. To say that the self knows means that the self is reflected in the mental
state and makes the latter manifested. The aim of Yoga is to arrest mental
modifications (citta-vrtti) so that
the self remains in its true, undefiled essence and is, thus, not subject to
suffering.
The attitude of the Yoga-sutras to the human body is ambivalent. The body is said to be
filthy and unclean. Thus, the ascetic cultivates a disgust for it. Yet, much of
the discipline laid down in the Yoga-sutras
concerns perfection of the body, with the intent to make it a fit instrument
for spiritual perfection. Steadiness in bodily posture and control of the
breathing process are accorded a high place. The perfection of body is said to
consist in "beauty, grace, strength and adamantine hardness."
Patañjali lays down an eightfold
path consisting of aids to Yoga: restraint (yama),
observance (niyama), posture (asana),
regulation of breathing (pranayama),
abstraction of the senses (pratyahara),
concentration (dharana), meditation
(dhyana), and trance (samadhi).
The first two constitute the ethical core of the discipline: the restraints are
abstinence from injury, veracity, abstinence from stealing, continence, and
abstinence from greed. The observances are cleanliness, contentment,
purificatory actions, study, and surrender of the fruits of one's actions to
God. Ahimsa (nonviolence) also is
glorified, as an ethics of detachment.
Various stages of samadhi are distinguished: the conscious and the superconscious,
which are subdivided into achievements with different shades of perfection. In
the final stage, all mental modifications cease to be and the self is left in
its pure, undefiled state of utter isolation. This is freedom (kaivalya),
or absolute independence.
The Vaishesika-sutras
were written by Kanada, a philosopher who
flourished c. 2nd-4th centuries. The
system owes its name to the fact that it admits ultimate particularities (vishesa).
The metaphysics is, therefore, pluralistic. (see also Vaisheshika)
The Vaishesika-sutras
are divided into ten chapters, each with two sections. Chapter 1 states the
purpose of the work: to explain dharma, defined
as that which confers prosperity and ultimate good on man. This is followed by
an enumeration of the categories of being
recognized in the system: substance, quality (guna), action, universality, particularity, and inherence (samavaya).
Later authors add a seventh category: negation (abhava).
This enumeration is followed by an account of the common features as well as
dissimilarities among these categories: the categories of "universal"
and "particularity" and the concepts of being and existence. Chapter 2
classifies substances into nine kinds: earth,
water, fire, air, ether, space, time, self, and mind. There next follows a
discussion of the question of whether sound is eternal or noneternal. Chapter 3
is an attempt to prove the existence of self by an inference. Chapter 4 explains
the words "eternal" and "noneternal," the noneternal being
identified with avidya, and
distinguishes between three different forms of the substances earth, water,
fire, and air--each of these is either a body, a sense organ, or an object.
Chapter 5 deals with the notion of action and the connected concept of effort,
and the next traces various special phenomena of nature to the supersensible
force, called adrsta. Chapter 6 argues
that performance of Vedic injunctions generates this supersensible force and
that the merits and demerits accumulated lead to moksa. Chapter 7 argues that qualities of eternal things are eternal
and those of noneternal things are noneternal. Chapter 8 argues that the self
and mind are not perceptible. Chapter 9 argues that neither action nor qualities
may be ascribed to what is nonexistent and, further, that negation may be
directly perceived. Chapter 9 also deals with the nature of hetu,
or the "middle term" in syllogism, and argues that the knowledge
derived from hearing words is not inferential. Chapter 10 argues that pleasure
and pain are not cognitions because they do not leave room for either doubt or
certainty.
This account of the contents of the sutras
shows that the Vaishesika advocates an atomistic cosmology
(theory of order) and a pluralistic ontology (theory of being). The material
universe arises out of the conjunction of four kinds of atoms:
the earth atom, water atom, fire atom, and air atom. There also are the eternal
substances: ether, in which sound inheres as a quality; space, which accounts
for man's sense of direction and distinctions between far and near; and time,
which accounts for the notions of simultaneity and nonsimultaneity and which,
like space, is eternal and is the general cause of all that has origin.
The overall naturalism of the Vaishesika,
its great interest in physics, and its atomism are all counterbalanced by the
appeal to adrsta (a supersensible
force), to account for whatever the other recognized entities cannot explain.
Among things ascribed to this supersensible force are movements of needles
toward a magnet, circulation of water in plant bodies, upward motion of fire,
movement of mind, and movements of soul after death. These limit the naturalism
of the system.
Knowledge belongs to the self; it
appears or disappears with the contact of the self with the senses and of the
senses with the objects. Perception of the self results from the conjunction of
the self with the mind. Perception of objects results from proximity of the
self, the senses, and the objects. Error exists because of defects of the
senses. Inference is of three kinds: inference of the nonexistence of something
from the existence of some other things, inference of the existence of something
from nonexistence of some other, and inference of existence of something from
the existence of some other thing.
Moksa
is a state in which there is no body and no
rebirth. It is achieved by knowledge. Works in accordance with the Vedic
injunction may help in its attainment.
The Nyaya-sutras
probably were composed by Gautama or Aksapada
about the 2nd century BC, though there is ample evidence that many sutras were subsequently interpolated. (see also Nyaya)
The sutras
are divided into five chapters, each with two sections. The work begins with a
statement of the subject matter, purpose, and relation of the subject matter to
the attainment of that purpose. The ultimate purpose is salvation--i.e.,
complete freedom from pain--and salvation is attained by knowledge of the 16
categories: hence the concern with these categories, which are means of valid
knowledge (pramana); objects of valid knowledge (prameya); doubt (samshaya);
purpose (prayojana); example (drstanta);
conclusion (siddhanta); the
constituents of a syllogism (avayava);
argumentation (tarka); ascertainment (nirnaya);
debate (vada); disputations ( jalpa);
destructive criticism (vitanda);
fallacy (hetvabhasa); quibble (chala);
refutations ( jati); and points of the
opponent's defeat (nigrahasthana).
The words "knowledge," buddhi,
and "consciousness" are used synonymously. Four means of valid
knowledge are admitted: perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony.
Perception is defined as the knowledge that arises from the contact of the
senses with the object, which is nonjudgmental, or unerring or judgmental.
Inference is defined as the knowledge that is preceded by perception (of the
mark) and classified into three kinds: that from the perception of a cause to
its effect; that from perception of the effect to its cause; and that in which
knowledge of one thing is derived from the perception of another with which it
is commonly seen together. Comparison is defined as the knowledge of a thing
through its similarity to another thing previously well-known.
The validity of the means of knowing is
established as against Buddhist skepticism, the main argument being that if no
means of knowledge is valid then the demonstration of their invalidity cannot
itself claim validity. Perception is shown to be irreducible to inference,
inference is shown to yield certain knowledge, and errors in inference are
viewed as being faults in the person, not in the method itself. Knowledge
derived from verbal testimony is viewed as noninferential.
Although the sutras do not explicitly
develop a detailed theory of causation, the
later Nyaya theory is sufficiently delineated in Chapter 4. No event is
uncaused. No positive entity could arise out of mere absence--a thesis that is
pressed against what seems to be a Buddhist view that in a series of momentary
events every member is caused by the destruction of the preceding member. Cause
and effect should be homogeneous in nature, and yet the effect is a new
beginning and was not already contained in the cause. The Buddhist thesis that
all things are negative in nature (inasmuch as a thing's nature is constituted
by its differences from others) is rejected, as is the view that all things are
eternal or that all things are noneternal. Both these latter views are untrue to
experience. Thus, the resulting metaphysics admits two kinds of entities:
eternal and noneternal. The whole is a new entity over and above the parts that
constitute it. Also, the idea that God is the material cause of the universe is
rejected. God is viewed as the efficient cause, and human deeds produce their
results under the control and cooperation of God.
Of the four main topics of the Nyaya-sutras
(art of debate, means of valid knowledge, syllogism,
and examination of opposed views) there is a long history. There is no direct
evidence for the theory that though inference (anumana)
is of Indian origin, the syllogism (avayava)
is of Greek origin. Vatsayana, the commentator
on the sutras, referred to some logicians who held a theory of a ten-membered
syllogism (the Greeks had three). The Vaishesika-sutras
give five propositions as constituting a syllogism but give them different
names. Gautama also supports a five-membered syllogism with the following
structure:
1. This hill is fiery (pratijña:
a statement of that which is to be proved).
2. Because it is smoky (hetu:
statement of reason).
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, as is a
kitchen (udaharana: statement of a
general rule supported by an example).
4. So is this hill (upanaya: application of the rule of this case).
5. Therefore this hill is fiery (nigamana:
drawing the conclusion).
The characteristic feature of the Nyaya
syllogism is its insistence on the example--which suggests that the Nyaya
logician wanted to be assured not only of formal validity but also of material
truth. Five kinds of fallacious "middle" (hetu) are distinguished: the inconclusive (savyabhicara), which leads to more conclusions than one; the
contradictory (viruddha), which
opposes that which is to be established; the controversial (prakaranasama),
which provokes the very question that it is meant to settle; the
counterquestioned (sadhyasama), which
itself is unproved; and the mistimed (kalatita),
which is adduced "when the time in which it might hold good does not
apply." (see also middle
term)
Other philosophical theses stated in the
sutras are as follows: the relation of words to their meanings
is not natural but conventional; a word means neither the bare individual nor
the universal by itself but all three--the individual, the universal, and
structure (akrti); desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition
are the marks of the self; body is defined as the locus of gestures, senses, and
sentiments; and the existence and atomicity of mind are inferred from the fact
that there do not arise in the self more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
When the Mahasangikas
("School of the Great Assembly") seceded from the Elders (Theravadins)
about 400 BC, the germs were laid for the rise of the Mahayana
Buddhism. The Mahasangikas
admitted non-arhat monks and
worshippers (i.e., those who had not
attained perfection), defied the Buddha, taught the doctrine of the emptiness of
the elements of being, distinguished between the mundane and the supramundane
reality, and considered consciousness (vijñana)
to be intrinsically free from all impurities. These ideas found varied
expression among the various groups into which the Mahasangikas
later divided (see also BUDDHISM ).
The Sarvastivadins
("realists" who believe that all things, mental and material, exist or
also that all dharmas--past, present,
and future--exist) seceded from the Elders about the middle of the 3rd century
BC. They rejected, in common with all other sects, pudgalatma, or a self of the individual, but admitted dharmatman--i.e., self-existence of the dharmas
(categories), or the elements of being. Each dharma
is a self-being; the law of causality applies to the formation of
aggregates, not to the elements themselves. Dharmas,
whether they are past or are in future, exist all the same. Of these, three
are said to be unconditioned: space (akasha)
and the two cessations (nirodha)--the
cessation that arises from knowledge and the cessation that arises prior to the
attainment of knowledge, the former being Nirvana, the latter being an
arrest of the flow of passions through meditation prior to the achievement of
Nirvana. By shunyata
the Sarvastivadins mean only the truth that there is no
eternal substance called "I." Because all elements--past, present, or
future--exist, the Sarvastivadins are obliged to account for these
temporal predicates, and several different theories are advanced. Of these, the
theory advanced by Vasumitra, a 1st-2nd-century-AD Sarvastivadin,
viz., that temporal predicates are determined by the function of a dharma,
is accepted by the Vaibhasikas--i.e.,
those among the Sarvastivadins who follow the authority of the
texts known as the Vibhasa.
The Vaibhasika doctrine of eternal elements is believed to be inconsistent
with the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Sautrantikas
(so-called because they rest their case on the sutras) insist on the noneternality of the dharma as well. The past and the future dharmas do not exist, and
only the present ones do. The so-called unconditioned dharmas are mere absences,
not positive entities. Thus, the Sautrantikas seem to be the only major
school of Buddhist philosophy that comes near to regarding Nirvana as
entirely negative. In their epistemology, whereas the Vaibhasikas are
direct realists, the Sautrantikas hold a sort of representationism,
according to which the external world is only inferred from the mental
conceptions that alone are directly apprehended.
Kautilya's
Arthashastra
(c. 321-296 BC) is the science of artha,
or material prosperity, which is one of the four goals of human life. By artha,
Kautilya meant "the means of subsistence of man," which is,
primarily, wealth and, secondarily, earth. The work is concerned with the means
of fruitfully maintaining and using the latter--i.e.,
land. It is a work on politics and diplomacy.
Though Kautilya recognized that sovereignty
may belong to a clan (kula), he was
himself concerned with monarchies. He advocated the idea of the king's
divine nature, or divine sanction of the king's office, but he also attempted to
reconcile it with a theory of the elective origin of the king. He referred to a
state of nature, without king, as an anarchy in which the stronger devours the
weaker. The four functions of the king are to acquire what is not gained, to
protect what is gained, to increase what is protected, and to bestow the surplus
upon the deserving. The political organization is held to have seven elements:
the king, the minister, the territory, the fort, the treasury, the army, and the
ally. These are viewed as being organically related. The three
"powers" of the king are power of good counsel, the majesty of the
king himself, and the power to inspire. The priest is not made an element of the
state organization. The king, however, is not exempt from the laws of dharma.
Being the "promulgator of dharma,"
the king should himself be free from the six passions of sex, anger, greed,
vanity, haughtiness, and overjoy. What Kautilya advocated was an
enlightened monarchical paternalism.
In the happiness of the subjects lies
the king's happiness. The main task of the king is to offer protection. Monarchy
is viewed as the only guarantee against anarchy. Thus, the king's duty is to
avert providential visitations such as famine, flood, and pestilence; he ought
also to protect agriculture, industry, and mining, the orphan, the aged, the
sick, and the poor, to control crime with the help of spies, and to settle legal
disputes.
Regarding relations with other states,
Kautilya's thoughts were based not so much on high moral idealism as on
the needs of self-interest. He wrote of six types of foreign policy: treaty (sandhi),
war (vigraha), marching against the enemy (yana), neutrality (asana),
seeking protection from a powerful king (samshraya),
and dual policy (dvaidhibhava). The
rules concerning these are: he who is losing strength in comparison to the other
shall make peace; he who is gaining strength shall make war; he who thinks
neither he nor the enemy can win shall be neutral; he who has an excess of
advantage shall march; he who is wanting in strength shall seek protection; he
who undertakes work requiring assistance shall adopt a dual policy.
Kautilya's views about the
formation and implementation of policy were as follows: a treaty based on truth
and oath is binding for temporal and spiritual consequences; a treaty based on
security is binding only as long as the party is strong. He who inflicts severe
punishments becomes oppressive; he who inflicts mild punishments is overpowered;
and he who inflicts just punishments is respected. Kautilya advocated an
elaborate system of espionage for domestic as well as foreign affairs.
About the time of the rise of Buddhism,
there was a sect of religious mendicants, the Ajivikas, who held
unorthodox views. In the strict sense, this name is applied to the followers of
one Makkhali Gosala, but in a wide sense it is
also applied to those who taught many different shades of heretical teachings.
Primary sources of knowledge about these are the Digha Nikaya, Anguttara Nikaya, Samyutta Nikaya, the Sutrakrtanga-sutra,
Shilanka's commentary on the Sutrakrtanga-sutra,
the Bhagavati-sutra, the Nandi-sutra,
and Abhayadeva's commentary on Samavayanga-sutra.
(see also Ajivika)
Makkhali's views may be thus summarized.
There is no cause of the depravity of things; they become depraved without any
reason or cause. There is also no cause of the purity of beings; they become
pure without any reason or cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or
on the efforts of others. All things are destitute of power, force, or energy.
Their changing states are due to destiny, environment, and their own nature.
Thus, Makkhali denies sin, or dharma, and
denies freedom of man in shaping his own future. He is thus a determinist,
although scholars have held the view that he might leave room for chance, if not
for freedom of will. He is supposed to have held an atomistic cosmology and that
all beings, in the course of time, are destined to culminate in a state of final
salvation. He believes not only in rebirth but also in a special doctrine of
reanimation according to which it is possible for one person's soul to be
reanimated in the dead bodies of others. Thus, the Ajivikas are
far from being materialists. (see also free will)
Another pre-Buddhistic system of
philosophy, the Carvaka, or the Lokayata,
is one of the earliest materialistic schools of philosophy.The name Carvaka
is traced back to one Carvaka, supposed to have
been one of the great teachers of the school. The other name, Lokayata,
means "the view held by the common people," "the system which has
its base in the common, profane world," "the art of sophistry,"
and also "the philosophy that denies that there is any world other than
this one." Brhaspati probably was the
founder of this school. Much knowledge of the Carvakas, however,
is derived from the expositions of the later Hindu writings, particularly from Madhava's
Sarva-darshana-samgraha ("Compendium
of All Philosophies," 14th century). Haribhadra in his Saddarshanasamuccaya
("Compendium of the Six Philosophies," 5th century AD) attributes
to the Carvakas the view that this world extends only to the
limits of possible sense experience.
The Carvakas apparently
sought to establish their materialism on an
epistemological basis. In their epistemology, they viewed sense perception alone
as a means of valid knowledge. The validity of inferential knowledge was
challenged on the ground that all inference requires a universal major premise
("All that possesses smoke possesses fire") whereas there is no means
of arriving at a certainty about such a proposition. No amount of finite
observations could possibly yield the required universal premise. The supposed
"invariable connection" may be vitiated by some unknown
"condition," and there is no means of knowing that such a vitiating
factor does not exist. Since inference is not a means of valid knowledge, all
such supersensible objects as "afterlife," "destiny," or
"soul" do not exist. To say that such entities exist though there is
no means of knowing them is regarded as absurd, for no unverifiable assertion of
existence is meaningful.
The authority of the scriptures also is
denied. First, knowledge based on verbal testimony is inferential and therefore
vitiated by all the defects of inference. The Carvakas regard the
scriptures as characterized by the three faults: falsity, self-contradiction,
and tautology. On the basis of such a theory of knowledge, the Carvakas
defended a complete reductive materialism according to which the four elements
of earth, water, fire, and air are the only original components of being and all
other forms are products of their composition. Consciousness thus is viewed as a
product of the material structure of the body and characterizes the body
itself--rather than a soul--and perishes with the body. In their ethics, the Carvakas
upheld a hedonistic theory according to which enjoyment of the maximum amount of
sensual pleasure here in this life and avoidance of pain that is likely to
accompany such enjoyment are the only two goals that men ought to pursue. (see
also hedonism)
Though the beginnings of Mahayana
are to be found in the Mahasangikas and many of their early sects,
Nagarjuna gave it a philosophical basis. Not
only is the individual person empty and lacking an eternal self, according to Nagarjuna,
but the dharmas
also are empty. He extended the concept of shunyata
to cover all concepts and all entities. "Emptiness"
thus means subjection to the law of causality or "dependent
origination" and lack of an immutable essence and an invariant mark (nihsvabhavata).
It also entails a repudiation of dualities between the conditioned and the
unconditioned, between subject and object, relative and absolute, and between samsara and Nirvana. Thus, Nagarjuna arrived at
an ontological monism; but he carried through an epistemological dualism (i.e.,
a theory of knowledge based on two sets of criteria) between two orders of
truth: the conventional (samvrtti) and
the transcendental (paramartha). The
one reality is ineffable. Nagarjuna undertook a critical
examination of all the major categories with which philosophers had sought to
understand reality and showed them all to involve self-contradictions. The world
is viewed as a network of relations, but
relations are unintelligible. If two terms, A and B, are related by the relation
R, then either A and B are different or they are identical. If they are
identical, they cannot be related; if they are altogether different then they
cannot also be related, for they would have no common ground. The notion of
"partial identity and partial difference" is also rejected as
unintelligible. The notion of causality is rejected on the basis of similar
reasonings. The concepts of change, substance, self, knowledge, and universals
do not fare any better. Nagarjuna also directed criticism against
the concept of pramana, or the means of valid knowledge.
Nagarjuna's philosophy is
also called Madhyamika, because it claims to tread the middle path, which
consists not in synthesizing opposed views such as "The real is
permanent" and "The real is changing" but in showing the
hollowness of both the claims. To say that reality is both permanent and
changing is to make another metaphysical assertion, another viewpoint, whose
opposite is "Reality is neither permanent nor changing." In relation
to the former, the latter is a higher truth, but the latter is still a point of
view, a drsti, expressed in a
metaphysical statement, though Nagarjuna condemned all
metaphysical statements as false.
Nagarjuna used reason to
condemn reason. Those of his disciples who continued to limit the use of logic
to this negative and indirect method, known as prasanga, are called the prasangikas:
of these, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, and Candrakirti are
the most important. Bhavaviveka, however,
followed the method of direct reasoning and thus founded what is called the svatantra
(independent) school of Madhyamika philosophy. With him Buddhist
logic comes to its own, and during his time the Yogacaras
split away from the Shunyavadins.
Converted by his brother Asanga
to the Yogacara, Vasubandhu wrote
the Vijñapti-matrata-siddhi ("Establishment of the Thesis of
Cognitions--Only"), in which he defended the thesis that the supposedly
external objects are merely mental conceptions. Yogacara idealism
is a logical development of Sautrantika representationism: the conception
of a merely inferred external world is not satisfying. If consciousness is
self-intimating (svaprakasha) and if consciousness can assume forms (sakaravijñana),
it seems more logical to hold that the forms ascribed to alleged external
objects are really forms of consciousness. One only needs another conception: a
beginningless power that would account for this tendency of consciousness to
take up forms and to externalize them. This is the power of kalpana,
or imagination. Yogacara added two other modes of
consciousness to the traditional six: ego consciousness (manovijñana) and storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijñana). The alaya-vijñana
contains stored traces of past experiences, both pure and defiled seeds.
Early anticipations of the notions of the subconscious or the unconscious, they
are theoretical constructs to account for the order of individual experience. It
still remained, however, to account for a common world--which in fact remains
the main difficulty of Yogacara. The state of Nirvana
becomes a state in which the alaya with its stored "seeds" would wither away (alayaparavrtti).
Though the individual ideas are in the last resort mere imaginations, in its
essential nature consciousness is without distinctions of subject and object.
This ineffable consciousness is the "suchness" (tathata)
underlying all things. Neither the alaya nor
the tathata, however, is to be
construed as being substantial.
Vasubandhu and Asanga are also
responsible for the growth of Buddhist logic. Vasubandhu defined
"perception" as the knowledge that is caused by the object, but this
was rejected by Dignaga, a 5th-century logician,
as a definition belonging to his earlier realistic phase. Vasubandhu defined
"inference" as a knowledge of an object through its mark, but
Dharmottara, an 8th-century commentator pointed out that this is not a
definition of the essence of inference but only of its origin.
Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya ("Compendium
of the Means of True Knowledge") is one of the greatest works on Buddhist
logic. Dignaga gave a new definition of "perception": a
knowledge that is free from all conceptual constructions, including name and
class concepts. In effect, he regarded only the pure sensation as perception. In
his theory of inference, he distinguished between inference for oneself and
inference for the other and laid down three criteria of a valid middle term (hetu),
viz., that it should "cover" the minor premise (paksa),
be present in the similar instances (sapaksa),
and be absent in dissimilar instances (vipaksa).
In his Hetucakra ("The Wheel of
'Reason"'), Dignaga set up a matrix of nine types of middle terms,
of which two yield valid conclusions, two contradictory, and the rest uncertain
conclusions. Dignaga's tradition is further developed in the 7th century
by Dharmakirti, who modified his definition of
perception to include the condition "unerring" and distinguished, in
his Nyayabindu, between four kinds of
perception: that by the five senses, that by the mind, self-consciousness, and
perception of the yogins.
He also introduced a threefold distinction of valid middle terms: the middle
must be related to the major either by identity ("This is a tree, because
this is an oak") or as cause and effect ("This is fiery, because it is
smoky"), or the hetu is a
nonperception from which the absence of the major could be inferred. Dharmakirti
consolidated the central epistemological thesis of the Buddhists that perception
and inference have their own exclusive objects. The object of the former is the
pure particular (svalaksana),
and the object of the latter (he regarded judgments as containing elements of
inference) is the universal (samanyalaksana).
In their metaphysical positions, Dignaga and Dharmakirti represent
a moderate form of idealism.
Kumarila
commented on Jaimini's sutra as well
as on Shabara's bhasya. The Varttika (critical
gloss) that he wrote was commented upon by Sucarita Mishra in his Kashika
("The Shining"), by Someshvara Bhatta in his Nyayasudha
("The Nectar of Logic"), and Parthasarathi
Mishra in Nyayaratnakara ("The
Abode of Jewels of Logic"). Parthasarathi's Shastradipika
("Light on the Scripture") is a famous independent Mimamsa
treatise belonging to Kumarila's school. (see also Prabhakara)
Prabhakara, who most likely lived
after Kumarila, was the author of the commentary Brhati ("The Large Commentary"), on Shabara's bhasya.
On many essential matters, Prabhakara differs radically from the
views of Kumarila. Prabhakara's Brhati
has been commented upon by Shalikanatha in his Rjuvimala
("The Straight and Free from Blemishes"), whereas the same
author's Prakaranapañcika ("Commentary of Five Topics") is a
very useful exposition of the Prabhakara system. Other works
belonging to this school are Madhava's Jaiminiya-nyayamala-vistara
("Expansion of the String of Reasonings by Jaimini"). Appaya Diksita's
Vidhirasayana ("The Elixir of
Duty"), Apadeva's Mimamsa-nyaya-prakasha
(Illumination of the Reasonings of Mimamsa)
and Laugaksi Bhaskara's Artha-samgraha ("Collection of Treasures").
Where Kumarila and Prabhakara
differed, Kumarila remained closer to both Jaimini
and Shabara. Kumarila, like Jaimini and Shabara, restricted
Mimamsa to an investigation into dharma,
whereas Prabhakara assigned to it the wider task of enquiring into
the meaning of the Vedic texts. Kumarila understood the Vedic injunction
to include a statement of the results to be attained; Prabhakara--following
Badari--excluded all consideration of the result from the injunction
itself and suggested that the sense of duty alone should instigate a person to
act.
Both the Bhatta (the name for Kumarila's
school) and the Prabhakara schools, in their metaphysics, were realists;
both undertook to refute Buddhist idealism and nihilism. The Bhatta
ontology recognized five types of entities: substance (dravya), quality (guna),
action (karma), universals (samanya),
and negation (abhava). Of these,
substance was held to be of ten kinds: the nine substances recognized by the Vaishesikas
and the additional substance "darkness." The Prabhakara
ontology recognized eight types of entities; from the Bhatta list,
negation was rejected, and four more were added: power (shakti), resemblance (sadrsa),
inherence-relation (samavaya), and
number (samkhya). Under the type
"substance," the claim of "darkness" was rejected on the
ground that it is nothing but absence of perception of colour; the resulting
list of nine substances is the same as that of the Vaishesikas.
Though both the schools admitted the reality of
the universals, their views on this point differed considerably. The Prabhakaras
admitted only such universals as inhere in perceptible instances and insisted
that true universals themselves must be perceivable. Thus, they rejected
abstract universals, such as "existence," and merely postulated
universals, such as "Brahminhood" (which cannot be perceptually
recognized in a person). (see also category)
The epistemologies of the two schools
differ as much as their ontologies. As ways of valid knowing, the Bhattas
recognized perception, inference, verbal testimony (shabda), comparison (upamana),
postulation (arthapatti), and
nonperception (anupalabdhi). The last
is regarded as the way men validly, and directly, apprehend an absence: this was
in conformity with Shabara's statement that abhava (nonexistence) itself is a pramana (way of true knowledge). Postulation is viewed as the sort
of process by which one may come to know for certain the truth of a certain
proposition, and yet the Bhattas refused to include such cases under
inference on the grounds that in such cases one does not say to himself "I
am inferring" but rather says "I am postulating."
"Comparison" is the name given to the perception of resemblance with a
perceived thing of another thing that is not present at that moment. It is
supposed that because the latter thing is not itself being perceived, the
resemblance belonging to it could not have been perceived; thus, it is not a
case of perception when one says "My cow at home is similar to this
animal."
The Prabhakaras rejected
nonperception as a way of knowing and were left with a list of five concerning
definitions of perception. The Bhattas, following the sutra,
define perception in terms of sensory contact with the object, whereas the
Prabhakaras define it in terms of immediacy of the apprehension.
As pointed out earlier, Kumarila
supported the thesis that all moral injunctions are meant to bring about a
desired benefit and that knowledge of such benefit and of the efficacy of the
recommended course of action to bring it about is necessary for instigating a
person to act. Prabhakara defended the ethical theory of duty for
its own sake, the sense of duty alone being the proper incentive. The Bhattas
recognize apurva (supersensible
efficacy of actions to produce remote effects) as a supersensible link
connecting the moral action performed in this life and the supersensible effect
(such as going to heaven) to be realized afterward. Prabhakara
understood by apurva only the action
that ought to be done.
In their principles of interpretation of
the scriptures, and consequently in their theories of meaning (of words and of
sentences), the two schools differ radically. Prabhakara defended
the thesis that words primarily mean either some course of action (karya)
or things connected with action. Connected with this is the further Prabhakara
thesis that the sentence forms the unit of
meaningful discourse, that a word is never used by itself to express a single
unrelated idea, and that a sentence signifies a relational complex that is not a
mere juxtaposition of word meanings. Prabhakara's theory of language
learning follows these contentions: the child learns the meanings of sentences
by observing the elders issuing orders like "Bring the cow" and the
juniors obeying them, and he learns the meaning of words subsequently by a close
observation of the insertion (avapa)
and extraction (uddhara) of words in
sentences and the resulting variations in the meaning of those sentences. From
this semantic approach follows Prabhakara's principle of Vedic
interpretation: all Vedic texts are to be interpreted as bearing on courses of
action prescribed, and there are no merely descriptive statements in the
scriptures. Furthermore, only the Vedic injunctions yield the authoritative
verbal testimony that may be regarded as a unique way of knowing, whereas all
other verbal knowledge is really inferential in character. In matters concerning
what ought to be done, Prabhakara therefore regarded only the
Vedas as authoritative. (see also language
acquisition)
Kumarila's theory is very
different. In his view, words convey their own meanings, not relatedness to
something else. He therefore was more willing to accommodate purely descriptive
sentences as significant. Furthermore, he regarded sentence meaning as composed
of separate word meanings held together in a relational structure; the word
meaning formed,for him, the simplest unit of sense. Persons thus learn the
meaning of words by seeing others talking as well as from advice of the elders.
The Mimamsa views
the universe as being eternal and does not admit the need of tracing it back to
a creator. It also does not admit the need of admitting a being who is to
distribute moral rewards and inflict punishments--this function being taken over
by the notion of apurva, or
supersensible power generated by each action. Theoretically not requiring a God,
the system, however, posits a number of deities as entailed by various
ritualistic procedures, with no ontological status assigned to the gods.
The linguistic philosophers considered
here are the grammarians led by Bhartrhari (7th
century AD) and Mandana-Mishra (8th century AD);
the latter, reputed to be a disciple of Kumarila, held views widely
different from the Mimamsakas. The grammarians share with
the Mimamsakas their interest in the problems of language
and meaning. But their own theories are so different that they cut at the roots
of the Mimamsa realism. The chief text of this school is
Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya.
Mandana's chief works are Brahma-siddhi
("Establishment of Brahman"), Sphota-siddhi
("Establishment of Word Essence"), and Vidhiviveka
("Inquiry into the Nature of Injunctions").
As his first principle, Bhartrhari
rejects a doctrine on which the realism of Mimamsa and Nyaya
had been built--the view that there is a kind of perception that is
nonconceptualized and that places persons in direct contract with things as they
are. For Bhartrhari this is not possible, for all knowledge is
"penetrated" by words and "illuminated" by words. Thus, all
knowledge is linguistic, and the distinctions of objects are traceable to
distinctions among words. The metaphysical monism of word (shabdadvaita) is not far from this--i.e., the view that the one word essence appears as this world of
"names and forms" because of man's imaginative construction (kalpana).
Metaphysically, Bhartrhari comes close both to Shankara's
Advaita and the Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmakirti. This
metaphysical theory also uses the doctrine of sphota
("that from which the meaning bursts forth"). Most Indian
philosophical schools were concerned with the problem of what precisely is the
bearer of the meaning of a word or a sentence. If the letters are evanescent and
if, as one hears the sounds produced by the letters of a word, each sound is
replaced by another, one never comes to perceive the word as a whole, and the
question is how one grasps the meaning of the word. The same problem could be
stated with regard to a sentence. The Mimamsakas postulated
an eternity of sounds and distinguished between the eternal sounds and sound
complexes (words, sentences) from their manifestations. The grammarians,
instead, distinguished between the word and sound and made the word itself the
bearer of meaning. As bearer of meaning, the word is the sphota.
Sounds have spatial and temporal
relations; they are produced differently by different speakers. But the word as
meaning bearer has to be regarded as having no size or temporal dimension. It is
indivisible and eternal. Distinguished from the sphota are the abstract sound pattern (prakrtadhvani) and the utterances (vikrtadhvani). Furthermore, Bhartrhari held that the sentence
is not a collection of words or an ordered series of them. A word is rather an
abstraction from a sentence; thus, the sentence-sphota is the primary unit of meaning. A word is also grasped as a
unity by an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha).
This theory of sphota, which is itself
a linguistic theory required by the problems arising from the theory of meaning,
was employed by the grammarians to support their theory of word monism.
Mandana-Mishra, in his Vidhiviveka,
referred to three varieties of this monism: shabdapratyasavada
(the doctrine of superimposition on the word; also called shabdadhyasavada), shabda-parinamavada
(the doctrine of transformation of the word), and shabdavivartavada (the doctrine of unreal appearance
of the word). According to the first two, the phenomenal world is still real,
though either falsely superimposed on words or a genuine transformation of the
word essence. The last, and perhaps most consistent, doctrine holds that the
phenomenal distinctions are unreal appearances of an immutable word essence.
Mandana attempted to integrate
this linguistic philosophy into his own form of advaitavada,
though later followers of Sankara did not accept the doctrine of sphota.
Even Vacaspati, who accepted many of Mandana's
theories, rejected the theory of sphota and
in general conformed to the Shankarite's acceptance of the Bhatta
epistemology.
Although as early as the commentators
Prashastapada (5th century AD) and Uddyotakara (7th century AD)
the authors of the Nyaya-Vaisesika schools used each other's doctrines
and the fusion of the two schools was well on its way, the two schools continued
to have different authors and lines of commentators. About the 10th century AD,
however, there arose a number of texts that sought to combine the two
philosophies more successfully. Well known among these syncretist texts are the
following: Bhasarvajña's Nyayasara
("The Essence of Nyaya"; written c.
950), Varadaraja's Tarkikaraksa
("In Defense of the Logician"; c. 1150), Vallabha's Nyayalilavati
("The Charm of Nyaya"; 12th century), Keshava Mishra's
Tarkabhasa ("The Language of Reasoning"; c.
1275), Annam Bhatta's Tarkasamgraha
("Compendium of Logic"; c. 1623),
and Vishvanatha's Bhasapariccheda
("Determination of the Meaning of the Verses"; 1634). (see also Vaisheshika)
Both the Nyaya-Vaishesika
schools are realistic with regard to things, properties, relations, and
universals. Both schools are pluralistic (also with regard to individual selves)
and theistic. Both schools admit external relations (the relation of inherence
being only partly internal), atomistic cosmology, new production, and the
concept of existence (satta) as the
most comprehensive universal. Both schools regard knowledge as a quality of the
self, and they subscribe to a correspondence theory regarding the nature of
truth and a theory of pragmatism-cum-coherence regarding the test of truth. The
points that divide the schools are rather unimportant: they concern, for
example, their theories of number, and some doctrines in their physical and
chemical theories.
Gautama's sutras were commented upon about AD 400 by Vatsayana,
who replied to the Buddhist doctrines, especially to some varieties of Shunyavada
skepticism. Uddyotakara's Varttika (c.
635) was written after a period during which major Buddhist works, but no
major Hindu work, on logic were written. Uddyotakara undertook to refute Nagarjuna
and Dignaga. He criticized and refuted Dignaga's theory of
perception, the Buddhist denial of soul, and the anyapoha
(exclusion of the other) theory of meaning. Positively, he introduced, for
the first time, the doctrine of six modes of contact (samnikarsa)
of the senses with their objects, which has remained a part of Nyaya-Vaishesika
epistemology. He divided inferences into those whose major premise (sadhya)
is universally present, those in which one has to depend only upon the rule
"Wherever there is absence of the major, there is absence of the middle (hetu),"
and those in which both the positive and the negative rules are at one's
disposal. He rejected the sphota theory
and argued that the meaning of a word is apprehended by hearing the last letter
of the word together with recollection of the preceding ones. Vacaspati
Mishra in the 9th century wrote his Tatparyatika
(c. 840) on Uddyotakara's Varttika
and further strengthened the Nyaya viewpoint against the Buddhists.
He divided perception into two kinds: the indeterminate, nonlinguistic, and
nonjudgmental and the determinate and judgmental. In defining the invariable
connection (vyapti) between the middle and the major premises, he introduced the
concept of a vitiating condition (upadhi)
and stressed that the required sort of connection, if an inference is to be
valid, should be unconditional. He also proposed a modified version of the
theory of the extrinsic validity of knowledge by holding that inferences as well
as knowledges that are the last verifiers (phalajñana) are self-validating.
Prashastapada's Vaishesika
commentary (c. 5th century) does not
closely follow the sutras but is
rather an independent explanation. Prashastapada added seven more
qualities to Kanada's list: heaviness (gurutva),
fluidity (dravatva), viscidity (sneha),
traces (samskara), virtue (dharma),
vice (adharma), and sound. The last
quality was regarded by Kanada merely as a mark of ether, whereas Prashastapada
elevated it to a defining quality of the latter. He also made the Vaishesika
fully theistic by introducing doctrines of creation and dissolution.
The Nyaya-Vaishesika
general metaphysical standpoint allows for both particulars
and universals, both change and permanence.
There are ultimate differences as well as a hierarchy of universals, the highest
universal being existence. Substance is defined
as the substrate of qualities and in terms of what alone can be an inherent
cause. A quality may be defined as what is neither substance nor action and yet
is the substratum of universals (for universals are supposed to inhere only in
substances, qualities, and actions). Universal is defined as that which is
eternal and inheres in many. Ultimate particularities belong to eternal
substances, such as atoms and souls, and these account for all differences among
particulars that cannot be accounted for otherwise. Inherence (samavaya)
is the relation that is maintained between a universal and its instances, a
substance and its qualities or actions, a whole and its parts, and an eternal
substance and its particularity. This relation is such that one of the relations
cannot exist without the other (e.g., a
whole cannot exist without the parts). Negation (abhava),
the seventh category, is initially classified into difference ("A is not
B") and absence ("A is not in B"), absence being further divided
into absence of a thing before its origin, its absence after its destruction,
and its absence in places other than where it is present. For these schools, all
that is is knowable and also nameable.
Knowledge is regarded as a
distinguishing but not essential property of a self. It arises when the
appropriate conditions are present. Consciousness is defined as a manifestation
of object but is not itself self-manifesting; it is known by an act of inner
perception (anuvyavasaya). Knowledge
either is memory or is not; knowledge other than memory is either true or false;
and knowledge that is not true is either doubt or error.
In its theory of error, these philosophers maintained an uncompromising realism
by holding that the object of error is still real but is only not here and now.
True knowledge (prama) apprehends its
object as it is; false knowledge apprehends the object as what it is not. True
knowledge is either perception, inference, or knowledge derived from verbal
testimony or comparison. Perception is defined as knowledge that arises from the
contact of the senses with their objects, and is viewed as either indeterminate
and nonlinguistic or as determinate and judgmental. Both aspects of the
definition of perception are viewed as valid--a point that is made against both
the Buddhists and the grammarians. Furthermore, perception is either ordinary (laukika)
or extraordinary (alaukika). The
former takes place through any of the six modes of sense-object contact
recognized in the system. The latter takes place when one perceives the proper
object of one sense through another sense ("The cushion looks soft")
or when, on recognizing universal in a particular, one perceives all instances
of the universal as its instances. Also extraordinary are the perceptions of the
yogins, who are supposed to be free
from the ordinary spatiotemporal limitations.
Four conditions must be satisfied in
order that a combination of words may form a meaningful
sentence: a word should generate an intention or expectancy for the words to
follow ("Bring"--"What?"--"A jar"); there should
be mutual fitness ("Sprinkle"--"With what?"--"Water,
not fire"); there should be proximity in space and time; and the proper
intention of the speaker must be ascertained, otherwise there would be
equivocation.
Among theistic proofs offered in the
system, the most important are the causal argument ("The world is produced
by an agent, since it is an effect, as is a jar"); the argument from a
world order to a lawgiver; and the moral argument from the law of karma
to a moral governor. Besides adducing these and other arguments, Udayana
in his Nyaya-kusumañjali stressed
the point that the nonexistence of God could not be proved by means of valid
knowledge.
The founder of the school of Navya-(New)
Nyaya, with an exclusive emphasis on the pramanas,
was Gangesha Upadhyaya (13th century), whose Tattvacintamani
("The Jewel of Thought on the Nature of Things") is the basic text
for all later developments. The logicians of this school were primarily
interested in defining their terms and concepts and for this purpose developed
an elaborate technical vocabulary and logical apparatus that came to be used by,
other than philosophers, writers on law, poetics, aesthetics, and ritualistic
liturgy. The school may broadly be divided into two subschools: the Mithila
school represented by Vardhamana (Gangesha's son), Paksadhara
or Jayadeva (author of Aloka gloss),
and Shankara Mishra (author of Upaskara);
and the Navadvipa school, whose chief representatives were Vasudeva
Sarvabhauma (1450-1525), Raghunatha Shiromani
(c. 1475-c. 1550), Mathuranatha
Tarkavagisha (fl. c. 1570),
Jagadisha Tarkalankara (fl. c. 1625), and Gadadhara Bhattacarya
(fl. c. 1650). (see also Navya-Nyaya)
By means of a new technique of analyzing
knowledge, judgmental knowledge can be analyzed into three kinds of
epistemological entities in their interrelations: "qualifiers" (prakara);
"qualificandum," or that which must be qualified (vishesya);
and "relatedness" (samsarga).
There also are corresponding abstract entities: qualifierness,
qualificandumness, and relatedness. The knowledge expressed by the judgment
"This is a blue pot" may then be analyzed into the following form:
"The knowledge that has a qualificandumness in what is denoted by 'this' is
conditioned by a qualifierness in blue and also conditioned by another
qualifierness in potness."
A central concept in the Navya-Nyaya
logical apparatus is that of "limiterness" (avacchedakata), which has many different uses. If a mountain
possesses fire in one region and not in another, it can be said, in the Navya-Nyaya
language, "The mountain, as limited by the region r,
possesses fire, but as limited by the region r'
possesses the absence of fire." The same mode of speech may be extended to
limitations of time, property, and relation, particularly when one is in need of
constructing a description that is intended to suit exactly some specific
situation and none other.
Inference is defined by Vatsayana
as the "posterior" knowledge of an object (e.g., fire) with the help of knowledge of its mark (e.g.,
smoke). For Navya-Nyaya, inference is definable as the knowledge
caused by the knowledge that the minor term (paksa,
"the hill") "possesses" the middle
term (hetu, "smoke"),
which is recognized as "pervaded by" the major (sadhya,
"fire"). The relation of invariable connection, or
"pervasion," between the middle (smoke) and the major
(fire)--"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire"--is called vyapti.
The logicians developed the notion of negation
to a great degree of sophistication. Apart from the efforts to specify a
negation with references to its limiting counterpositive (pratiyogi),
limiting relation, and limiting locus, they were constrained to discuss and
debate such typical issues as the following: Is one to recognize, as a
significant negation, the absence of a thing x
so that the limiter of the counterpositive x
is not x-ness but y-ness?
In other words, can one say that a jar is absent as a cloth even in a locus in
which it is present as a jar? Also, is the absence of an absence itself a new
absence or something positive? Furthermore, is the absence of colour in general
nothing but the sum total of the absences of the particular colours, or is it a
new kind of absence, a generic absence? Gangesha argued for the
latter alternative, though he answers the first of the above three questions in
the negative.
Though the philosophers of this school
did not directly write on metaphysics, they nevertheless did tend to introduce
many new kinds of abstract entities into their discourse. These entities are
generally epistemological, though sometimes they are relational. Chief of these
are entities called "qualifierness," "qualificandumness,"
and "limiterness." Various relations were introduced, such as direct
and indirect temporal relations, paryapti relation
(in which a number reside, in sets rather than in individual members of those
sets), svarupa relation (which holds,
for example, between an absence and its locus), and relation between a knowledge
and its object.
Among the Navya-Nyaya
philosophers, Raghunatha Shiromani in Padarthatattvanirupana undertook a bold revision of the traditional
categorial scheme by (1) identifying "time," "space," and
"ether" with God; (2) eliminating the category of mind by reducing it
to matter; (3) denying atoms (paramanu)
and dyadic (paired) combinations of them (dvyanuka),
(4) eliminating "number," "separateness,"
"remoteness," and "proximity" from the list of qualities;
and (5) rejecting ultimate particularities (vishesa)
on the grounds that it is more rational to suppose that the eternal substances
are by nature distinct. He added some new categories, however, such as causal
power (shakti) and the moment (ksana),
and recognized that there are as many instances of the relation of inherence as
there are cases of it (as contrasted with the older view that there is only one
inherence that is itself present in all cases of inherence).
There are three commentaries on the Samkhya-karika:
that by Raja, much referred to but not extant; that by Gaudapada
(7th century), on which there is a subcommentary Candrika by Narayanatirtha; and the Tattva-kaumudi
by Vacaspati (9th century). The Samkhya-sutras
are a much later work (c. 14th
century) on which Aniruddha (15th century) wrote
a (see also Yoga,
Samkhya, "Samkhya-sutra")
vrtti
and Vijñanabhiksu (16th
century) wrote the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya
("Commentary on the Samkhya Doctrine"). Among independent
works, mention may be made of Tattvasamasa
("Collection of Truths"; c. 11th
century).
The Yoga-sutras
were commented upon by Vyasa in his Vyasa-bhasya
(5th century), which again has two excellent subcommentaries: Vacaspati's
Tattvavaisharadi and Vijñanabhiksu's Yogavarttika,
besides the vrtti by Bhoja (c. 1000).
For Vacaspati, creation was
viewed in terms of the mere presence of the selves and the mere presentation to
them of Matter (the undifferentiated primeval stuff). Such a view has obvious
difficulties, for it would make creation eternal, because the selves and Matter
are eternally copresent. Vijñanabhiksu considered the
relation between the selves and Matter to be a real relation that affects Matter
but leaves the selves unaffected. Creation, in accordance with Bhiksu's
theism, is due to the influence of the chief self--i.e., God. Furthermore, whereas the earlier Samkhya authors,
including Vacaspati, did not consider the question about the ontological
status of the gunas,
Bhiksu regards them as real, as extremely subtle substances--so that each
guna is held to be infinite in number.
In general, the Samkhya-sutras show a
greater Brahmanical influence, and there is a clear tendency to explain away the
points of difference between the Samkhya and the Vedanta. The
author of the sutras tried to show
that the Samkhya doctrines are consistent with theism or even with the
Upanisadic conception of Brahman. Vijñanabhiksu made
use of such contexts to emphasize that the atheism of Samkhya is taught
only to discourage men to try to be God, that originally the Samkhya was
theistic, and that the original Vedanta also was theistic. The Upanisadic
doctrine of the unity of selves is interpreted by him to mean an absence of
difference of kind among selves, which is consistent with the Samkhya. Maya
(illusion) for Bhiksu means nothing but the prakrti
(Matter) of the Samkhya. The sutras
also give cosmic significance to mahat, the
first aspect to evolve from Matter, which then means cosmic Intelligence; a
sense not found in the karikas.
In epistemology the idea of reflection
of the spirit in the organs of knowing, particularly in the buddhi, or intelligence, comes to
the forefront. Every cognition ( jñana)
is a modification of the buddhi, with
consciousness reflected in it. Though this is Vacaspati's account, it
does not suffice according to Bhiksu. If there is the mere reflection of
the self in the state of the buddhi, this
can only account for the fact that the state of cognition seems to be a
conscious state; it cannot account for the fact that the self considers itself
to be the owner and experiencer of that state. Accounting for this latter fact,
Bhiksu postulated a real contact between the self and buddhi
as a reflection of the buddhi state
back in the self.
Vacaspati, taking over a notion
emphasized in Indian epistemology for the first time by Kumarila,
introduced into the Samkhya theory of knowledge a distinction between two
stages of perceptual knowledge. In the first, a stage of nonconceptualized (nirvikalpaka)
perception, the object of perception is apprehended vaguely and in a most
general manner. In the second stage, this vague knowledge (alocanamatram)
is then interpreted and conceptualized by the mind. The interpretation is not so
much synthesis as analysis of the vaguely presented totality into its parts.
Bhiksu, however, ascribed to the senses the ability to apprehend
determinate properties, even independently of the aid of manas. For Samkhya, in general, error is partial truth; there
is no negation of error, only supplementation, though later Samkhya
authors tended to ascribe error to wrong interpretation.
An important contribution to
epistemology was made by the writers on the Yoga: this concerns the key notion
of vikalpa,
which stands for mental states referring to pseudo-objects posited only by
words. Such mental states are neither "valid" nor "invalid"
and are said to be unavoidable accompaniments of one's use of language.
Because the self is not truly an agent
acting in the world, neither merit nor demerit, arising from one's actions,
attaches to the self. Morality has empirical significance. In the long run, what
really matters is knowledge. Nonattached performance of one's duties is an aid
toward purifying intelligence so that it may be conducive to the attainment of
knowledge: hence the importance of the restraints and observances laid down in
the Yoga-sutras. The greatest good is
freedom--i.e., aloofness (kaivalya)
from matter.
Though Patañjali's
yoga is known as Raja Yoga (that in which one attains to self-rule), Hatha
Yoga (hatha =
"violence," "violent effort": ha = "sun," tha
= "moon," hatha = "sun
and moon," breaths, or breaths travelling through the right and left
nostrils) emphasizes bodily postures, regulation of breathing, and cleansing
processes as means to spiritual perfection. A basic text on Hatha Yoga is
the Hatha-yoga-pradipika ("Light
on the Hatha Yoga"; c. 15th
century). As to the relation between the two yogas, a well-known maxim lays down
that "No raja without hatha,
and no hatha without raja."
The one religious consequence of the Samkhya-Yoga
is an emphasis on austere asceticism and a turning away from the ritualistic
elements of Hinduism deriving from the Brahmanical sources. Though they continue
to remain as an integral part of the Hindu faith, no major religious order
thrived on the basis of these philosophies.
No commentary on the Vedanta-sutras survives from the period before Shankara,
though both Shankara and Ramanuja referred to the vrttis
by Bodhayana and Upavarsa (the two may indeed be the same person).
There are, however, pre-Shankara monistic interpreters of the
scriptures, three of whom are important: Bhartrhari, Mandana (both
mentioned earlier), and Gaudapada. Shankara
referred to Gaudapada as the teacher of his own teacher Govinda,
complimented him for having recovered the advaita
(nondualism) doctrine from the Vedas, and also wrote a bhasya on Gaudapada's main work: the karikas
on Mandukya Upanisad.
Gaudapada's karikas
are divided into four parts: the first part is an explanation of the Upanisad
itself, the second part establishes the unreality of the world, the third
part defends the oneness of reality, and the fourth part, called Alatasanti
("Extinction of the Burning Coal"), deals with the state of
release from suffering. It is not accidental that Gaudapada used
as the title of the fourth part of his work a phrase in common usage among
Buddhist authors. His philosophical views show a considerable influence of Madhyamika
Buddhism, particularly of the Yogacara school, and one of his main
purposes probably was to demonstrate that the teachings of the Upanisads
are compatible with the main doctrines of the Buddhist idealists. Among his
principal philosophical theses were the following: All things are as unreal as
those seen in a dream, for waking experience and dream are on a par in this
regard. In reality, there is no production and no destruction. His criticisms of
the categories of change and causality are reminiscent of Nagarjuna's.
Duality is imposed on this one reality by maya,
or the power of illusion-producing ignorance. Because there is no real
coming into being, Gaudapada's philosophy is often called ajativada
("discourse on the unborn"). Though thus far agreeing with the
Buddhist Yogacarins, Gaudapada
rejected their thesis that citta,
or mind, is real and that there is a real
flow of mental conception.
Shankara
greatly moderated Gaudapada's extreme illusionistic theory. Though
he regarded the phenomenal world as a false appearance,
he never made use of the analogy of dream. Rather, he contrasted the objectivity
of the world with the subjectivity of dreams and hallucinations. The distinction
between the empirical and the illusory--both being opposed to the
transcendental--is central to his way of thinking.
Though Vedanta is frequently
referred to as one darshana (viewpoint),
there are, in fact, radically different schools of Vedanta; what binds
them together is common adherence to a common set of texts. These texts are the Upanisads,
the Vedanta-sutras,
and the Bhagavadgita--known
as the three prasthanas (the basic
scriptures, or texts) of the Vedanta. The founders of the various schools
of Vedanta have all substantiated their positions by commenting on these
three source books. The problems and issues around which their differences
centre are the nature of Brahman; the status of the phenomenal world; the
relation of finite individuals to the Brahman; and the nature and the means to moksa,
or liberation. The main schools are: Shankara's unqualified
nondualism (shuddhadvaita); Ramanuja's qualified nondualism (vishistadvaita),
Madhva's dualism (dvaita); Bhaskara's
doctrine of identity and difference (bhedabheda);
and the schools of Nimbarka and Vallabha, which
assert both identity and difference though with different emphasis on either of
the two aspects. From the religious point of view, Shankara
extolled metaphysical knowledge as the sole means to liberation and regarded
even the concept of God as false; Ramanuja recommended the path of
bhakti combined
with knowledge and showed a more tolerant attitude toward the tradition of Vedic
ritualism; and Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabha all propounded a
personalistic theism in which love and devotion to a personal God are rated
highest. Although Shankara's influence on Indian philosophy could
not be matched by these other schools of Vedanta, in actual religious
life the theistic Vedanta schools have exercised a much greater influence
than the abstract metaphysics of Shankara.
Shankara's
philosophy is one among a number of other nondualistic philosophies: Bhartrhari's
shabdadvaita, the Buddhist's vijñanadvaita,
and Gaudapada's ajativada.
Shankara's system may then be called atmadvaita--the
thesis that the one, universal, eternal, and self-illuminating self whose
essence is pure consciousness without a subject (ashraya) and without an object (visaya)
from a transcendental point of view alone is real. The phenomenal world and
finite individuals, though empirically real, are--from the higher point of
view--merely false appearances. In substantiating this thesis Shankara
relied as much on the interpretation of scriptural texts as on reasoning. He set
down a methodological principle that reason should be used only to justify
truths revealed in the scriptures. His own use of reasoning was primarily
negative; he showed great logical skill in refuting his opponents' theories. Shankara's
followers, however, supplied what is missed in his works--i.e., a positive rational support for his thesis.
Shankara's
metaphysics is based on a criterion of reality, which may be briefly formulated
as follows: the real is that whose negation is not possible. It is then argued
that the only thing that satisfies this criterion is consciousness, because
denial of consciousness presupposes the consciousness that denies. It is
conceivable that any object is not existent, but the absence of consciousness is
not conceivable. Negation may be either mutual negation (of difference) or
absence. The latter is either absence of a thing prior to its origination or
after its destruction or absence of a thing in a place other than where it is
present. If the negation of consciousness is not conceivable, then none of these
various kinds of negations can be predicated of consciousness. If difference
cannot be predicated of it, then consciousness is the only reality and anything
different from it would be unreal. If the other three kinds of absence are not
predicable of it, then consciousness should be beginningless, without end, and
ubiquitous. Consequently, it would be without change. Furthermore, consciousness
is self-intimating; all objects depend upon consciousness for their
manifestation. Difference may be either among members of the same class or of
one individual from another of a different class or among parts of one entity.
None of these is true of consciousness. In other words, there are not many
consciousnesses; the plurality of many centres of consciousness should be viewed
as an appearance. There is no reality other than consciousness--i.e.,
no real prakrti; such a thing
would only be an unreal other. Also, consciousness does not have internal parts;
there are not many conscious states. The distinction between consciousness of
blue and consciousness of yellow is not a distinction within consciousness but
one superimposed on it by a distinction among its objects, blue and yellow. With
this, the Samkhya, Vijñanavadin Buddhist, and Nyaya-Vaishesika
pluralism are refuted. Reality is one, infinite, eternal, and self-shining
spirit; it is without any determination, for all determination is negation.
The basic problem of Shankara's
philosophy is how such pure consciousness appears, in ordinary experience, to be
individualized ("my consciousness") and to be of an object
("consciousness of blue").
As he stated it, subject and object are as opposed to each other as light and
darkness, yet the properties of one are superimposed on the other. If something
is a fact of experience and yet ought not to be so--i.e., is rationally unintelligible--then this must be false.
According to Shankara's theory of error,
the false appearance is a positive, presented entity that is characterized
neither as existent (because it is sublated when the illusion is corrected) nor
as nonexistent (because it is presented, given as much as the real is). The
false, therefore, is indescribable either as being or as nonbeing, it is not a
fiction, such as a round square. Shankara thus introduced a new
category of the "false" apart from the usual categories of the
existent and the nonexistent. The world and finite individuals are false in this
sense: they are rationally unintelligible, their reality is not logically
deducible from Brahman, and their experience is cancelled with the knowledge of
Brahman. The world and finite selves are not creations of Brahman; they are not
real emanations or transformations of it. Brahman is not capable of such
transformation or emanation. They are appearances that are superimposed on
Brahman because of man's ignorance. This superimposition was sometimes called adhyasa
by Shankara and was often identified with avidya. Later writers referred to avidya as the cause of the error. Thus, ignorance came to be
regarded as a beginningless, positive something that conceals the nature of
reality and projects the false appearances on it. Shankara,
however, did distinguish between three senses of being: the merely illusory (pratibhasika),
the empirical (vyavaharika; which has
unperceived existence and pragmatic efficacy), and transcendental being of one,
indeterminate Brahman.
In his epistemology, Shankara's
followers in general accepted the point of view of the Mimamsa
of Kumarila's school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of
knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, nonperception, and
postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner
sense in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by
respective mental modifications. The truth of cognitions is regarded as
intrinsic to them, and a knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not
rejected as false. In perception a sort of identity is achieved between the form
of the object and the form of the inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said
to assume the form of the object. In their theory of inference, the Nyaya
five-membered syllogism is rejected in favour of a three-membered one.
Furthermore, the sort of inference admitted by the Nyaya, in which the
major term is universally present, is rejected, because nothing save Brahman has
this property according to the system.
Shankara
regarded moral life as a necessary preliminary to metaphysical knowledge and
thus laid down strict ethical conditions to be fulfilled by one who wants to
study Vedanta. For him, however, the highest goal of life is to know the
essential identity of his own self with Brahman, and though moral life may
indirectly help in purifying the mind and intellect, over an extended period of
time knowledge comes from following the long and arduous process whose three
major stages are study of the scriptures under appropriate conditions,
reflection aimed at removing all possible intellectual doubts about the
nondualistic thesis, and meditation on the identity of atman and Brahman. Moksa is
not, according to Shankara, a perfection to be achieved; it is
rather the essential reality of one's own self to be realized through
destruction of the ignorance that conceals it. God is how Brahman appears to an
ignorant mind that regards the world as real and looks for its creator and
ruler. Religious life is sustained by dualistic concepts: the dualism between
man and God, between virtue and vice, and between this life and the next. In the
state of moksa, these dualisms are
transcended. An important part of Shankara's faith was that moksa
was possible in bodily existence. Because what brings this supreme state is
the destruction of ignorance, nothing need happen to the body; it is merely seen
for what it really is--an illusory limitation on the spirit.
Shankara's
chief direct pupils were Sureshvara, the author of Varttika ("Gloss") on his bhasya and of Naiskarmya-siddhi
("Establishment of the State of Non-Action"), and Padmapada,
author of Pañcapadika, a
commentary on the first five padas, or
sections, of the bhasya. These early
pupils raised and settled issues that were not systematically discussed by Shankara
himself--issues that later divided his followers into two large groups: those
who followed the Vivarana (a work
written on Padmapada's Pañcapadika
by one Prakashatman in the 12th century) and those who followed Vacaspati's
commentary (known as Bhamati) on Shankara's bhasya. Among the chief issues that divided Shankara's
followers was the question about the locus and object of ignorance. The Bhamati
school regarded the individual self as the locus of ignorance and sought to
avoid the consequent circularity (arising from the fact that the individual self
is itself a product of ignorance) by postulating a beginningless series of such
selves and their ignorances. The Vivarana school
regarded both the locus and the object of ignorance to be Brahman and sought to
avoid the contradiction (arising from the fact that Brahman is said to be of the
nature of knowledge) by distinguishing between pure consciousness and valid
knowledge (pramajñana). The
latter, a mental modification, destroys ignorance, and the former, far from
being opposed to ignorance, manifests ignorance itself, as evidenced by the
judgment "I am ignorant." The two schools also differed in their
explanations of the finite individual. The Bhamati
school regarded the individual as a limitation of Brahman just as the space
within the four walls of a room is a limitation of the big space. The Vivarana school preferred to regard the finite individual as a
reflection of Brahman in the inner sense. As the moon is one, but its
reflections are many, so also Brahman is one, but its reflections are many.
Later followers of Shankara, such as Shriharsa
in his Khandanakhandakhadya and his
commentator Citsukha, used a destructive, negative dialectic in the manner of Nagarjuna
to criticize man's basic concepts about the world.
The philosophies of transcendence and immanence (bhedabheda)
assert both identity and difference between the world and finite individuals, on
the one hand, and Brahman, on the other. The world and finite individuals are
real and yet both different and not different from the Brahman.
Among pre-Shankara
commentators on the Vedanta-sutras,
Bhartrprapañca defended the thesis of bhedabheda, and Bhaskara (c.
9th century) closely followed him. Bhartrprapañca's commentary
is not extant; the only known source of knowledge is Shankara's
reference to him in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad, in which Bhartrprapañca is said to have held that
though Brahman as cause is different from Brahman as effect, the two are
identical inasmuch as the effect dissolves into the cause, as the waves return
into the sea. Bhaskara viewed Brahman as both the material and the
efficient cause of the world. The doctrine of maya
was totally rejected. Brahman undergoes the modifications by his own power.
As waves are both different from and identical with the sea, so are the world
and the finite individuals in relation to Brahman. The finite selves are parts
of Brahman, as sparks of fire are parts of fire. But the finite soul exists,
since beginningless time, under the influence of ignorance. It is atomic in
extension and yet animates the whole body. Corresponding to the material world
and the finite selves, Bhaskara ascribed to God two powers of
self-modification. Bhaskara, in his theory of knowledge, distinguished
between self-consciousness that is ever-present
and objective knowledge that passively arises out of appropriate causal
conditions but is not an activity. Mind, thus, is a sense organ. Bhaskara
subscribed to the general Vedanta thesis that knowledge is intrinsically
true, though falsity is extrinsic to it. In his ethical views, Bhaskara
regarded religious duties as binding at all stages of life. He upheld a theory
known as jñana-karmasamuccaya-vada:
performance of duties together with knowledge of Brahman leads to
liberation. In religious life, Bhaskara was an advocate of bhakti,
but bhakti is not a mere feeling
of love or affection for God, but rather is dhyana,
or meditation, directed toward the transcendent Brahman who is not exhausted
in his manifestations. Bhaskara denied the possibility of liberation in
bodily existence.
The bhedabheda
point of view had various other adherents: Vijñanabhiksu,
Nimbarka, Vallabha, and Caitanya.
Ramanuja (11th century)
sought to synthesize a long tradition of theistic religion with the absolutistic
monism of the Upanisads, a task in
which he had been preceded by no less an authority than the Bhagavadgita.
In his general philosophical position, he followed the vrttikara
Bodhayana, the Vakyakara (to whom he referred but whose
identity is not established except that he advocated a theory of real
modification of Brahman), Nathamuni (c.
1000), and his own teachers' teacher Yamunacarya (c.
1050).
The main religious inspirations are from
the theistic tradition of the Alvar poet-saints
and their commentators known as the Acaryas, who sought to combine
knowledge with action (karma) as the
right means to liberation. There is also, besides the Vedic tradition, the
religious tradition of Agamas,
particularly of the Pañcaratra literature. It is within
this old tradition that Ramanuja's philosophical and religious
thought developed.
Ramanuja rejected Shankara's
conception of Brahman as an indeterminate, qualityless, and differenceless
reality on the ground that such a reality cannot be perceived, known, thought
of, or even spoken about, in which case it is nothing short of a fiction. In
substantiating this contention, Ramanuja undertook, in his Shri-bhasya
on the Vedanta-sutras, a detailed examination of the different ways of
knowing. Perception, either nonconceptualized or conceptualized, always
apprehends its object as being something, the only difference between the two
modes of perception being that the former takes place when one perceives an
individual of a certain class for the first time and thus does not subsume it
under the same class as some other individuals. Nor can inference provide one
with knowledge of an indeterminate reality, because in inference one always
knows something as coming under a general rule. The same holds true of verbal
testimony. This kind of knowledge arises from understanding sentences. For Ramanuja
there is nothing like a pure consciousness without subject and without object.
All consciousness is of something and belongs to someone. He also held that it
is not true that consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness. In
fact, one's own past consciousness becomes the object of present consciousness.
Consciousness is self-shining only when it reveals an object to its own owner--i.e.,
the self.
Rejecting Shankara's
conception of reality, Ramanuja defended the thesis that Brahman
is a being with infinitely perfect excellent virtues, a being whose perfection
cannot be exceeded. The world and finite individuals are real, and together they
constitute the body of Brahman. The category of body and soul is central to his
way of thinking. Body is that which can be controlled and moved for the purpose
of the spirit. The material world and the conscious spirits, though substantive
realities, are yet inseparable from Brahman and thus qualify him in the same
sense in which body qualifies the soul. Brahman is spiritual-material-qualified.
Ramanuja and his followers undertook criticisms of Shankara's
illusionism, particularly of his doctrine of avidya
(ignorance) and the falsity of the world. For Ramanuja, such a
beginningless, positive avidya could
not have any locus or any object, and if it does conceal the self-shining
Brahman, then there would be no way of escaping from its clutches.
A most striking feature of Ramanuja's
epistemology is his uncompromising realism. Whatever is known is real, and only
the real can be known. This led him to advocate the thesis that even the object
of error is real--error is really incomplete knowledge--and correction of error
is really completion of incomplete knowledge.
The state of moksa is not a state in which the
individuality is negated. In fact, the sense of "I" persists even
after liberation, for the self is truly the object of the notion of
"I." What is destroyed is egoism, the false sense of independence. The
means thereto is bhakti, leading to
God's grace. But by bhakti Ramanuja means dhyana, or intense meditation with
love. Obligation to perform one's scriptural duties is never transcended.
Liberation is a state of blessedness in the company of God. A path emphasized by
Ramanuja for all persons is complete self-surrender (prapatti)
to God's will and making oneself worthy of his grace. In his social outlook, Ramanuja
believed that bhakti does not
recognize barriers of caste and classes.
The doctrinal differences among the
followers of Ramanuja is not so great as among Shankara's.
Writers such as Sudarshana Suri and Venkatanatha
continued to elaborate and defend the theses of the master, and much of their
writing is polemical. Some differences are to be found regarding the nature of
emancipation, the nature of devotion, and other ritual matters. The followers
are divided into two schools: the Uttara-kalarya,
led by Venkatanatha, and the Daksina-kalarya,
led by Lokacarya. One of the points at issue is whether or not
emancipation is destructible; another, whether there is a difference between
liberation attained by mere self-knowledge and that attained by knowledge of
God. There also were differences in interpreting the exact nature of
self-surrender to God and the degree of passivity or activity required of the
worshipper.
Madhva (born 1199?) belonged to the
tradition of Vaisnava religious faith and showed a great polemical spirit
in refuting Shankara's philosophy and in converting people to his
own fold. An uncompromising dualist, he traced back dualistic thought even to
some of the Upanisads. His main works
are his commentaries on the Upanisads,
the Gita, and the Vedanta-sutras.
He also wrote a commentary on the Mahabharata
and several logical and polemical treatises. (see also dualism)
He glorified difference. Five types of
differences are central to Madhva's system: difference between soul and God,
between soul and soul, between soul and matter, between God and matter, and that
between matter and matter. Brahman is the fullness of qualities, and by his own
intrinsic nature, Brahman produces the world. The individual, otherwise free, is
dependent only upon God. The Advaita concepts of falsity and indescribability of
the world were severely criticized and rejected. In his epistemology, Madhva
admitted three ways of knowing: perception, inference,
and verbal testimony. In Madhva's system the existence of God cannot be proved;
it can be learned only from the scriptures.
Bondage and release both are real and
devotion is the only way to release, but ultimately it is God's grace that
saves. Scriptural duties, when performed without any ulterior motive, purify the
mind and help one to receive God's grace.
Among the other theistic schools of Vedanta,
brief mention may be made of the schools of Nimbarka
(c. 12th century), Vallabha
(15th century), and Caitanya (16th century).
Nimbarka's philosophy is known as
Bhedabheda because he emphasized both identity and difference of the
world and finite souls with Brahman. His religious sect is known as the
Sanaka-sampradaya of Vaisnavism. Nimbarka's commentary of
the Vedanta-sutras is known as Vedanta-parijata-saurabha
and is commented on by Shrinivasa in his Vedanta-kaustubha. Of the three realities admitted--God, souls, and
matter--God is the independent reality, self-conscious, controller of the other
two, free from all defects, abode of all good qualities, and both the material
and efficient cause of the world. The souls are dependent, self-conscious,
capable of enjoyment, controlled, atomic in size, many in number, and eternal
but seemingly subject to birth and death because of ignorance and karma.
Matter is of three kinds: nonnatural matter, which constitutes divine body;
natural matter constituted by the three gunas;
and time. Both souls and matter are pervaded by God. Their relation is one of
difference-with-nondifference. Liberation is because of a knowledge that makes
God's grace possible. There is no need for Vedic duties after knowledge is
attained, nor is performance of such duties necessary for acquiring knowledge.
Vallabha's commentary on the Vedanta-sutras
is known as Anubhasya ("The Brief
Commentary"), which is commented upon by Purusottama in his Bhasya-prakasha
("Lights on the Commentary"). His philosophy is called pure
nondualism--"pure" meaning "undefiled by maya."
His religious sect is known as the Rudra-sampradaya of
Vaisnavism and also Pustimarga, or the path of grace.
Brahman, or Shri Krishna, is viewed as the only independent
reality; in his essence he is existence, consciousness, and bliss, and souls and
matter are his real manifestations. Maya is
but his power of self-manifestation. Vallabha admitted neither parinama
(of Samkhya) nor vivarta (of
Shankara). According to him, the modifications are such that they
leave Brahman unaffected. From his aspect of "existence" spring life,
senses, and body. From "consciousness" spring the finite, atomic
souls. From "bliss" spring the presiding deities, or antaryamins, for whom Vallabha finds place on his ontology. This
threefold nature of God pervades all beings. World is real; but samsara,
the cycle of birth and death, is unreal, and time is regarded as God's power
of action. Like all other Vedantins, Vallabha rejected the Vaishesika
relation of samavaya and replaced it by tadatmya,
or identity. The means to liberation is bhakti,
which is defined as firm affection for God and also loving service (seva).
Bhakti does not lead to knowledge, but knowledge is regarded as a
part of bhakti. The notion of
"grace" plays an important role in Vallabha's religious thought. He is
also opposed to renunciation.
Caitanya (1485-1533) was one of the most
influential and remarkable of the medieval saints of India. His life is
characterized by almost unique emotional fervour, hovering on the pathological,
which was directed toward Shri Krishna (the incarnation of
Vishnu). He has not written anything, but the discourses recorded by
contemporaries give an idea of his philosophical thought that was later
developed by his followers, particularly by Rupa Gosvamin and Jiva
Gosvamin. Rupa is the author of two great works: Bhakti-rasamrta-sindhu
("The Ocean of the Nectar of the Essence of Bhakti") and Ujjvalanilamani ("The Shining Blue Jewel"). Jiva's
main work is the great and voluminous Satsamdarbha.
These are the main sources of the philosophy of Bengal Vaisnavism.
Caitanya rejected the conception of an intermediate Brahman. Brahman, according
to him, has three powers: the transcendent power that is threefold (the power of
bliss, the power of being, and the power of consciousness) and the two immanent
powers, namely, the powers of creating souls and the material world. Jiva
Gosvamin regarded bliss to be the very substance of Brahman who, with the
totality of all his powers, is called God. Jiva distinguished between
God's essential power, his peripheral power that creates the souls, and the
external power (called maya) that
creates cosmic forms. The relation between God and his powers is neither
identity nor difference, nor identity-with-difference. This relation,
unthinkable and suprarational, is central to Caitanya's philosophy. For Jiva,
the relation between any whole and its parts is unthinkable. Bhakti
is the means to emancipation. Bhakti is
conceived as a reciprocal relation between man and God, a manifestation of God's
power in man. The works of Jiva and Rupa delineated a detailed and
fairly exhaustive classification of the types and gradations of bhakti.
The main philosophers of the medieval
Vaisnavism have been noted above. Vaisnavism, however, has a long
history, traceable to the Vishnu worship of the Rigveda, the Bhakti conception
of the epics, and the Vasudeva cult of the
pre-Christian era. Of the two main Vaisnava scriptures, or agamas,
the Pañcaratra ("Relating to the
Period of Five Nights") and the Vaikhanasa ("Relating to a
Hermit or Ascetic") are the most important. Though Vaisnava
philosophers trace the Pañcaratra works to Vedic origin,
absolutists such as Shankara refused to acknowledge this claim.
The main topics of the Pañcaratra literature concern
rituals and forms of image worship and religious practices of the Vaisnavas.
Of philosophical importance are the Ahirbudhnya-samhita
("Collection of Verses for Shiva") and Jayakhya-samhita
("Collection of Verses Called Jaya"). The most well-known Pañcaratra
doctrine concerns the four spiritual forms of God: the absolute, transcendent
state, known as Vasudeva; the form in which knowledge and strength
predominate (known as Samkarsana); the form in which wealth and
courage predominate (known as Pradyumna); and the form in which power and energy
predominate (known as Aniruddha). Shankara
identified Samkarsana with the individual soul, Pradyumna with
mind, and Aniruddha with the ego sense. Furthermore, five powers of God are
distinguished: creation, maintenance, destruction, favour, and disfavour. Bhakti
is regarded as affection for God and associated with a sense of his majesty.
The doctrine of prapatti, or complete
self-surrender, is emphasized. (see also "Vaikhanasa Samhita")
The Shaiva schools are the
philosophical systems within the fold of Shaivism, a religious sect that
worships Shiva as the highest deity. There is a
long tradition of Shiva worship going back to the Rudra hymns of the
Rigveda, the Shiva-Rudra of the Vajasaneyi-Samhita,
the Atharvaveda, and the Brahmanas. Madhava
in his Sarva-darshana-samgraha referred
to three Shaiva systems: the Nakulisha-Pashupata, the Shaiva,
and the Pratyabhijña systems. The Shaiva system of Madhava's
classification probably corresponds to Shaiva-siddhanta
of Tamil country, and the Pratyabhijña is known as Kashmir
Shaivism. The Shaiva-siddhanta is realistic and dualistic;
the Kashmir system is idealistic and monistic. (see also Shaivism,
Pashupata)
The source literature of the Shaiva-siddhanta
school consists of the Agamas,
Tamil devotional hymns written by Shaiva saints but collected by
Nambi (c. AD 1000) in a volume known
as Tirumurai, Civa-ñana-potam ("Understanding
of the Knowledge of Shiva") by Meykantatevar (13th
century), Shivacarya's Shiva-jñana-siddhiyar ("Attainment of the Knowledge of Shiva"),
Umapati's Shivaprakasham ("Lights
on Shiva") in the 14th century, Shrikantha's
commentary on the Vedanta-sutras (14th
century), and Appaya Diksita's commentary thereon. This school
admits three categories (padarthas):
God (Shiva or Pati, Lord), soul (pashu),
and the bonds (pasha), and the 36
principles (tattvas). These 36 are
divided into three groups: at the top, in order of manifestation from Shiva,
are the five pure principles--shivatattva (the
essence of Shiva), shakti (power),
sada-shiva (the eternal good), ishivara
(lord), and shuddha-vidya (true
knowledge); seven mixed principles--pure maya,
five envelopes (destiny, time, interest, knowledge, and power), and purusa,
or self; and 24 impure principles beginning with prakrti
(this list is broadly the same as that of Samkhya). Shiva is
the first cause: his shakti, or power,
is the instrumental cause, maya the
material cause. This maya-shakti is
not God's essential power but is assumed by him; it is parigraha-shakti ("Assumed Power"). The relation of Shiva
to his essential power is one of identity. Bonds are of three kinds: karma,
maya, and avidya. The world and souls are real, and emancipation requires the
grace of Shiva. The Shaiva-siddhanta always insisted on the
preservation of the individuality of the finite soul, even in the state of
emancipation, and rejected Shankara's nondualism. Appaya Diksita's
commentary shows the tendency to attempt a reconciliation between the Agama
tradition of realism and pluralism with the Advaita tradition. The soul is
eternal and all-pervasive, but, owing to original ignorance, it is reduced to
the condition of anava, which consists
in regarding oneself as finite and atomic. Knowledge of its own nature as well
as God's is possible only by God's grace.
The source literature of this school
consists in the Shiva-sutra, Vasugupta's
Spanda-karika ("Verses on
Creation"; 8th-9th centuries), Utpala's Pratyabhijña-sutra ("Aphorisms on Recognition"; c.
900), Abhinavagupta's Paramarthasara
("The Essence of the Highest Truth"), Pratyabhijña-vimarshini
("Reflections on Recognition"), and Tantraloka ("Lights on the Doctrine") in the 10th century,
and Ksemaraja's Shiva-sutra-vimarshini
("Reflections on the Aphorisms on Shiva"). As contrasted
with the Shaiva-siddhanta, this school is idealist and monist,
and, although it accepts all the 36 tattvas
and the three padarthas, it is Shiva,
the Lord, who is the sole reality. God is viewed as both the material and
efficient cause of the universe. Five aspects of God's power are distinguished:
consciousness (cit), bliss (ananda),
desire (iccha), knowledge (jñana),
and action (kriya). Shiva is
one--without a second, infinite spirit. He has a transcendent aspect and an
immanent aspect, and his power with its
fivefold functions constitutes his immanent aspect. The individual soul of a
person is identical with Shiva; recognition of this identity is essential
to liberation.
Jainism,
founded in about the 6th century BC by Vardhamana Mahavira,
the 24th in a succession of religious leaders known as Jinas (Conquerors),
rejects the idea of God as the creator of the world but teaches the
perfectibility of man, to be accomplished through the strictly moral and ascetic
life. Central to the moral code of Jainism is the doctrine of ahimsa,
or noninjury to all living beings, an idea that may have arisen in reaction to
Vedic sacrifice ritual. There is also a great emphasis on vows (vratas)
of various orders. (see also ahimsa,
or ahimsa)
Although earlier scriptures, such as the
Bhagavati-sutra, contained assorted
ideas on logic and epistemology, Kundakunda of
the 2nd century AD was the first to develop Jaina logic. The Tattvarthadhigama-sutra
of Umasvatis, however, is the first systematic work, and Siddhasena (7th
century AD) the first great logician. Other important figures are Akalanka (8th
century), Manikyanandi, Vadideva, Hemchandra (12th century), Prabhachandra
(11th century), and Yasovijaya (17th century).
The principal ingredients of Jaina
metaphysics are: an ultimate distinction between "living substance" or
"soul" ( jiva) and
"nonliving substance" (ajiva);
the doctrine of anekantavada,
or nonabsolutism (the thesis that things have infinite aspects that no
determination can exhaust); the doctrine of naya
(the thesis that there are many partial perspectives from which reality can be
determined, none of which is, taken by itself, wholly true, but each of which is
partially so); and the doctrine of karma,
in Jainism a substance, rather than a process, that links all phenomena in a
chain of cause and effect.
As a consequence of their metaphysical
liberalism, the Jaina logicians developed a unique theory of seven-valued logic,
according to which the three primary truth values are "true,"
"false," and "indefinite," and the other four values are
"true and false," "true and indefinite," "false and
indefinite," and "true, false, and indefinite." Every statement
is regarded as having these seven values, considered from different standpoints.
(see also many-valued
logic)
Knowledge is defined as that which
reveals both itself and another (svaparabhasi).
It is eternal, as an essential quality of the self; it is noneternal, as the
perishable empirical knowledge. Whereas most Hindu epistemologists regarded pramana
as the cause of knowledge, the Jainas identified pramana
with valid knowledge. Knowledge is either
perceptual or nonperceptual. Perception is either empirical or nonempirical.
Empirical perception is either sensuous or
nonsensuous. The latter arises directly in the self, not through the sense
organs, but only when the covering ignorance is removed. With the complete
extinction of all karmas, a person
attains omniscience (kevala-jñana).
(See also JAINISM .)
Reference has been made earlier to the Sufi
(Islamic mystics), who found a resemblance between the ontological monism
of Ibn al-'Arabi and that of Vedanta. The Shattari order
among the Indian Sufis practiced Yogic austerities and even
physical postures. Various minor syncretistic religious sects attempted to
harmonize Hindu and Muslim religious traditions at different levels and with
varying degrees of success. Of these, the most famous are Ramananda,
Kabir, and Guru Nanak. Kabir
harmonized the two religions in such a manner that, to an enquiry about whether
he was a Hindu or a Muslim, the answer given by a contemporary was "It is a
secret difficult to comprehend. One should try to understand." Guru Nanak
rejected the authority of both Hindu and Muslim scriptures alike and founded his
religion (Sikhism) on a rigorously moralistic, monotheistic basis. (see also Mughal
dynasty, Shattariyah)
Among the great Mughals, Akbar
attempted, in 1581, to promulgate a new religion, Din-e
Ilahi, which was to be based on reason and ethical teachings common to
all religions and which was to be free from priestcraft. This effort, however,
was short-lived, and a reaction of Muslim orthodoxy was led by Shaykh
Ahmed Sirhindi, who rejected ontological monism in favour of
orthodox unitarianism and sought to channel mystical enthusiasm along Qur`anic
(Islamic scriptural) lines. By the middle of the 17th century, the tragic
figure of Dara Shikoh, the Mughal emperor Shah
Jahan's son and disciple of the Qadiri sufis, translated
Hindu scriptures, such as the Bhagavadgita and the Upanisads,
into Persian and in his translation of the latter closely followed Shankara's
commentaries. In his Majma' al-bahrayn he
worked out correlations between Sufi and Upanisadic
cosmologies, beliefs, and practices. During this time, the Muslim elite of India
virtually identified Vedanta with Sufism. Later, Shah
Wali Allah's son, Shah 'Abd-ul-'Aziz, regarded
Krishna among the awliya` (saints).
In the 19th century, India was not
marked by any noteworthy philosophical achievements, but the period was one of
great social and religious reform movements. The newly founded universities
introduced Indian intellectuals to Western thought, particularly to the
empiricistic, utilitarian, and agnostic philosophies in England, and John Stuart
Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and Herbert Spencer had become the most influential
thinkers in the Indian universities by the end of the century. These
Western-oriented ideas served to generate a secular and rational point of view
and stimulated social and religious movements, most noteworthy among them being
the Brahmo (Brahma) Samaj movement founded by Rammohan Ray. Toward the later
decades of the century, the great saint Ramakrishna
Paramahamsa of Calcutta renewed interest in mysticism, and many young
rationalists and skeptics were converted into the faith exemplified in his
person. Ramakrishna taught, among other things, an essential diversity of
religious paths leading to the same goal, and this teaching was given an
intellectual form by Swami Vivekananda, his famed disciple.
The first Indian graduate school in
philosophy was founded in the University of Calcutta during the first decades of
the 20th century, and the first incumbent of the chair of philosophy was Sir
Brajendranath Seal, a versatile scholar in many branches of learning, both
scientific and humanistic. Seal's major published work is The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, which, besides being a
work on the history of science, shows interrelations among the ancient Hindu
philosophical concepts and their scientific theories. Soon, however, the German
philosophers Kant and Hegel came to be the most studied philosophers in the
Indian universities. The ancient systems of philosophy came to be interpreted in
the light of German idealism. The Hegelian
notion of Absolute Spirit found a resonance in
the age-old Vedanta notion of Brahman. The most eminent Indian Hegelian
scholar is Hiralal Haldar, who was concerned with the problem of the relation of
the human personality with the Absolute, as is evidenced by his book Neo-Hegelianism.
The most eminent Kantian scholar is K.C.
Bhattacharyya. (see also Hegelianism)
Among those who deserve mention for
their original contributions to philosophical thinking are Sri Aurobindo
(died 1950), Mahatma Gandhi (died 1948), Rabindranath
Tagore (died 1941), Sir Muhammed Iqbal
(died 1938), K.C. Bhattacharyya (died 1949), and Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan (died 1975). Of these, Sri Aurobindo was first a political
activist and then a yogin, Tagore and
Iqbal poets, Gandhi a political and social leader, and only Radhakrishnan
and Bhattacharyya university professors. This fact throws some light on the
state of Indian philosophy in this century.
In his major work, The Life Divine, Sri Aurobindo
starts from the fact of human aspiration for a kingdom of heaven on earth and
proceeds to give a theoretical framework in which such an aspiration would be
not a figment of imagination but a drive in nature, working through man toward a
higher stage of perfection. Both the denial of the materialist and that of the
ascetic are rejected as being one-sided. The gulf between unconscious matter and
fully self-conscious spirit is sought to be bridged by exhibiting them as two
poles of a series in which spirit continuously manifests itself. The Vedantic
concept of a transcendent and all-inclusive Brahman
is sought to be harmonized with a theory of emergent evolution. Illusionism is
totally rejected. The purpose of man is to go beyond his present form of
consciousness. Yoga is interpreted as a technique not for personal liberation
but for cooperating with the cosmic evolutionary urge that is destined to take
mankind ahead from the present mental stage to a higher, supramental stage of
consciousness. A theory of history, in accordance with this point of view, is
worked out in his The Human Cycle.
Rabindranath Tagore's philosophical
thinking is no less based on the Upanisads,
but his interpretation of the Upanisads
is closer to Vaisnava theism and the Bhakti cults than to traditional
monism. He characterized the absolute as supreme person and placed love higher
than knowledge. In his Religion of Man, Tagore
sought to give a philosophy of man in which human nature is characterized by a
concept of surplus energy that finds expression in creative art. In his lectures
on Nationalism, Tagore placed the
concept of society above that of the modern nation-state.
Mahatma Gandhi preferred to say that the
truth is God rather than God is the truth, because the former proposition
expresses a belief that even the atheists share. The belief in the presence of
an all-pervading spirit in the universe led Gandhi to a strict formulation of
the ethics of nonviolence (ahimsa).
But he gave this age-old ethical principle a wealth of meaning so that ahimsa
for him became at once a potent means of collective struggle against social and
economic injustice, the basis of a decentralized economy and decentralized power
structure, and the guiding principle of one's individual life in relation both
to nature and to other persons. The unity of existence, which he called the
truth, can be realized through the practice of ahimsa,
which requires reducing oneself to zero and reaching the furthest limit of
humility. (see also ahimsa,
or ahimsa)
Influenced by the British philosopher
J.M.E. McTaggart's form of Hegelian idealism and the French philosopher Henri
Bergson's philosophy of change, Muhammed Iqbal conceived reality
as creative and essentially spiritual, consisting of egos. "The truth,
however, is that matter is spirit," he wrote,
in space-time reference. The unity
called man is body when we look at it as acting in regard to what we call
external world; it is mind or soul when we look at it as acting in regard to the
ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.
Influenced by British Neo-Hegelianism in
his interpretation of the Vedantic tradition, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
was primarily an interpreter of Indian thought to the Western world. He defended
a realistic interpretation of the concept of maya--thereby playing down its
illusionistic connotation, a theory of intuition as the means of knowing
reality, and a theory of emergent evolution of spirit (not unlike Sri Aurobindo,
but without his doctrine of supermind) in nature and history. The most original
among modern Indian thinkers, however, is K.C. Bhattacharyya, who rejected the
conception of philosophy as a construction of a worldview and undertook a
phenomenological description of the various grades of subjectivity: (1) the
bodily, (2) the psychic, and (3) the spiritual. With regard to (1), he
distinguished between the objective body and the felt body and regarded the
latter as the most primitive level of the subjective sense of freedom from the
objective world. The stage (2) includes the range of mental life from image to
free thought. In introspection, the level (2) is transcended, but various levels
of introspection are distinguished, all leading to greater freedom from
objectivity. It would seem, however, that for Bhattacharyya absolute freedom
from objectivity was a spiritual demand. According to his theory
of value, value is not an adjective of the object but a feeling absolute,
of which the object evaluated appears as an adjective, and his logic of
alternation is a modern working out of the Jaina theories of anekanta
(non-absolutism) and syadvada (doctrine
of "may be").
Among later philosophers, N.V. Banerjee
(1901-81) and Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1911-84), the son of K.C. Bhattacharyya,
have made important contributions. In Language,
Meaning and Persons (1963), Banerjee examines the development of personhood
from a stage of individualized bondage to liberation in a collective identity, a
life-with-others. This liberation, according to Banerjee, also entails an
awareness of time and freedom from spatialized objects.
In his earlier writings such as Object,
Content and Relation (1951) and Alternative
Standpoints in Philosophy (1953), Bhattacharyya developed his father's idea
of theoretically undecidable alternatives in philosophy. In the later works Philosophy, Logic and Language (1965) and Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy (1974), he developed the
concept of metaphysics as a science of the nonempirical a priori essences that
are initially discerned as the structure of the empirical but are subsequently
recognized as autonomous entities. The method of metaphysics for him is
reflection, phenomenological and transcendental. Kalidas Bhattacharyya was
concerned with the nature and function of philosophical reflection and its
relation of unreflective experience. What reflection brings to light, he held,
is present in pre-reflective experience, but only as undistinguished and fused,
in a state of objective implicitness. The essences as such are not real but
demand realization in pure reflective consciousness. At the same time, he
emphasized the limitations of any doctrine positing the constitution of nature
in consciousness. Such a doctrine, he insisted,
cannot be carried out in details.
Among those who apply the
phenomenological method and concepts to understanding the traditional Indian
philosophies, D. Sinha, R.K. Sinari, and J.N. Mohanty are especially noteworthy.
Others who interpret the Indian philosophies by means of the methods and
concepts of analytical philosophy include B.K. Matilal and G. Misra. In the
field of philosophy of logic, P.K. Sen has worked on the paradoxes of
confirmation and the concept of quantification, and Sibajiban on the liar
paradox and on epistemic logic. Sibajiban and Matilal have made important
contributions toward rendering the concepts of Navya-Nyaya logic into the
language of modern logic. In ethics and social philosophy, notable work has been
done by Abu Sayyid Ayub, Daya Krishna, Rajendra Prasad, and D.P. Chattopadhyaya.
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